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The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze in
detail the many aspects of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship as
it developed from 1953 to 1970. The relationship between the
two is extremely important because it provides insight into
the roles of both Egypt aand the Soviet Union in both the
history of the Middle East and in world politics.

The period

from 1953 to 1970 is key in understanding the relationship
between the two states because it is the period of the genesis
of the relationship and a period in which both nations went
through marked changes in both internal policy and their
external relations.
Data used in this study varies widely.

It includes

material from sources as diverse as diplomatic memoirs, press

accounts in both English and Russian, statistical collections
of both a military and an economic nature, and chronicles of
cultural interaction.

These sources were consulted in various

research libraries throughout the United States.
On the basis of the available sources it is possible to
state that Egypt and the Soviet Union developed a broad
relationship that included integration in the military,
economic aid and trade, diplomatic cooperation, and cultural
exchange.

Both derived important but distinct benefits from

their friendship.

This study attempts to show what those

benefits were, how the friendship developed, and why it
developed as it did.
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CHAPTER I
THE QUIET NILE
Historically there has been relatively little contact
between Russia and Egypt.

The period following the military

coup in Egypt in 1952 and continuing until the death of
Gamel Abdel Nasser in 1970 is an exception to this general
rule.

This interlude was a time of comparatively feverish

interaction between the Soviet government in Russia and the
Arab Socialist Union government of Nasser in Egypt.

Re-

lations on all levels between the two countries were tremendously broadened.

An intimate diplomatic relationship

developed that bound the fortunes of the United Arab
Republic (Egypt) and the Soviet Union tightly together.
Economic interaction increased to such an extent that the
total commerce between the two nations was multiplied by a
factor of more than twenty between 1951 and 1970.

Soviet

imports from Egypt increased by almost 4500 percent during
that same period.

Exports showed a somewhat slower rate of

increase but still rose from 21.8 million rubles in 1951
1

to 326.9 million rubles in 1970.

Cultural contacts between

the two nations also became frequent during this period.
Interaction in the cultural sphere ranged from contact
between the Islamic elements in Soviet Central Asia and
the Egyptian clergy to the exchange of films and cultural

2

centers.

Even a cursory glimpse at the increased contact

between the Soviet Union and Egypt shows how dramatic the
change in relationship between the two was.

The extremity

of this change makes the relationship between the Egyptians
and the Soviets an important target for an investigation
into its new nature in order to try to discover the factors
that precipitated it and to try to fathom its full extent.
There are many plausible reasons for the Soviet Union
to be interested in developing a closer relationship with
Egypt.

These range from Egypt's strategic importance to its

cultural prominence - especially in the Arab world.

Many of

the factors that kindled Soviet interest in Egypt during
this period were age old.

Others developed from the growing

conflict for power and influence between the Soviets and the
United States that was going on at the time.
The location of Egypt is of major import in any discussions of its influence in world affairs. Egypt is the
2
geographic center of the Arab world; to the west and south
of Egypt are located the Arab-speaking nations of Africa:
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the Sudan and Tunisia;
to the north and east are the Arab nations of Asia:

Iraq,

Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the
United Arab Emirates and the two Yemens.

Because of its

location at the conjunction of Asia and Africa, Egypt plays
an important role in the affairs of two of the major seas of
the world.

Egypt has excellent ports on both its t1edi t-

3

erranean and Red Sea coasts.

Because of its access to two

of the most strategically important bodies of water in the
Middle East, Egypt necessarily must play an important role
(either as an independent actor or as a pawn) in the affairs
of the area that has been termed the "Crossroads of the
World."
Another important facet of the strategic importance of
Egypt is its control of the mouth of the Nile, the longest
river in the world.

By controlling its mouth, Egypt domin-

ates the entire drainage basin of the Nile.

This, in turn,

allows Egypt an important voice in the affairs of the Sudan,
Ethiopia and, at times, even Uganda.
A third body of water that plays an important role in
making Egypt one of the most strategically important nations
of the world is the man-made Suez canal.

The Suez canal,

built by Egyptian labor under British and French direction
in 1869, directly connects the Red and Mediterranean Seas.
By providing a connection between the two, the Suez drastically shortens the sea route from Asia to Europe.

The

elimination of the need for ships going in either direction
to circumnavigate Africa makes the Canal one of the world's
busiest shipping routes.
Beyond its intrinsic strategic importance as the center
of the Middle East, Egypt is strategically important because
of its position in relation to the Soviet Union.

Cairo and

4

Alexandria are located approximately 1000 miles directly to
the south of Odessa, the Soviet Union's main Black Sea port.
The region directly south of its borders has been of interest to the governments of Russia from the days of the Tsars
until the present.

Whether this interest is a result of a

traditional Russian obsession for a warm water port, or
simply because of the traditional significance of the area
in world affairs, or possibly even because of ideological
considerations is open to question.

Whatever the case, the

Russian interest in the area is unquestionable.

Egypt's

geopolitical importance alone would be enough to interest
any nation desirous of expanding its influence.

However,

there are other factors that have drawn Soviet interest to
Egypt.
"Egypt has for more than a century been the bellwether
of Arab attitudes, the symbol of Arab values, the embodiment
3
of Arab polarities.'' It is this position of preeminence
that makes Egypt the most culturally important of all of the
Arab nations.

This situation exists, and has existed,

despite the fact that Egypt is without a doubt the least
ethnically Arab of all of the Arabic-speaking nations of the
Middle East.

Egypt has gained its preeminent role in the

Arab world not so much through its ethnic makeup as through
its role as the pioneering leader of the Arab world.

It was

the first of the Arab nations to modernize politically,
intellectually, and economically.

Modernization is one of

5

the factors that has made Egypt the key to the Arab world.
Egypt began its march toward modernization in 1805 when
Muhammed Ali destroyed the old Mamluk dynasty and established his own rule.

Ali established a dynasty in Egypt

which was committed to the intellectual and economic modernization of that country's institutions within an Islamic
context and with as little Western influence on the culture
of the country as possible.
Egypt with an idea:

Ali began the modernization of

Autocracy is contrary to the Islamic

doctrines of equality and humility.

He and his successors

promoted the communication of ideas through print.

To this

end, they founded the first major printing center in the
Arab world in Cairo.

They established a network of primary

and secondary schools in which children were indoctrinated
4
in the application of pure Islamic ideals to Egyptian life.
The intellectual climate of Egypt was further enhanced by
sending many Egyptians to study in European colleges and
universities, and by the opening of several foreign missionary schools in Egypt itself.

The renewal of intellectual

activity helped to revive the Arabic language, and, as a
result, Cairo gradually became the intellectual focal point
of the nineteenth century Arab world.
It also became the center of revolutionary economic and
political impulses within the Turk-controlled Arab world.
(Turkish control was nominal in most cases, including
Egypt Is.)

This was so despite the tendency of the Ali

6

dynasty to brutally repress any and all ideas which came
into sharp conflict with Islamic ideals.

Ali was determined

to maintain Islam as the central basis of all of the aspects
of the life of Egypt and its inhabitants and any breaches of
Islamic law or tradition were drastically punished.

Despite

its harsh measures, the Ali dynasty was unable to prevent
the heightened intellectual activity in the country from
producing and developing nonorthodox political and economic
ideas and gradually merging these ideas into the cultural
milieu of Egypt and, by extension, the entire Arab world.
The Ali dynasty was responsible for considerable increases in the material well-being of the Egyptian economy,
as well as for stimulating increased intellectual activity.
The Egyptian economy was revolutionized by the introduction
of widespread cultivation of cotton for export.

A modern

system of irrigation was developed which helped to extend
the amount of cultivatable land in the Nile valley.

The

Suez canal was built thanks to the encouragement of foreign
investment capital by the Alis.

Railroads were laid, modern

shipping ports built, and neophyte waterworks, sewer systems,
electric lighting networks, and mass transit facilities were
all introduced by the Ali dynasty and its administration.
The military was revamped.

European banking methods re-

placed the ancient methods that had theretofore been in
common use.

These achievements came about as a result of

the Ali dynasty's desire to foster the modernization of

7
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Egypt and its institutions.
The modernization of Egypt's economic, political and
intellectual life by the Ali dynasty made it the first of
the nations of the Arab world to take such a step.

It

became more than simply an intellectual center for the Arab
world (although the educational and intellectual role of
such institutions as the Islamic college, Al-Azhar, were
very important to the development of the Arab world, as was
Cairo's role as the publishing center of the Arab-speaking
world, and should not be downplayed), it became a role
model, a nation to be emulated in the development of the
Arab nations.

It maintained this mystique for the other

Arab nations despite its nominally colonial role under the
Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century and the
first two decades of the twentieth and its later position as
a de facto colony of Great Britain from the 1880's until
1952.
It was this role as the spiritual (but not religious),
cultural, and intellectual leader of the Arab world that,
along with other factors, made Egypt so important in the
eyes of the post-Stalin Soviet Union.

A strong, positive

relationship with Egypt should give the Soviet Union a
dominant role in the politics of the entire Arab world and
greatly enhance its position vis-a-vis the West throughout
the world reasoned Soviet leaders.

8

A third major factor in Egypt's importance to the
Soviet Union is its population.

With over forty million

inhabitants, Egypt has more than twice the population of any
other Arab nation.

In fact, the people of Egypt comprise

over 25% of the entire population of the Arabic-speaking
world.

With its large population, Egypt must play a major,

if not a dominant, role in the politics of the Middle East.
The combination of Egypt's intrinsic strategic importance, its geographic relationship to the Soviet Union, and
its cultural preeminence in the Arab world, make it one of
the most important of the "developing" nations of the world
in Soviet eyes.

As a result, there is little wonder that

when the Soviet Union became capable of extending its interests and influence throughout the world after World War II,
one of its choices in which to attempt to insert itself was
Egypt.

It was a logical choice given the considerations

outlined above.

However, for the Soviets to be successful

the Egyptians had to be willing to accept their overtures.
After their successful coup in 1952 reasons began to
develop for Egypt's revolutionary leaders to become interested in Soviet overtures.

Egypt needed an alternative to

the United States to push forward its internal and external
plans for advancement.

It needed a nation that had suffi-

cient economic resources to be able to bankroll a large
portion of these plans as an ally.

It needed a country that

could provide it with the technical know-how to modernize.

9

It needed a country that could resist American diplomatic
and, especially, economic pressure. Above all, what Egypt
needed was a country that was willing to supply its needs
without immediate returns other than Egypt's friendship.
There were few if any nations that could meet all of
these requirements.

Most European nations were unable to

help because they were still struggling to recover from a
debilitating war.

Even if they had been able to help, it is

unlikely that they would have been willing to do so in
opposition to American wishes.

Britain was in the same

predicament as most of Europe.

It was rapidly divesting

itself of its colonial empire and trying to rebuild from
four years of intensive German bombing.

However, the

British may have been able to help the Egyptians.

They did,

in fact, offer the Egyptians aid in conjunction with an
American offer.

As later events were to prove, their

position regarding Egypt and its role in foreign affairs was
nearly identical to the American position, and they would
not pursue a policy counter to American wishes regarding
Egypt.
Most of the rest of the nations of the world were
unable to help.

They were trying to modernize and develop

their own resources.

India, Japan, and the African nations

all had their own crises to meet.

China probably would have

been willing to help despite its own financial needs.

The

Chinese, however, like the Egyptians, were trying to develop

10
a war-ravaged nation with little industry.

As a result, all

they were capable of offering was the nebulous boon of moral
support.

They could offer nothing concrete in the way of

financial assistance.
able to help.

Egypt's Arab brethren were also un-

They still had not received the tremendous

wealth that their underground oil reserves would later bring
them.
The Soviet Union was just about the only place to which
the Egyptian government, dissatisfied with American offers,
could turn.

Although it, too, had been ravaged by World War

II, the Soviet Union had managed a relatively rapid recovery.

The Soviets had an economy which was sufficiently

sound to absorb the losses endemic in aiding Egypt in her
far-reaching internal and external schemes.

The Soviets

were capable of providing the technical knowledge required
in the modernization of Egypt.

They were capable of with-

standing American pressure to the bitter end.
doing so since World War II concluded.

They had been

The Soviet Union

also met the most important requirement in aiding the
Egyptians - it was willing to help.

It was to demonstrate

its willingness to support the Egyptians in 1955 when the
6
two nations consummated the historic Czech Arms Deal.
The spectre of American resistance to the modernization
of Egypt has repeatedly arisen in the foregoing pages.
However, the Americans were not unalterably opposed to
Egypt's development of its resources.

They were quite
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willing to aid Egypt's modernization if this aid was delivered on American terms and the modernization proceeded on
an American timetable.

They were not willing to aid the
7
Egyptians on Egyptian terms.
In fact, the Egyptians were offered economic aid by the
United States.

However, as the following will hopefully

demonstrate, the Egyptians could not readily accept the
economic and political conditions that the United States
attached to its loan.

However, despite several conditions

which were hard for the Egyptians to swallow, they did
accept the terms.

For reasons which will hopefully become

clear as this study progresses, the United States withdrew
its offer of aid.

The Egyptians then began searching for an

alternative source of the aid, which the Americans had
proven unwilling to provide.
They found that alternative in the Soviet Union and an
offer which it had made before the Americans had tendered
theirs.

The Egyptian-Soviet rapprochement seemed to be a

marriage made in heaven.
goals.

Both sides were fulfilling their

The Egyptians were getting the financial aid that

they needed, and on their own terms (or at least so it
seemed at the time) .

The Soviets were improving their

global strategic position vis-a-vis the United States by
gaining Egypt, at the very least
plete financial dependent.

as an ally, if not a com-
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As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the developments that allowed the Soviet Union to drastically upgrade
its presence in the Middle East have their roots imbedded in
the fabric of history.

A look at the historical record of

Russian involvement shows that this involvement has come
along two main lines: 1) Economic intercourse; and 2) diplomatic/political contact.

The economic intercourse between

Russia and Egypt had been exclusively through the medium of
traditional international commerce prior to the aforementioned Czech Arms Deal.
Although there had been some commerce between the
Tsarist government and Egypt before the Soviet revolution,
commerce between the Soviet regime and Egypt did not begin
until the early 1920's.

At that time, it began to develop

along the lines that had been drawn during the Tsarist
period.
and rice.

The Egyptians supplied the Soviet Union with cotton
In turn, the Soviets supplied them with lumber,

wheat and various other items from the Soviet Union.
trade between the two was never large, however.

The

The maximum

flow of commercial goods between the two during their
pre-friendship period was during the fiscal year of 1927/28
when 146.7 million rubles (evaluated in 1950 A.D. rubles)
worth of goods changed hands.
almost completely ceased.

By 1930 this commerce had

It totally stopped by 1941 when

World War II intervened in the trade process.

During the

years prior to World War II, Egypt nearly always had a trade
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surplus in its trade with the Soviet Union.

The only ex-

ceptions to this general rule were the 1923/24 fiscal year
8

and the year of 1932.
The reasons for the drastic decrease between the
U.S.S.R. and Egypt at that time are unclear.

It is quite

possible that it was due to the negative reaction of Great
Britain to the publishing of the program of action of the
9
Egyptian Communist Party in 1931. This probably combined
with a general worsening of internal conditions in Russia due
to the drive for collectivization being pushed by Josef
Stalin to put a damper on Soviet-Egyptian commerce.

A look

at the political contacts between the Soviet Union and Egypt
prior to the Egyptian revolution is the next step which must
be taken in understanding the nature of the relationship
that was to develop between the Soviet Union and Egypt in
the 1950's.
The Egyptian Communist Party has already been mentioned.

Although it was quite small and proscribed by the

Egyptain government, it was developing under the tutelage of
the Comintern.

Contact between the Egyptians and the

Comintern had been established long before the Egyptian
program of action of the Communist Party was published.
After the Soviet Union settled down following its own revolutions in 1917, the first major political event in Russian
foreign policy that was to have any siginif icant effect upon
Egypt was the Conference of the Peoples of the East held in

14
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Baku in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaidzhan.

The Baku con-

ference, as it came to be known, was an attempt by Lenin and
the Comintern to promote revolution in the countries of Asia
and Africa.

It was aimed at both those countries that had

recently become independent and those that were still
European colonies.

Egypt was one of the countries whose

left-wing sent a delegate to the conference.

As a matter of

fact, the Egyptians had been closely connected with the
conference even before it took its final form.
The initial idea for a meeting along the lines of the
Baku conference came from a prominent Crimean Tatar member
of the Communist Party of the then Tsarist Empire.

His idea

was for a conference of Muslim peoples to be held in Cairo
in 1908.

He passed his idea on to Grigori Zinoviev (who was

to become the head of the Comintern) .

Zinoviev carried

through with the idea and it resulted in the conference at
Baku.

The appeal made by Lenin and the Cominterm at Baku

was directed toward the nascent working classes of Asia and
Africa.

It was aimed at inspiring them to join with the

bourgeosie in their countries and to throw out their foreign
oppressors and join with Russia in the (Marxist) march of
history.
The conference at Baku was a child of the Comintern.
The Comintern was destined to become one of the, if not the,
most important instruments of Soviet foreign policy from its
founding following the Russian revolution of November 1917
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until its dismantlement as a concession to the Western
11
allies of the Soviet Union during World War II.
It was
founded in 1919 as an aid to the world socialist movement.
From its inception until its demise, the Comintern was
comprised mostly of Soviet citizens.

It remained mostly

Russian in character and became the unofficial arm of Soviet
foreign policy in the rest of the world.

It was heavily

involved in the creation of Communist parties throughout the
world.

It helped to devise the tactics of the various Com-

munist parties around the globe.

It played a major role in

the development of the platform of the Egyptian Communist
Party as evidenced by the text of that party's program of
action as published in Arabic in 1931 and Russian in 1932.
In that program of action, the Egyptian Party declared that
it must make an "alliance with the U.S.S.R., with the international revolutionary proletariat, and the toilers struggling in the colonies" in order to promote the establishment
12
of "a Soviet regime'' in Egypt. This type of rhetoric was a
standard component of Comintern influenced programs of
13
action throughout the Third World.
Most of the contact between Egypt and the Soviet Union
was on the unofficial level heretofore mentioned.

There was

little direct contact between the Soviet government and that
of Egypt.

There was some trade between the two nations, but

that was ostensibly handled through intermediaries.

Despite

the lack of direct contact between the Soviet government and
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its Egyptian counterpart, there was no lack of interest on
the part of the Soviet Union in Egypt.

They continued to

have the same interests in the strategic and cultural impact
on the Eastern Mediterranean basin that good relations with
Egypt could have.

They were interested in obtaining

supplies of Egyptian cotton (which was one of the world's
finest strains) as well.
There was a strong deterent to the spread of Soviet
influence at the time, however.

The rise of Fascism through-

out the world drastically slowed the spread of left-wing
ideologies and their manifestations in all of their forms.
Fascism, despite whatever characteristics it might or might
not have, was undeniably the most effective force in the
1930's in halting the spread of Communism throughout Europe
and the European colonies.

It was the reaction of the

middle classes to the growing unrest and disorder that was
occuring in Europe at that time.

This malaise was often
14
attributed to the spread of Communism. With this rise of
Fascism in the west (especially in Germany) , and the expansionistic imperialism of Japan in the east, the Soviet
Union became a land threatened on both frontiers.

As a

result, it resorted to a policy of gaining non-aggression
pacts with its neighbors to protect itself from these growing threats.

This type of diplomacy combined with the

Soviets' own internal difficulties to leave little room for
Soviet manuever in a British sphere of influence like Egypt.
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Due to British perceptions of the Soviets' policies (which
they gained from the type of propaganda the Comintern was
spreading) and Great Britain's own long-standing interests
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the British quite successfully
kept the Soviet bear and its influence out of Egypt.

They

had no trouble at all in counteracting the weak and sporadic
attempts of the Egyptian Communist Party to stir up revolution between 1931 and the Second World War.
World War II, although it constituted a major threat to
the existence of the Soviet Union, was fraught with opportunities for Soviet diplomacy in what had been hitherto
unaccessible regions.

The alliance between the Soviet Union

and the Western powers, especially Great Britain, opened up
many new vistas in which the Soviets could attempt to establish themselves as a factor.

The former British colonies of

Asia and Africa, including Egypt, now became acceptable
nations with which the Soviets could attempt to establish
diplomatic contacts without the opposition of the British or
any of the other Allied powers.
The first step in Soviet diplomatic penetration into
Egypt came in 1943.

At that time the Soviets and the Farouk

monarchy of Egypt exchanged diplomatic personnel.

The

second step in the further exploitation in this breach of
the diplomatic wall around the old British sphere of influence in Egypt came in 1948 when the Soviets concluded a
barter agreement with the Egyptian government on February

18
15
25. The last significant diplomatic contact between the
Soviet Union and the Egyptian monarchy came in March of 1952
on the eve of the Egyptian revolution.

At that time the

Farouk government and the Soviet Union concluded a second
barter agreement.

Three months later, the Farouk monarchy

was to fall.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

As the year 1952 opened, Egypt was still ruled by its
hereditary monarch.

King Farouk I was the titular head of

the Egyptian constitutional monarchy.

The governmental

system of Egypt was loosely based on that of Great Britain.
Under the provisions of the Egyptian constitution which had
chartered the monarchy, the King had the power to appoint
two-fifths of the Egyptian senate and to disband the cabinets
of the country.

King Farouk often exercised his perogative

of cabinet dismissal and, as a result, during his reign
Egypt was a victim of constant governmental turnover.

This

kept Egypt in a constant state of internal political instability.

During Farouk's reign, the civil government changed

hands no less than fifteen times.

Martial law was declared

on three separate occasions, in 1939, 1948 and 1952.

One

measure of the unstable character of Egyptian politics
during this period is the fact that Mustafa el-Nahas was
prime minister three times and Ali Maher twice (excluding
his caretaker role between the death of Farouk's father and
Farouk's assumption of the throne) while Farouk was king.
During Farouk's reign, the government of Egypt changed an
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average of once a year despite the six years of martial law
when no governmental changes took place.

In 1952 martial

law was declared for the last time during Farouk's reign.
After it was suspended, three different governments were
formed before the July revolution eliminated the monarchy.
The continual governmental upheavals were a direct cause of
the revolution.

They led to dissatisfaction in the Egyptian

officer corps and finally led the officers to feel constrained to make a governmental change of their own.
External factors were also a contributing factor to
Egypt's instability under King Farouk.

Two of the periods

during which martial law was in force were periods during
which Egypt was at war.

The first of these came two years

after Farouk succeeded his father to the throne.

At that

time World War II interrupted the flow of Egyptian politics.
During the war Egypt was the site of battles between
British/American forces and their German opponents.

Parts

of Egypt were occupied for a time by the Germans during the
16
war.
It served as a base for both the Germans and the
British Eighth Army at different times during the course of
the war.
The second war which interrupted Egyptian political
life was to occur in 1947.

At that time Egypt and its Arab

allies attacked the fledgling state of Israel.

Their re-

sulting defeat increased the popular dissatisfaction with
the policies of the governments under Farouk.

An especially
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important facet of this dissatisfaction was the disgruntlement of the Egyptian officer corps.

One of the officers who

became discontented with the government was Captain Gamel
Abdel Nasser.

Nasser had been actively anti-British since

he organized student riots protesting the constitution of
1936.

Following the first Arab debacle at the hands of the

Israelis, Nasser became increasingly anti-Farouk.

He also

developed a hatred for the Israelis that was to help eliminate any chance of peace in the Middle East in the years to
come.

The Israeli-Arab conflict was to erupt into open war

sporadically (in 1956, 1967, and again in 1973).

The con-

flict between the Arabs and Israelis is still smoldering to
the present day and quite probably will never be settled
without drastic changes of attitude on the part of both
sides.

Because of the constant external flux that Egypt was

subject to, the internal situation became more and more
uncertain.

Egypt was involved in wars from 1939 to 1945 and

again in 1947 and 1948.

It suffered through the invasions

of hostile powers and defeat from its enemies.

It was used

as a base and a retreat route by both its enemies and its
allies.

It is little wonder that internal discontent rose

dramatically during the reign of King Farouk.
The army was the base for one of the many nationalistic
movements that developed during Farouk's reign.

This group,

the most important of all of the revolutionary groups in
Egypt, was to become known as the Free Officers clique.

The
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Free Officers clique had been formed in 1942 by a young
lieutenant named Anwar el-Sadat.

It was dedicated to the

removal of foreign influence from Egypt - especially the
influence of Great Britain.

To accomplish its goal, the

Free Officers clique conspired to help Germany against the
Allies during World War II.

Sadat and General Aziz el-Masry

became involved in a plot to aid German general Erwin Rommel.
Sadat arranged for contact between Masry and Rommel.

Masry

was to help the Germans by convincing Egyptian troops to
desert the British.
far-reaching.

Masry's efforts in this regard were

Masry disseminated pro-German propaganda

among his fellow officers in the Egyptian Army, and the
Moslem Brotherhood took to the streets of Cairo proclaiming
themselves "Rommel's soldiers".
versive was shortlived, however.

Masry's career as a subHe was arrested by the

British late in 1942 when he was preparing to fly to
Rommel's headquarters in Libya so he could broadcast
17
anti-British radio messages to the Egyptian troops. With
the arrest of Masry, Sadat became the prime motivating force
in the Free Officers clique.

In time, the movement was to

grow and others (such as Nasser) were to join him at its
fore.
Although it attempted to aid the German cause in World
War II, the Free Officers clique was in no sense pro-Nazi.
Rather, they were determined to rid Egypt of, what they were
certain was, the stultifying effect of British influence on

22
their national development.

In 1942 aiding Rommel must have

seemed an excellent opportunity to accomplish their goal.
The Free Officers clique was primarily anti-British in
character - rather than anti-monarchy - until the very end
of Farouk's reign.

At that time, when it began to become

more apparent to the leaders of the Free Officers that
Farouk's tutelege was leading Egypt upon a course of disaster, the clique began to take on a much more definitely
anti-Farouk character.
A word or two about the British role in Egyptian politics is needed at this point.

The British had played a

dominant role in Egyptian political affairs since their
intervention there in 1841.

After the British intervention

in Egypt at that time, Egypt had nominally remained an integral portion of the decadent, sickly, and slowly deteriorating area of Ottoman dominion, but in actuality, the
British played the dominant role in Egyptian politics until
the coup in 1952.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the British
domination of Egypt's politics spurred the rise of nationalistic movements in Egypt.

These groups were dedicated to

the removal of foreign influence from Egyptian soil.

This

movement toward national independence in all aspects of
policy was culminated in 1952 when the Free Officer's clique
(which included Sadat, Lt. Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, and
Lt. General Mohammed Neguib) led a successful revolt that
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forced King Farouk to abdicate and placed Egypt at least
temporarily among the ranks of the world's multi-party
democracies.
When the Egyptian revolution occurred in 1952, the
Soviet Union was led by Josef Stalin.

Stalin held the reins

of power in the Soviet Union firmly in his personal grasp.
He maintained autocratic control of all of the aspects of
the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet government
and the Communist Party.

Stalin had a rather simplistic

view of world affairs that has been labeled the Two Camp
View of world politics.

Simply stated, in Stalin's view the

world was divided into two camps:

Those who followed the

Soviet line of foreign policy; and those who didn't.

Those

who didn't toe the Soviet mark were obviously enemies.
There was no middle ground for any nation that preferred to
chart its own course rather than follow either the Soviet
line or the opposing 'Western' line.

The results of this

policy as it applied to Egypt were quite predictable.

The

Soviets alienated the emerging Third World nations - including Egypt - by criticizing them.

The Soviet press attacked

Egypt and the other Arab nations by labeling the newly
formed Arab League "a tool of British imperialism."

It

further antagonized the new-born Egyptian regime by calling
Nasser, as it had India's Nehru and Syria's Shishakli, a
18
"lackey of imperialism." Needless to say, this did not lead
to immediately harmonious relations between the new Egyptian
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government and the Soviet Union.
The Two Camp view undoubtedly cost the Soviet Union a
large amount of the influence that was becoming available in
the new nations of the Third World.

These nations, includ-

ing Egypt, wanted to determine their own course in policy
matters and a little encouragement along those lines would
have gone a long way in weaning them away from their traditional ties to the West.

They had no desire to have their

policies determined by bureaucrats in Moscow, London, or
Washington, who often had little or no understanding of the
needs and desires of the nations and cultures of the emergent Third World.

Unfortunately, this was what both sides

expected them to put up with.

As a result of the desire for

independence in the governments of the underdeveloped nations,
Stalin's Two Camp view was counterproductive (so, too, was
the same approach by John Foster Dulles) .

There was soon to

be a shift in the pattern of Soviet foreign policy however.
With the death of Stalin in 1953, a power struggle began in Moscow between his former lieutenants.

At first

Georgi Malenkov assumed the mantle of Stalin's successor.
He held the two most important positions in the heirarchy of
the Soviet Union, those of First Secretary of the Communist
party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
All-Union Government.

He relinquished his position as First

Secretary within two weeks of gaining it, presumably as a
result of pressure from the Politburo.

The head of the
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Soviet secret police was also a major factor in the power
struggle that followed Stalin's death.

Lavrenti Beria, the

head of the NKVD, had the authority and physical power to
control the party to a large extent.

He had been given this

power by Stalin in order to help Stalin maintain his position of autocratic leadership by uncovering any plots
directed at undermining Stalin's authority and eliminating
their perpetrators.

Following Stalin's death, Beria

attempted to place himself in Stalin's position as dictator.
For the next three months, Beria battled the other members
of the Politburo in his attempts to gain the power which he
sought.

He was ultimately unsuccessful and the other Soviet

leaders finally eliminated him from the calculations of
power in June of 1953.

At that time, Beria was executed,

probably with the. help of the Soviet army.

Another key

figure in the period immediately following Stalin's death
was Vyacheslav Molotov, an Old Bolshevik who had the main
responsibility for foreign policy.

Molotov and Malenkov

held the two top roles in Soviet politics until September of
1953, when Nikita S. Khrushchev was designated First Secretary of the Communist Party.
The rise of Khrushchev heralded a major new struggle
for primacy in the Soviet Union between Malenkov and
Krushchev.

Molotov played a less significant role in the

struggle than did these other two because his role as
Foreign Minister was inherently less important in Soviet
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internal politics than were their positions.

All three of

these figures were members of the Political Bureau of the
Communist Party, or Politburo, and it was to be the stage on
which the struggle for power was to again take place.
For two years the struggle at the top between Krushchev
and Malenkov was to rage quietly.

Khrushchev slowly gained

the upper hand and, finally on February 8, 1955, he succeeded
in forcing Malenkov to resign his post of Premier.
was replaced as premier by Nikolai Bulganin.

Malenkov

Eventually,

Bulganin himself was to struggle with Krushchev for power.
He and the rest of the so-called "Anti-Party" group were
defeated two years later following a nearly successful
attempt to oust Khrushchev that occurred while Khrushchev
was absent from Moscow.

In fact, the attempt was successful

in the Politburo, but Khrushchev returned and was able to
convince the Central Committee to override the decision of
the Politburo.
During the years following Stalin's death, the power in
the Soviet Union was in the hands of what appears to have
been, and what the Soviets called, a collective leadership.
In the collective leadership some, like Khrushchev and
Malenkov, were more equal than others, but all played a role
in the decisions that were reached.

The collective leader-

ship had a shifting membership, but the most important of
its members were probably Malenkov, Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Klimenty Voroshilov and Anastas
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Mikoyan.

All of these men affected Soviet policy consider-

ably at various times during the years following the death
of Stalin.

As the alignments of these men shifted, so did

the policies of the Party and the Soviet government.
The viewpoints of the various factions in the political
infighting in the Soviet Union can be seen in the rapid
oscillations taken in the state controlled press on many
policy issues.

During the period immediately following

Stalin's demise when Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria were the
main figures in Soviet policy, the policy of the Soviets
shifted slightly from its anti-Arab bent to one that was
slightly more favorable.

(It was, however, still harshly

critical of Egyptian policies at times.

A case in point was

the bitter Soviet condemnation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty
signed in 1954.)

It was not until Khrushchev ousted Malenkov

in 1955 from the Soviet premiership that there was a strong
and definitely pro-Arab policy emanating from Moscow.
The interests of the U.S.S.R. had long been directed
toward Egypt.

With the rise of Arab nationalism as embodied

by Nassar and the Egyptian revolution and the rise in the
U.S.S.R. of Khrushchev, the stage was now set for the Soviet
Union and Egypt to become partners and, eventually, close
allies.

The Czech Arms Deal in 1955 was the start of a

friendship that was to last as long as Nasser lived.
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CHAPTER II
THE CZECH ARMS DEAL AND BEYOND: THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
The military relationship between the Soviet Union and
Egypt was the key which allowed the Soviets to enter the
political arena of the Middle East and to escape the encirclement attempts of the West in that area by completely bypassing the Northern Tier of nations of the region.

As well

as being the medium for the first important breakthrough
between the Soviets and the Arabs, the military aspect of
the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was in many
ways its most important facet.
•

It was the one element which

was really crucial for Egypt over the long term.
The military relationship was crucial for Egypt for a
number of reasons, but what made it vital for both the
Soviets and the Egyptians was that it was the long aspect of
the relationship between the nations in which it was nearly
impossible for the Egyptians to replace the Soviets and their
support with Western aid while still maintaining their avowed
foreign policy goals vis-a-vis their archenemy, Israel.
Without Soviet arms and military support, the Egyptians
could not avenge their defeats at the hands of Israel and
assuage their wounded pride.

They could not help their

Palestinian "brothers" achieve a "just" solution to the
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problems which the creation of the state of Israel had engendered.

With these goals - and with the prestige that

championing them had gained for Nasser and Egypt, it was unlikely that they would change them as long as Nasser was
alive - Soviet military support was vital if the Egyptians
hoped to accomplish the tasks which they had set for themselves.
The military relationship between the Nasser regime and
the Soviet Union clearly started with the so-called Czech
Arms Deal between the two countries in which Czechoslovakia
acted as the transshipper of Soviet equipment to Egypt and
the supplier of record of the arms thus provided.

The pact

between the Soviet Union and Egypt provided the Egyptians
with substantial numbers of relatively modern types of military equipment, including MiG-15 fighters, IL-28 light
bombers, naval destroyers, submarines, IS-III (Stalin) heavy
tanks, T-34 medium tanks, and light arms of all types.

All

in all, the arms credit provided in the deal by the Soviets
to the Egyptians totalled between ninety and two hundred and
1

fifty million dollars in value.

All of the Soviet weaponry

which was supplied by the Soviet Union to Egypt through
Czechoslovakia was, from the Soviet point of view, outmoded.
From the Egyptian point of view, however, the weaponry was as
good or better than anything it had received from the West,
2
and was certainly supplied in much greater quantities.
The arms credits were offered by the Soviet Union to
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Egypt in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice shipments
which were to be sent to the Soviet Union over a twelve-year
period.

Under the terms of the agreement, Egypt was allowed

to purchase weaponry with a high market value without drastically depleting its then-existing holdings in foreign
currency.
The Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt upset an arms balance which had existed in the Hiddle East since 1950.

This

balance had been maintained by the Near Eastern Arms Coordinating Commission (a Western-dominated body which had
been set up under the terms of the Tripartite Declaration in
1950) which had controlled the supply of Western arms to all
of the nations of the Middle East.

The Czech Arms Deal des-

troyed the Western monopoly on arms supply to the Middle
East and with it, the ability of the N.E.A.C.C. to maintain
an arms balance in the region.

It also marked the entrance

of the Soviet Union into the political and military life of
the Middle East as a significant factor.
The entrance of the Soviet Union into the politics of
the region by aiding Egypt was clearly motivated almost completely by political considerations on the part of both involved nations.

From the Soviet point of view, the Arms Deal

demonstrated the Soviet Union's ability to tamper with local
balances of power set up by the West and to of fer solid inducements to its prospective partners.

In terms of Hiddle

Eastern politics, this meant that the Western-dominated
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status quo was no longer inviolable, and the ruling regimes
of the region's nations no longer needed to bow to Western
pressures for political accords or changes in order to maintain a reliable military posture vis-a-vis their neighbors.
As a result, the Czech Arms Deal effectively sabotaged the
3

Baghdad pact which was in the process of being organized by
Great Britain and the United States under their joint policy
of the containment of the Soviet Union.

It also provided

the Soviet Union with several new prospective allies.
The undermining of the Baghdad pact was also something
quite close to Nasser's heart.

Whether he and Egypt had

stayed out of the pact on principle because it curtailed
Arab independence too far (as the Egyptians have contended) ,
or it was simply a case of the Egyptians having been politically outmanuevered by Iraq's president, Nuri a-Said (as

4
has been suggested elsewhere), Nasser was determined to
destroy the Baghdad pact because it could well have thrust
Iraq into Egypt's place at the forefront of the Arab world.
Egypt needed some sort of a bold political stroke to maintain its position.
gambit.

The Czech Arms Deal provided just such a

With the Arms Deal, Egypt could offer military

assistance to other Arab countries and organize a counteralliance which would negate the Iraqi attempt to improve
their political position in, and perhaps even gain hegemony
over, the Arab world.

Secondly, the signing of an arms

accord with the Soviet Union made Egypt much more capable of
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charting its own political course instead of being forced to
accept the policy dictates of either the West or the Soviet
Union.
It has been argued, particularly by the Egyptian side,
that the Czech Arms Deal was a needed step to ensure the
security of Egypt.

The Egyptians claim that Israel had al-

ready made a secret agreement with France which would have
supplied the Israelis with significant amounts of advanced
armaments (including Mystere IV jets and AMX-13 tanks) before the Soviet-Egyptian pact was signed and that that pact
5
was needed to offset those arms deliveries. This argument
is dubious at best.

Israel had requested !1ysteres from

France in 1954, but it had requested the less sophisticated
Mystere II.

Soon thereafter, the French authorities agreed

to supply Israel with a dozen Mystere II's.

The shipment of

these planes was held up for quite some time because of misgivings which were voiced in N.E.A.C.C. meetings.

During

the interim the Hystere II had become obsolete and the French
agreed to replace the nystere II's with Mystere IV's.

The

change in aircraft caused further delays in N.E.A.C.C. approval, and it was not until April 12, 1956 that the first
of eight Mysteres arrived in Israel.
On the other hand, the Soviets had nearly completed the
arms deliveries contracted for under the terms of the Czech
Arms Deal with Egypt before the Israelis received their
small quantity of Mystere IV's.

Clearly, Egypt was the first
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nation to receive a massive boost in its level of arms supplies, not Israel as the Egyptians have claimed.

It is also

just as apparent that the shattering of the delicate arms
balance in the Middle East could well have been avoided by
more adroit handling of Egyptian arms requests by the United
6
States and Great Britain in 1954 and 1955.
A second argument put forward by the Egyptians regarding the military necessity of their agreement with the
Soviets is that their planes were inoperative and that they
needed new aircraft to replace them.

They claim that less

than ten of their planes were airworthy at the time of the
7

arms deal.

Again, this contention does not seem to hold

water when it is carefully examined.

In late July of 1955,

approximately fifty of Egypt's eighty fighters were capable
of participating in an aerobatic exhibition at Egypt's
annual military parade.

This would seem to contradict the

Egyptian claims of aircraft disabilities.

Certainly any

nation that could make its jets operational for a military
parade could make them operational for a military emergency.
After the initial ties of the Czech Arms Deal, the next
step in the deepening of the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship came quite soon.

Immediately prior to the beginning

of the Suez Canal War between Great Britain, France and
Israel on the one side, and Egypt on the other, the Soviet
Union and Egypt came to terms on a second arms pact which
provided the Egyptians with an identical amount of credit to
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8
that provided by the initial deal.

The weaponry provided by

this second agreement was not delivered until after the war.
As a result, it did much to supply Egypt with replacements
for its heavy losses during the futile military phase of its
battle with its opponents.
The Suez Canal War between Egypt and its Franco-AngloIsraeli opponents provided an opportunity for the Soviet
Union to show its support for its newfound ally by providing
Egypt with direct military support.
forthcoming.

Such support was not

The Soviet Union was reluctant to provide any

such support for a variety of reasons.

It was probably quite

wise in making this decision since its involvement certainly
would have drawn the U.S. into the conflict in support of its
NATO allies and quite possibly would have led to a nuclear
conflagration in which the Soviets and much of Europe would
have been annihilated.
After the military phase of the Suez War had been coneluded, the Soviets did threaten direct military involvement
in the conflict.

They warned that both Soviet "volunteers"

and Soviet rocket forces were prepared to defend Egypt from
9
the "capitalist aggressors." Generally, these statements by
the leaders of the Soviet Union were considered idle threats.
The military round of the conflict was effectively over so
there was little point in sending Soviet "volunteers" to
Egypt.

The rocket threat was even less credible.

In 1956

the Soviets had not yet deployed rockets capable of reaching

38

more than 450 miles on any scale of note, although they were
10
close to developing a rocket that could. This put all of
Great Britain and Israel out of Soviet missile range, and a
large portion of France (including Paris) as well.
The weaponry supplied to Egypt by the Soviets played a
role that was little greater than that of the Soviets themselves during the combat phase of the Suez War.
participated much.

Neither

President Nasser called for the complete

cessation of all air activities when Britain and France began their bombardment of Egypt, presumably because of overwhelming Anglo-French-Israeli airpower.

This effectively

took the newly-supplied Soviet jets out of the fray.

The

Egyptians tried to withdraw their new IL-28's at that time
along with their Soviet and Czech advisors and technicians.
However, according to one British general, Franco-British
bombers caught 60 percent of the Egyptian IL-28's on the
ground and destroyed them.
effective.

The MiG-15's were little more

Less than thirty of them were operational at the

onset of the Israeli invasion of the Sinai.

Of these four

were shot down and the rest were withdrawn with the entry
of the British and French into the conflict.

Despite this

attempt to withdraw the bulk of their air force, most of the
Egyptians' newly-supplied aircraft were, like the IL-28's,
11
destroyed on the ground by the Anglo-French bombing.
The Soviet-supplied ground equipment apparently did perform well in the uses to which it was put.

Unfortunately,
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the Egyptians relied upon static defensive positions which
negated the value of their tanks' mobility.

As a result,

the Israeli army simply bypassed the Egyptian positions and
roared almost unchecked to the Suez Canal.

With the with-

drawal of the Egyptian air forces, the fate of the bypassed
Egyptian ground positions was sealed.

The U.S. cease-fire

of November 7th came, therefore, as a great benison to the
beleagured Egyptians.
The third of the arms deals between the Soviet Union
and Egypt came in the wake of the Suez Canal War.

Under the

terms of the agreement, the Soviets agreed to replace all of
Egypt's wartime losses and to add a large quantity of
12
weapons above and beyond those required as replacements.
This pact was the origin of all the post-Suez agreements between the two nations and set a pattern for future accords.
Under the terms of the 1957 agreement, the Soviets were to
provide Egypt with over one hundred and fifty million
dollars worth of hardware.

The weaponry included 200 MiG-17

fighter-bombers and more naval vessels.

The MiG-17 was a

more modern version of the HiG-15 which had been provided
under the terms of the Czech Arms Deal and would upgrade
the Egyptian air forces.

Soviet and Czech trainers and ad-

visors were also sent again to Egypt to instruct that
country's pilots in the use of the newly purchased aircraft.
The combination of the 1957 arms agreement between Egypt and
the Soviet Union and the two previous accords prompted one
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Egyptian spokesman to claim that the strength of the Egyptian
Air Force had doubled between the beginning of The Suez Canal
13
War and September of 1957.
The next arms agreement between Egypt and the Soviet
Union came two years later in the midst of the tension between the two countries which had arisen over Nasser's re14
pression of the Egyptian Communist Party.
Slightly smaller
than the previous agreements had been, the 1959 accord nevertheless was valued at approximately one hundred and twenty
It included 120 MiG-19 interceptors and

million dollars.

also included the construction of some new elements in the
Egyptian military infra-structure such as five new airfields
and a submarine base which was built at Aboukir on the
Mediterranean coast.
Thereafter, arms agreements between the Soviet Union
and Egypt seemed to come at the pace of approximately one
every two years.

The next agreement between the two nations

was concluded on schedule in 1961.

Valued at one hundred

and seventy million dollars, the 1961 agreement provided
enough equipment to fully equip six Egyptian infrantry and
armored divisions.

The Soviets also dispatched over 1300

Soviet and Warsaw Pact advisors (900 of whom were Soviets)
15
to reorganize the Egyptian military along Soviet lines.
The next agreement between the two nations was of far
greater value.

Estimates of its total monetary worth vary
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from two hundred and twenty million dollars to five hundred
16
million dollars. Even if one accepts the low estimate as
valid, the 1963 accord was of far greater value than any of
the previous agreements had been.

Concluded in June of that

year, it was undoubtedly the most significant pact of all of
those concluded between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the
interim between the Czech Arms Deal and the Six-Day War in
1967.

For the first time, the Soviets had agreed to provide

Nasser's government with first-line weapons.
The reasons for the change in the quantity and quality
of the arms with which the Soviets provided Egypt are numerous.

One important factor was the Egyptian intervention in

the Yemeni civil war on the side of the "progressive" republican government which had been set up in opposition to the
Yemeni monarchy.
The Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni civil war was
exact.Ly tue type uf actiun Wllicu the: SovieL.. Un.1.on llad llOpt::d
17
In the view of the
fur from J..ts Midale Lastern al.Lies.
Soviet leaders, such actions could only broaden their own
base of support by polarizing the Middle East and increasing
the necessity for the more radical of the Arab regimes to
rely on the Soviet Union and its allies for military and
political support against their Western-supplied foes.
The Soviet hopes in this regard were undoubtedly fueled
by the short-lived Tripartite Pact concluded between Egypt,
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Syria and Iraq in April of 1963. The pact between the Arab
radicals had as one of its stated goals the creation of a
military alliance which would "be able to free the Palestine
19
Arab homeland from the Zionist danger." The pact must have
brought the pleasant spectre of an anti-Western Arab alliance
hovering before the eyes of Soviet leaders.

Such a possibil-

ity (which never came about) undoubtedly encouraged the
Soviet Union to supply the Egyptians with better weapons in
the hopes of cementing the newly-formed Arab alliance which
was aimed at Israel and through it the West.
The 1963 agreement provided Egypt with the same T-54b
medium tanks that were still standard for both Soviet and
Warsaw Pact armored forces at that time.

The Egyptians re-

ceived enough of the new tanks to completely equip two
armored divisions.

The quality of the Egyptian Air Force

was also improved markedly by the weaponry provided under
the terms of the pact.

The Egyptians received at least 50

MiG-21 supersonic interceptors, a first-line fighter with
which they augmented their forces.

They also received

several TU-16 medium bombers which could carry a much
heavier payload than that of the aircraft which had hitherto
been provided to them.

These aircraft may well have been

the most important of all of the equipment which was supplied to Egypt under the terms of the 1963 arms deal.

They

provided Egypt with a really significant offensive threat
with which it could extensively damage the Israeli heartland
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for the first time.

The agreement called for more IL-28

light bombers, MiG-17 and niG-19 fighters, AN-12 troop transport planes and IL-16 paratroop carriers to aid in the resupply and support of the Egyptian forces in Yemen, as well
as MI-2 helicopters and (probably) SAM-2 ground-to-air
missiles.

The Egyptian navy was by no means neglected.

It

received 36 guided missile gunboats, two destroyers, and two
submarines.
The 1963 arms deal marked a breakthrough in the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union and was in
many ways a new breakthrough in the military balance in the
Middle East.

It was the first time in modern history when

any of the Middle Eastern nations were supplied with
state-of-the-art weaponry in significant quantities for all
three major branches of the military: land, sea and air; and
the first time that the Soviets had supplied a nation with
an avowedly anti-Communist leader with frontline military
equipment. It also signalled the beginning of an arms race
for both quantity and quality between Israel and the Arabs
that was to rapidly escalate and it was eventually to serve
as a proving ground for the new weapons systems of both the
Soviet Union and the West.
There was one more Soviet-Egyptian arms pact prior to
the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel in 1967.

Concluded

in August of 1965, the agreement provided Egypt with approximately three hundred and ten million dollars worth of
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equipment.

It significantly increased the Egyptian stock-

piles of land, sea and air armament, but i t did not qualitatively improve their armed forces as had previous deals be20
cause no new weapons types were supplied to the Egyptians.
At the onset of the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union had
over the years supplied Egypt with an immense amount of armament (See Figure 2).

They had completely revamped the

structure of the Egyptian armed forces and had trained those
forces in the uses of the weaponry that they had been provided.

They had helped to improve the infrastructure of the

Egyptian military by helping to construct new air and naval
bases for its use.

The total value of the armaments and

services with which the Soviet Union had provided Egypt before the Six-Day•War has been estimated at anywhere from one
to two billion dollars.

The equipment was both a step up in

both quantity and quality and provided Egypt with something
beyond military might; something in the long run which has
undoubtedly proved far more valuable to Egypt:

It had main-

tained and even enhanced Egypt's position as the preeminent
political and cultural force in the Arab world.

It had

helped to maintain Egypt's role as the innovator of the
Middle Eastern Arab nations and as the most physically powerful of those nations.

These effects combined to place the

value of the Soviet Union's military aid to Egypt far beyond
even the two billion dollar upper limit that has been placed
upon it.

With such advances in both physical and emotional
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power, the Egyptians and Soviets must have expected a far
better showing than the Egyptians had given in the Suez
Canal War in any future conflict.

They were to be rudely

disappointed very soon.
The Six-Day War between Israel on the one side and an
Arab combination of nations that included Egypt, Syria and
Jordan on the other, marked a new watershed in SovietEgyptian relations.

The Soviet military presence in the

Arab world, particularly in Egypt, increased dramatically
after the Arab debacle.

Not only did the Soviets replace

Arab equipment losses and drastically increase the quality
of the armaments which were provided to the Arab forces
(particularly in terms of air defense equipment), but
they also occupied air and naval bases in Egypt and eventually began to fly fighter sorties over Egypt and man
surface-to-air installations in Egypt's defense.
On the morning of June 5, 1967, the Israeli armed
forces initiated a "preemptive" attack on the Arab nations
of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.

Their attack was a com-

plete success and achieved the devastation of the air
forces and airfields of the Arabs in a very short time.
Egypt and Syria had been singled out by the Israelis as
their primary foes.

Within three hours of the launching of

the Israeli attack, their planes had destroyed nearly 60
percent of the Egyptian air force in attacks on Egyptian
21
airfields throughout Eastern Egypt. During the brief

46

course of the war, another 40 Egyptian aircraft were downed
22
by Israeli pilots.
The quick devastation of Egypt's air force and those of
the other Arab nations assured that the battle on the ground
would be equally devastating to the armies of the Arab
nations.

The Israeli air force dominated the skies.

In the

open desert warfare which followed the initial Israeli air
strike, this meant that Arab military formations were completely vulnerable to ground support attacks from Israeli
aircraft.

This combined with Israeli tank and tank crew

superiority to result in the rout of the Egyptian tank
forces and in the destruction of at least 500 Egyptian tanks
23
in battle.
By the end of the brief conflict, the Israelis had advanced from their pre-war borders to the Suez Canal in the
West.

They had made similar gains in other regions.

They

had demonstrated land and air superiority over their foes
and the navies of both sides had been no more than negligible factors in the conflagration.

A great deal of the

Soviet equipment supplied to the Arabs had proven to be almost completely ineffective against the armed forces of the
24

Israelis.
Unlike the hesitance which the Soviets showed following
the Suez attacks, they reacted immediately to the Israeli
attack.

They condemned the Israelis, declared their un-
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conditional support for the Arabs, and began to pressure for
an immediate cease-fire when the extent of the Arab debacle
became clear.

By June 9, the Arabs had all decided that a

cease-fire was essential.

The Israelis, however, demurred.

They continued their advances into Arab territory and were,
for example, nearing Syria's capital, Damascus.

The Soviets,

perhaps fearing the downfall of the rather radical Syrian
regime, immediately broke off diplomatic relations with
Israel and threatened other sanctions including direct uni25
lateral military intervention.
Eventually, the combination of Soviet threats and
American pressure and the Israelis' achievement of most of
their goals resulted in the end of the Six-Day War.

The war

had resulted in the complete humiliation of the Arabs and in
the destruction of the bulk of their armed forces.

It also

left them shorn of large amounts of valuable territory.

The

two most important outcomes of the war as far as the Soviets
and the Egyptians were concerned were undoubtedly the evidence that Soviet military supplies to Egypt and the other
Arab nations were completely inadequate for their needs and,
perhaps even more importantly, the realization that the
Egyptians were now even more reliant on the Soviet Union at least in terms of military support - than they had ever
been in the years prior to the war.
The performance of Egypt's armed forces during the
Six-Day War gave the Soviets extensive information on what
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was needed in any future wars that might conceivably be
fought between Egypt and Israel.

The most pressing of

Egypt's needs was clearly some sort of an effective air
defense.

The Egyptian pilots had proven themselves to be

no match for their Israeli counterparts.

The SAM-2

anti-aircraft missiles with which the Soviets had provided
the Egyptians before the war proved to be no more effective
in reducing Israeli air superiority.

The SAM-2 missiles had

a very slow rate of acceleration and were rather ineffective
at low levels.

Since most of the Israeli sorties were flown

at low levels, the Israeli planes easily evaded the missiles
26
which the Egyptians fired at them.
To offset the problems in Egypt's air defense, the
Soviet Union provided Egypt with an air defense package that
was designed to overcome the failings of the Egyptian pilots
and the SAM-2.

This was the Soviet alternative to an

Egyptian proposal that the Russians take complete command of
27
Egyptian air defense and the Egyptian air forces.
The
Soviets began by replacing the massive aircraft losses that
the Egyptians had suffered from the Israelis' surprise preemptive bombing raids on Egypt's airfields at the outset of
the Six-Day War.

Egypt's losses were staggering:

They lost

all 30 of their TU-16 medium bombers, two-thirds (27) of
their IL-28 light bombers, 12 SU-7 ground attack fighters,
90 MiG-21 interceptors, 20 MiG-19 fighters, 75 MiG-17
fighter-bombers, and 32 transport planes or helicopters.

All
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in all, they lost approximately 300 of their 500 aircraft,
nearly all of their strategic bomber force, and the majority
of their most advanced interceptors.

By the end of June of

1967, the Soviets had replaced 200 MiG's.

By October of that

year, they had supplied Egypt with an additional 100 MiG-2ls,
28
50 MiG-19's, 50 to 60 SU-7's, and 20 IL-28's. As a result
of the speed of the massive Soviet airlift to resupply them,
the Egyptians had by late fall more than replaced nearly
every element in their air force.

The only two exceptions

were their strategic bombing force and their troop transport
planes.
The Soviets also slowly rebuilt Egypt's anti-aircraft
system.

Initially the Soviets shipped Egypt an improved

version of the SAM-2, along with radar guided 57mm
anti-aircraft guns.

Along with the weapons, there came

Soviet controlling technicians to oversee the use of the
weapons.

Eventually the Soviets also supplied Egypt with

SAM-3 missiles which were manned by Soviet technicians and
placed around the Aswan dam.

The bulk of the new

anti-aircraft missiles was placed in a rectangular formation between the Suez and the Egyptian heartland along the
Nile.

The so-called "missile box" was a key element in the

new Egyptian air defense plan and was intended to protect
Cairo and the rest of the upper Nile Valley from deep interdiction by Israeli bombers.

Initially, it was relatively

unsuccessful; neither the missiles nor their technicians had
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been sufficiently improved to slow the Israeli pilots who
crossed the Suez to raid strategic targets within Egypt.
The Soviets also rapidly replaced the tanks that the
Egyptians had lost in the Sinai during the Six-Day War.

The

pace of this segment of the Soviet resupply of Egypt's military was somewhat slower than was the replacement of air29
craft, but, nevertheless, by February of 1968, the Soviets
had provided the Egyptians with replacements for 60 percent
of the 700-800 Egyptian tanks which had been captured or
30
destroyed. In some ways the Egyptians were better off on
land than they had been prior to the debacle in June.

Many

of the tanks that they had lost in the Sinai were older
models such as the IS-III heavy tank and the T-34 medium
tank.

All of the replacements that they received were the

much more modern and effective T-55 medium tanks.
The massive resupply of Egypt's military by the Soviet
Union after the Six-Day War was undertaken on terms that
practically amounted to an outright gift.

According to

Nasser on July 28, 1968, "We (Egypt) have so far paid not
one millieme for the arms we obtained from the Soviet Union.
31
We have no money to buy arms." Indeed they did not. By
1968 the Egyptians had completely depleted their reserves
of foreign currency of 1955 and were heavily in debt.
By October 1968, the Soviet Union had replaced over
80 percent of Egypt's material losses from the Six-Day
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War.

That month also marked an inspection of the Egyptian

defenses along the Suez Canal by the Soviet Chief of Staff,
Marshal Ivan I. Iakobovskii.

He returned to Moscow and re-

ported his findings, and then immediately returned to
32
Egypt. At that time, the Soviets proposed that Egypt and
the other Arab nations to which the Soviet Union was selling
arms join together in a defense organization along with the
33
nations of the Warsaw Pact Organization. This would have
put the arms that the Soviet Union was selling more directly under Soviet supervision and tightened the military and
political relationship between Egypt and the other Arab
countries and the Soviet Union.

Nasser and the other Arab

leaders were skeptical of the idea for many of the same
reasons that had caused them to reject the Anglo-American
sponsored Baghdad Pact in the mid-fifties.

As a result,

the idea never came to fruition and quickly disappeared.
By early 1969, the Egyptians were beginning to become
familiar with their newly-acquired Soviet weaponry.

They

had been instructed in its use by their Soviet advisors
until they were proficient enough for these advisors to become unnecessary.

As a consequence, the Soviet advisors

were steadily withdrawn until less than two thousand were
left in Egypt.

As the number of Soviet advisors dwindled,

so, too, did the influx of Soviet arms to Egypt.

Spare parts

soon became in short supply and the Egyptians consequently
did not have the hardware to fight any war save a defensive
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one for more than two or three days.

By cutting off the

supply lines to Egypt, the Soviet Union's leaders had effectively eliminated the possibility of Egypt launching an
attack on Israel and placed Egypt's impatient military under
limited control.
The Soviet control of Egypt's military possibilities
was not to last long, however.

The junior officers in

Egypt's military were impatient and would brook little, if
any, delay in going into combat with the Israelis.

They

disliked the diffidence of their Soviet advisors and chafed
under the restraints which had been placed upon them.
February of 1969, their discontent was assuaged.

In

After a

visit to the front, President Nasser gave permission for
Egypt's artillery to resume its shelling of the Israeli
positions across the Suez.

Thus began the so-called "war of
34

attrition" between Egypt and Israel.

It quickly escalated.

Initially the Soviet role in the "war of attrition"
was minimal.

In fact, in the political arena the Soviet

Union's leaders agitated for a cessation of the hostilities
35

for the first several months of the conflict.

Nasser was,

however, adamant in his resolve to pursue his policy of a
mini-war against the Israelis.

After a time the Soviet

Union acceded to his wishes and went along, albeit reluctantly, with the Egyptian desire for conflict.
The Soviet role in the conflict developed slowly.

At
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first, i t was limited to the supply of copious quantities of
artillery shells and presumably advice on tactics from the
Soviet advisors in Egypt to the Egyptian commanders of the
fire-control centers at which they were stationed.

The

Egyptian artillery barrages directed at the Bar-Lev line of
Israel naturally provoked an Israeli response.

The Israelis

were clearly outgunned in any sort of an artillery battle
with the Egyptians.

The Egyptians had more and better artil-

lery and less frontier to cover.

To offset their disadvan-

tage, the Israelis resorted to commando and air raids and
an occasional armored sortie across the Canal.

By November

their tactics had completely obliterated Egypt's missile box
and had given them free access to Egypt's heartland.
were bombing when and where they chose.

They

Egypt's air force

was unable to stop the Israeli air incursions and was
effectively banished from the air by the Israeli superiority
36
in that medium.
The Israeli air superiority over the Egyptians was an
embarrassment of sorts to the Soviet Union.

It made a

mockery of the Soviet attempt to rebuild Egypt's defenses
and, thus, indirectly jeopardized the Soviet's ties with
all of their Arab allies.

This was particularly true if

Egypt's vulnerability was linked to the Soviet Union.

Again

the desires of the Soviet Union and the Nasser regime had
come into congruence.

In December 1969, this congruence

brought the Soviet Union more directly into the "war of
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attrition."
The heightened Soviet involvement began in mid-December

when Anwar Sadat went to the Soviet Union to request more
help.

His visit was a success.

The Soviets agreed to take

"active measures in strengthening the defense capability
37
of the U.A.R. (Egypt) and the other Arab states." The most
important element of the agreement that Sadat and the
Egyptian delegation had worked out with the Soviet leadership
was their agreement to send the SAM-3 surface-to-air missile
to Egypt.

The SAM-3 was a sophisticated weapon that even

North Vietnam, which was suffering from incessant U.S. bombing, had as yet not received from the Soviets.

The missile

was effective at low altitudes and so could go a long way
in helping the Egyptians to effectively combat the Israeli
air force and its low-flying tactics.
Despite its value, it appeared that the supply of the
SAM-3 to Egypt would turn out to be too little too late.

In

January of 1970, the Israelis announced that "all of Egypt
38

is our battlefield" and extended their raids to the thitherto unbombed areas west of the Nile where the bulk of Egypt's
population dwelled.

Nasser hurried secretly to the Soviet

Union to arrange for more aid.

His journey accomplished two

things, one of which would be of tremendous significance for
Soviet-Egyptian relations and both of which would be instrumental in stemming the tide of the Israeli air assault.
The first of the two things which Nasser accomplished
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during the course of his talks with the Soviet leadership
was of obvious importance.

He succeeded in convincing the

Soviets to speed up their arms deliveries.

As a result, by

mid-March the SAM-3 missiles were already arriving in Egypt
along with Soviet technicians to man them.
The dispatch of Soviet technicians to man the SAM-3's
was the second, and in many ways more important, of Nasser's
accomplishments on his trip to Moscow.

Nasser had convinced

the Soviet leadership to commit their technicians and also
their fighter pilots to an active role in the defense of
Egypt.
The commitment of Soviet personnel to an active role
in combat to defend Egypt was another major breakthrough in
the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship.

No similar

course of action had ever been taken by the Soviet Union in
support of a non-Communist nation.

The genesis of the change

in their relationship had begun with the Six-Day War.

In

that conflict Egypt had shown an inability to defend itself
and its Soviet weaponry adequately from Israeli attacks.
This inability had been underscored by the results of the
first phase of the "war of attrition.''
was committed to Egypt as its ally.

The Soviet Union

Egypt was unable to

defend itself and unwilling to suspend hostilities.

The

logic of the situation demanded that the Soviets either
commit their own troops or even more sophisticated weaponry
(such as the MiG-23[25]) to Egypt's defense.

Both courses
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of action had their drawbacks.

Committing their troops

risked both the lives of the troops and steadily escalating
involvement.

Committing their best weaponry risked its

falling into the hands of their enemies.

As it turned out,

the Soviet Union chose to adopt a compromise between the
two courses of action.
Initially, the Soviet role remained quite limited.
The new SAM-3 missiles and their Soviet crews were cornrnitted only to halt Israel's deep penetration raids against
the Egyptian heartland when first ernplaced on March 15,
39

1970.

They were therefore placed exclusively around Cairo,

Alexandria and the Aswan Darn.

The Soviet fighter pilots

and their planes officially patrolled only the areas around
the SAM-3 sites in order to protect them from Israeli
attacks in early April.

They also were committed to protect

the airbases which Nasser had given over to Soviet control
40

under the terms of the January 1970 agreement.
involvement of the Soviet Union was shortlived.

The limited
For a

variety of political and military reasons, the scope of
their activities would soon widen.
In early April 1970, the Israelis ceased their deep
penetration raids over Egypt.

The new SAM-3 sites and the

Soviet air missions over them had been effective in deterring the Israelis from their assaults on the Egyptian
heartland.

Those sites and air missions had now become,

however, effectively pointless to continue.

The Soviet
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leadership was now faced with another decision regarding its
role in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict; either withdraw their
forces and perhaps see a resumption of the Israeli raids,
or increase their involvement by widening the scope of their
military support of Egypt.

Flushed with success, they chose

the latter.
On January 1, 1970, there were only 2500-4000 Soviet
advisors in Egypt.
of missile crews.

None were pilots and none were members
The Soviets manned no SAM sites or air-

craft, nor did they control any airfields.

By !larch 31,

there were 6500 to 8000 Soviet military personnel in Egypt.
Sixty to eighty of the Soviets were pilots and approximately
4,000 were members of missile crews.

The Soviets were

manning twenty-two SAM sites and may have controlled one
airfield.

By June 30, the number of Soviets had escalated

to between 100 and 150 pilots and 8,000 missile crew members.
They manned 45 to 55 SAl1 sites and were flying 120 combat
aircraft as well as controlling six airfields on Egyptian
41
soil. The pilots had also extended their range of operations from the limited sphere of April to now include
flights up to the edge of the Suez Canal Zone.

Additionally,

in May the Egyptians had deployed Soviet crews and SAM-3
missiles in the Canal air defenses and had rebuilt their
missile box with the improved equipment and improved firing
42
techniques, which were probably suggested by the Soviets.
The tide of the war of attrition had now turned.
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Soviet weapons, Soviet personnel and Soviet tactics had put
Egypt back into a feasible defensive position almost overnight.

The Israelis, while not defeated, were now being

held in check.

For Egypt it was a military victory.

the Soviets it was something more.

For

It was a vindication of

their air defense plans for Egypt and an earnest of the
lengths to which they would go in support of their allies.
It could not do anything but good for their political role
in the Arab world.
The war of attrition continued into July.

On the 30th

of that month, something happened in the skies over Egypt
which could well have changed the complexion of events in
the Middle East for some time to come.

Four Soviet-piloted

Mig-2l's were lured into an Israeli trap and shot down in a
43

dogfight that took less than one minute.

It was the first

documented case of the loss of Soviet pilots during the
conflict.

The incident might well have been disasterous

for the peace process that was underway in the Middle East.
The American-proposed Rogers Plan had been accepted by the
44
Egyptians on July 23rd. The Israeli Knesset was set to
debate the issue on July 31st.

Flushed by the success of

their pilots against the Soviets, the Israelis might well
have chosen to reject the peace initiative in hopes of
earning a more favorable offer.

The direct military involve-

ment of the Soviet Union had turned the tide of the "war
of attrition" but the Israelis had now proven themselves
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capable of defeating even the Soviets in air combat.

With

proof of their own vulnerability, perhaps the Soviet Union
would be less willing to support Egypt quite so forcefully.
Some argued along these lines in the Knesset in the hope
that in the continuation of conflict, Israel would improve
its bargaining position.

Cooler heads prevailed, however,
45

and the Knesset approved the Rogers proposal on July 31.

A

cease-fire came into effect one week later.
The cease-fire did not slow the renewed influx of
Soviet-made arms and Soviet personnel into Egypt.

When

Nasser died on September 28, 1970, there were 150 Soviet
pilots manning a like number of planes and over 10,000
46

Soviets manning more than 70 SAM sites.
Nasser's death marked the beginning of the end of
an era in Soviet-Egyptian military relations and SovietEgyptian relations as a whole.

When he had come to power,

following the coup of the Free Officers in 1953, the Soviet
Union and Egypt had had little government-to-government contact for many years.

The Czech Arms Deal that Nasser had

initiated changed that.
The Czech Arms Deal was the military key that opened
the door for Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union to
grow and flourish.

It released Egypt and with it the rest

of the Arab world from its dependence upon the West for
arms, and with that, from political dependence as well.

It
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brought the Soviet Union into a region of the globe that it
had thitherto been, economically, militarily and politically,
almost completely excluded from by the hegemony of the West.
It shattered the delicate military and political balances
that had been maintained in the region and, with one bold
stroke, made a connection between the Soviet Union and
Egypt that was to endure for more than two decades.
From the point of view of the Soviet Union, the Czech
Arms Deal both strengthened Egypt's ability to break free
of the West and withstand its pressures and appealed to the
professional interests of the upper echelons of the Nasser
regime.

It also was the beginning of what the Soviet leader-

ship hoped would be a broader based anti-imperialist coalition than they had been able to forge previously.

The

Soviet attempt to forge such a coalition may well have been
a policy counterweight to its efforts to ease tensions with
the West, efforts which were embodied by the Austrian State
Treaty and the generation of the so-called "Spirit of
47
Geneva." Like most major qualitative changes in
Soviet-Egyptian relations, the Czech Arms Deal came at a
time when the relationship between the Soviet Union and the
West was relatively positive (See Figure 3).

Whether this

was because the Soviets had a conscious policy line under
the auspices of which they counterbalanced positive direct
relations with the West by minor indirect provocation and
the encouragement of "national independence" movements, or
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simply a result of coincidence, it is remarkable in its con48
sistency as a pattern. The single exception to the rule was
the commitment of Soviet air defense personnel to Egypt in
19 70.
The qualitative changes in Soviet-Egyptian relations
also coincided with almost every improvement in SovietWestern relations.
the pattern:

Again, there was a single exception to

the period of relative tension between the

Soviets and Egyptians which existed in 1970.

At that time,

Soviet relations with the West were at a positive peak due
49

to the "Spirit of Camp David," however, there were no major
changes in Soviet-Egyptian relations,

a circumstance that

was almost certainly due to Nasser's avid anti-Communist
campaigns in Egypt and Syria.
From the Egyptian point of view, the benefits of Soviet
arms patronage were obvious.
pendence from the West.

It provided them with inde-

It provided them with a much greater

stock of weaponry than they could possibly have obtained
elsewhere.

Most importantly, it helped to preserve Egypt's

standing as the cultural and political innovator and leader
of the Arab world.
From the Czech Arms Deal until Nasser's death, the
Soviet-Egyptian military relationship improved greatly.

The

improvement came in fits and starts, but it always came
despite occasional Soviet reservations or Egypt's periodic
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determination to demonstrate that i t was as independent of
the Soviet Union as i t was of the West.

Egypt's consistent

defeats at the hands of Israel forced it to depend more and
more upon the Soviet Union for military support.

The more

it relied upon the Soviet Union for its military hardware,
the more permanent that reliance became.

By the time of

Nasser's death, the militaries of the two countries had become so inexorably intertwined that Egypt was depending on
Soviet personnel manning Soviet weaponry for its air defense
since it was unable to defend itself from Israeli depradations.
However, the more the Egyptians relied upon the
Soviets, the more the Soviets were forced to bolster Egypt's
defense to maintain the viability of the Nasser regime with
which it was so intimately connected.

And, despite the

almost complete reliance of the Egyptians upon it for military hardware and support and for the training of many of
50
its officers, both in the U.S.S.R. and in Egypt, the Soviet
Union still had no control of Egypt's actions.

Egypt con-

tinually acted in a bellicose manner, a manner that cost
the Soviets progressively more money and eventually cost
them lives.
Clearly, the military relationship over the years between Egypt and the Soviet Union had both positive and negative repercussions for both sides.

Egypt was provided with

military weaponry, training, and support which gave it the
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ability, or at least what it preceived as the ability, to
pursue an aggressive foreign policy line toward Israel.

As

a result, Nasser and Egypt gained a great deal of political
prestige in the Arab world.

But what had been gained also

extracted costs that were nearly as great in terms of
political independence.

It also had both positive and nega-

tive effects on Egypt's economy.

While the relationship did

modernize Egypt's military and thus, at least to some extent,
the rest of the economy through a ''trickle down" process,
the militarization of Egyptian society drained away resources
from the civilian sector of the economy and led to periodic
wars which destroyed much of the economic progress that had
been made, especially that which had been made in the Sinai
Peninsula.
The military relationship between the two nations had
both an up side and a down side for the Soviet Union as well.
It gave the Soviets bases in Egypt and unlimited access to
the Suez Canal - when it was open - which provided them with
an improved military posture and presence in the Hediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, and it made Egypt dependent
upon the Soviets for military hardware and support.

They

also gained an excellent testing ground for their weaponry
in the Arab-Israeli wars (although there were often instances when their weapons fell into the hands of the
Western intelligence agencies as a result of its having
been committed in Egypt).

On the other hand, the relation-
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ship also cost them a great deal of military hardware and
capital and gave them an ally which was both unpredictable
and uncontrollable and which of ten acted in a manner that
was contrary to Soviet goals and aspirations.
Overall, it is impossible to make an overreaching
judgment of the value of the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship which is not at least to some degree debatable.
The value of the relationship to each nation involved was
different in both form and content.

The goals of the two

nations were too dissimilar for it to be otherwise.
result, some differences were unavoidable.

As a

These differ-

ences may well have led to a situation in 1970 where the
burdens of Soviet help - while still necessary for a few
more years - were beginning to outweigh the benefits for
the Egyptians.

Sadat's increasingly negative attitude

toward the Soviet Union in the years after he took power in
Egypt may be evidence of this.

For the Soviets, on the

other hand, their presence in Egypt still probably held too
much value for them than any costs which arose from it could
negate.
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Notes (Chapter II)
1)

The figures given for this vary from source to source.
The high figure of $250 million comes from the u.S.
Congress, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the
Joint Committee, New Directions in the Soviet Economy,
89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1966), p. 965.
The low figure comes from Jon Glassman, Arms for the
Arabs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975),
p. 10.

2)

There are several different estimates of exactly how
many of each of the various types of weapons were supplied to Egypt, but even the low estimates indicate
that the crucial level of tank and jet aircraft supplies
were increased by 50 percent and 100 percent respectively. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see
Glassman, ibid, p. 11.

3)

The name by which the treaty is commonly known, the
Baghdad Pact, suggests the coup which a-Said had pulled.
He had successfully convinced the British and the
Americans to base the treaty organization in his capital,
thereby increasing the prestige and importance of Iraq
vis-a-vis Egypt with the West and the Arab world.
The
suggestion that Nasser was trying to offset this perceived advantage appears in Anthony Eden's memoirs,
Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1960), and in Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

4)

Love, ibid, p. 101. This suggestion also appears in Jon
Glassman, op cit, pp. 9-10. Anthony Nutting says Nasser
told the British that it was because of an Israeli raid
on Gaza earlier in the year. Nutting, Nasser (New York:
E. P. Dutton, 1972), p. 116.

5)

See Chapter 3, pp. 57-64.

6)

Love, op cit, p. 244, quoting Salah Salem, the Egyptian
Minister of both National Guidance and Sudan Affairs.

7)

The two pacts taken together involved over $300 million
worth of Soviet arms. Glassman, op cit, p. 10.

8)

The Soviets' "offstage thunder'' is detailed by Love on
pages 610-624 of Suez. Mohammed Heikal discusses the
importance of Soviet diplomatic support for Egypt
during the Suez crisis and the manner in which it came
about on pages 68 through 72 of The Sphinx and the
Commissar.
Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New
York: Harper & Row, 1978).
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9)

The Sputnik launch in 1957 demonstrated the Soviet
capability of reaching anywhere in the world with their
missiles. However, capability and deployment were two
aifferent matters. Soviet missiles were incapable of
reaching Western Europe in any numbers until much later.

10)

Kennett Love quoting General Sir Charles Keightley.
Love, op cit, pp. 528 and 574. This information is confirmed by Anthony Nutting in his biography of Nasser
where he also says that the British and French destroyed 18 of the 30 Egyptian IL-28's at Lukor, but
states further that the Anglo-French forces destroyed
more IL-28's further north. Anthony Nutting, op cit,
p. 170.

11)

In fact, Mohammed Heikal asserts that for all intents
and purposes, the Egyptian air force was destroyed
during the first day of the Anglo-French bombing.
Mohammed Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 109.

12)

Jon Glassman, op cit, p. 24.
Information on the content
of the arms accord is also provided by George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Hiddle East (Washington:
American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1972),
pp. 146-149.

13)

Middle East Journal (Autumn 1957), p. 418.

14)

Nasser's persistent suppression of the Egyptian Communist party was a frequent source of difficulties between
the Soviets and the Egyptians. See Volume XI of the
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, #33, p. 14; #38, pp.
21-22; and #43, p. 32 for a look at the problems in
1958.

15)

Glassman, op cit, p. 24.

16)

Glassman, ibid, p. 24. Lenczowski says that the value
was $220 million in terms of Soviet official prices,
but the purchase may well have been worth $500 million
(presumably on the open market). Lenczowski, op cit,
p. 148.

17)

The Yemeni civil war was fought between royalist elements and the left. The Egyptians intervened on the
side of the leftists and supplied them with both troops
and Soviet weaponry.
This action seemed to both the
Soviets and the rest of the world to be a step toward
the radicalization of the Arab world. Certainly it
was, at the very least, another step in expanding the
influence of Egypt, the Soviet Union's ally, in the
Arab world.
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18)

An account of the 24 days of negotiation which led to
this accord is provided by Anthony Nutting. Nutting,
Nasser, pp. 326-335. The Union never really got off
the ground and shattered before it was completed.

19)

Glassman, op cit, p. 25.

20)

Glassman, ibid, p. 26.

21)

This meant that nearly 300 Egyptian planes were put
out of action before they even had a chance to get off
the ground.
See Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 40
for a detailed account of the Egyptian losses and those
of the other Arab combatants.

22)

Edgar O'Ballance gives this figure as a part of his information on the ineptitude of the Arab pilots during
the war. O'Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War
(London: Faber, 1972), p. 82. It is also presented in
Israeli Ministry of Defense, The Six-Day War (Tel Aviv:
Israeli Ministry of Defense Publishing, 1967), p. 40
and Glassman, ibid, p. 47.

23)

O'Ballance, ibid, p. 168;

24)

This included SAM-2 anti-aircraft missiles, Shrnel
anti-tank missiles, T54/55 tanks and even the MiG-21
fighter.
In part this was due to the Arabs' ineptitude
with the weapons, but it was also due to technical
shortcomings of the weapons themselves.
The weaknesses of the weapons were amply demonstrated during the
war.
See Glassman, ibid, pp. 45-49; O'Ballance, ibid,
pp. 168-171; as well as Nadav Safran, From War to War:
The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York:
Pegasus, 1969), pp. 322-324.

25)

Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (New
York:
St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 42-43.

26)

A short description of the capabilities of the SN1-2 is
provided by Glassman, ibid, on p. 47. An even more
detailed account is provided by Edgar O'Ballance, The
Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-1970 (Harnden,
Connecticut: Archon Books, 1974), on page 77.

27)

This information is drawn from Alvin z. Rubinstein, Red
Star on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977), p. 29.
Rubinstein provides the most detailed list of the items involved in the Soviet resupply of the Egyptian air force in 1967. Also see
A. Y. Yodfat, "Arms and Influence in Egypt - the
Record of Soviet Military Assistance since June 1967",
New Middle East, #10 (July 1969), pp. 27-32.

Lenczowski, op cit, p. 148.

Glassman, ibid, p. 48.
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28)

Glassman, op cit, quoting Anwar Sadat, p. 67 note.

29)

This was partially due to the extreme length of the
training period for a tank crew of over twenty months.
There was little point in rushing tanks to Egypt which
would then simply sit idle until crews could be trained
to man them.

30)

In contrast in October of 1967, the Egyptians had
already received more planes from the Soviets than they
had lost during the Six-Day War.

31)

BBC/ME/2830/A/9 (July 25, 1968) cited in Alvin Rubinstein, Red Star Over the Nile (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977), p. 29.

32)

These visits are reported in O'Ballance, The Electronic
War . . . , pp. 51-52.

33)

Ibid, p. 52.
idea.

34)

The "war of attrition" consisted of periodic shelling,
commando raids, aerial combat, and bombing between the
Israelis and the Egyptians. The Egyptians used the
artillery duels and commando raids to help rebuild their
own self-respect which had been badly damaged by their
miserable military performance during the war. The
Israelis responded in kind as well as through aerial
assaults. At one point, the aerial raids grew to be so
destructive that they threatened to completely destroy
Egypt's industrial centers. For a full account of the
"war of attrition" see O'Ballance, The Electronic War

35)

Mohammed Heikal characterized the Soviet's behavior as
"begging." Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p.
193.

36)

Glassman, quoting the New York Times of November 11,
1969. Glassman, op cit, p. 71.

37)

Alexei Kosygin in Pravda, 11 December 1969.

38)

O'Ballance, The Electronic War . . . , p. 105. O'Ballance
is quoting Moshe Dyan. A slightly different version of
this quote is provided by Glassman. Glassman, ibid, p.
75.

39)

This information is given by Rubinstein who is citing
a speech made by Anwar Sadat. Rubinstein, op cit, p.
113ff.

The Arabs were less than thrilled by the
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40)

The secret agreement was negotiated by Nasser near the
end of January.
Soviet planes and pilots began to
arrive at their new Egyptian bases in early April. The
details of the visit appear in Glassman, op cit, p. 74.
Also see O'Ballance, The Electronic War . . . , p. 114.

41)

These figures are drawn from Strategic Survey 1970,
(London:
The Institute, 1975). They are also cited
by Glassman on page 75 of Arms for the Arabs.

42)

Soviet personnel were manning Egypt's so-called ''missile
box" and they were directing the placement and utilization of the SAM-3's.
It stands to reason that the
Soviets as experts were the ones who suggested the new
firing techniques. For more on this see O'Ballance, op
cit, p. 113-122.

43)

The loss was never mentioned by the Soviet press in any
way.
The New York Times reported the incident on August
12. Alvin Rubinstein cites the same incident, but
claims that five Soviet planes were downed.
He also
quotes an "informed Cairene" as saying that ''there were
'drunken parties' at Egyptian bases when the Soviet
pilots were shot down." Rubinstein, op cit, p. 120ff.

44)

The Rogers Plan was a proposal developed by the Americans and put forward by their Secretary of State,
William Rogers, in December 1969, which called for
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in return
for "a permanent peace based on a binding agreement."
The final details of the agreement were to be worked out
with the aid of Gunnar Jarring, a U.N. mediator. Nasser
announced his willingness to accept the proposal before
the Congress of the ASU on July 23. Mohammed Heikal
claims that this was met with "surprise and consternation" on the part of many Arabs. For his account see
p. 198 of The Sphinx and the Commissar.

45)

Yaacov R'oi and Ilana Dimant-Kass directly link the
Israeli acquiescence to the downing of the Soviet pilots.
R'oi and Dimant-Kass, The Soviet Military Involvement
in Egypt, January 1970 - July 1972 (Jerusalem:
The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research Paper #6, 1974),
p. 18.

46)

Strategic Survey 1970, p. 47, and Glassman, op cit, p. 75.

47)

The "Spirit of Geneva" was the optimistic mood regarding international relations that followed the four-power
summit in Geneva in July 1955.

48)

The idea of a consistent two-emphasis Soviet foreign
policy is developed more fully in Glassman, op cit, on
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pp. 3-6.
49)

The "Spirit of Camp David" was, like the "Spirit of
Geneva", a positive attitude toward international relations which followed a summit between the world's
major powers. This one took place between Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Khrushchev at the American President's
Camp David retreat in September of 1959.

50)

The Soviets had been training Egyptian officers in both
tactics and the use of Soviet weaponry since just after
the Czech Arms Deal. See the Middle East Journal, Vol.
10, #3 (Summer 1956), p. 262 for the announcement of
the beginnings of this sort of cooperation between the
militaries of the two countries.

CHAPTER III
NOT BY ARMS ALONE: SOVIET-EGYPTIAN DIPLOMACY
The political aspect of the relationship between Egypt
and the Soviet Union was by far the most broad-reaching
element of the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the
Egyptians.

Politics and diplomacy were necessarily involved

in each of the other facets of the relationship, if for no
other reason than simply because they played the role of the
initial phase in the development of the military, economic,
and cultural connections between Egypt and the Soviet Union.
The political connections between the two countries were
tenuous at best before the consummation of the Czech Arms
Deal.

After the signing of the arms pact, the political

aspect of the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt
solidified and became a prominent part of the overall involvement between the two nations.

While politics and dip-

lomacy were always involved when one of the other elements
of the relationship was being negotiated, they also had an
independent role in situations where the others were either
useless or inappropriate.
Prior to the signing of the Czech Arms Deal, there
were few direct contacts between Egypt and the Soviet Union.
Certainly, the connections that did exist were on no scale
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of any note.

While the direct contacts between the two

countries were relatively unimportant, the internal political developments within both Egypt and the U.S.S.R. were
instrumental in shaping the interrelationship between the
two nations for the next two decades.

Developments affect-

ing the future connections between the two occurred in Egypt
first when the military coup led by Lt. Colonel Gamel Abdel
Nasser and Lt. General Mohammed Neguib swept away the
monarchy which had ruled Egypt for the last century and a
half.
After leading the successful coup by the military in
1952, Nasser and Neguib became the dominant figures in the
Free Officers clique and in Egyptian politics.

They then

proceeded to form a government that emphasized reform.

What

had previously been known as the Executive Council of the
Free Officers' clique now became known as the Revolutionary
Command Council.

The Council, under the joint direction of

Nasser and Neguib, reinstated Ali Maher - who had been one
of the Prime Ministers during Farouk's reign - as Prime
Minister with the stipulation that he must accept and implement a list of demands regarding the running of the
Egyptian government that the Revoluntionary Command Council
deemed necessary.

These demands included the restoration of

the 1923 constitution, the disbanding of the political
police, the cessation of martial law, and the deposing of
1

King Farouk.

The next major move made by the Revolutionary
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Command Council was to ask that Maher begin a program of
land reform.

The Council continued to push for the political

reforms that it had demanded earlier, and it also began to
make overtures to the British and American governments for
the acceptance of its revolution.

It hoped for economic and

military aid for Egypt from these two nations, especially
from the United States.
In September of 1952, Maher was dismissed as Prime
Minister.

The officially stated reason for his dismissal

was his failure to follow the Revolutionary Command Council's
2
land reform policies. A more likely explanation of it is
that the Revolutionary Command Council was simply making its
move to consolidate its effective position of power and its
titular counterpart.

This argument is lent a measure of

credence by the immediate installation of Neguib as Prime
Minister after Maher had been dismissed.

Still, the old

multiple party political system of Egypt remained until
January of l953, when Neguib issued decrees abolishing the

1923 constitution and instituting a military government.
The military government was to be a transitional phase that
was to last three years according to the decrees.

Another

important move made by the Revolutionary Command Council at
this time was begun by Nasser who had been named Minister of
the Interior.

As Minister of the Interior, Nasser controlled

the police organs of the Egyptian government.

He used the

security forces which he now controlled to initiate a drive
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to suppress the Egyptian Communist Party.

The policy of

suppressing the Communist Party was to set a pattern that
Nasser was to follow all through his career, a pattern that
was to cause considerable friction between Egypt and the
Soviet Union in later years.
With Neguib's assumption of the post of Prime Minister,
a power struggle began to surface which pitted him against
Nasser.

Earlier there had been subsurface indications of

such a dispute existing between the two central figures of
the Free Officer's clique, but they had been sublimated by
the need for internal solidarity within the Free Officer's
clique and the Revolutionary Command Council in the face of
its external opponents.

The conflict bewteen the two most

influential members of Egypt's revolution came to a head in
1954 when Nasser violently suppressed the Moslem Brother4
hood. Neguib was a supporter of the Brotherhood and was,
in turn, given its support, so Nasser's act - in his capacity as Minister of the Interior - brought him to loggerheads with Neguib.

Their clash resulted in a brief but

bitter clash which culminated in Neguib's resignation of the
post of Prime Minister.

Nasser took over the reins of

government when Neguib resigned.
Nasser's arrogation of power in Egypt was greeted with
mixed reactions by the leadership in the Soviet Union.

The

Egyptian Communist Party had sided with Neguib in his power
struggle with Nasser.

Given the relationship between the
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ECP and the Soviet Union at that time, a relationship which
was characterized by complete Soviet dominance, the ECP
decision to support Neguib would seem to be indicative of
the attitude of at least one of the elements in the Soviet
leadership at the time.

The members of that clique within

the Sqviet leadership must have felt that Nasser was more
pro-British than Neguib because he seemed to have more ties
to England from his education there and from his military
connections with British officers than did Neguib.
Officially, the response of the Soviet Union to
Nasser's assumption of power in Egypt was not quite as
5
hostile as that of the Egyptian Communist Party.
It ranged
from the condemnation of some of his policies to the encouragement of others.

The Soviets, of course, encouraged

any kind of hostility toward the West which was exhibited by
Nasser.

When the Egyptians signed the Anglo-Egyptian Pact

in 1954, the Soviets on the other hand reacted in an equally
predictable negative fashion.

They claimed that the Nasser
6
regime ''was totally dishonoured." This oscillation toward

Egypt and the Nasser regime was typical of the Soviet Union's
attitude toward the revolutionary government for the first
7

few years following its inception in 1952.

The initial

period of disinterest in Egyptian affairs shown by the Soviet
Union (which was mentioned in the first chapter) was quickly
followed by the unsettled situation described above.

It is

understandable in light of the internal turmoil that was
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taking place in the Soviet Union and, to some extent, in
Egypt at the time.
In the Soviet Union Stalin was still in power, but he
was becoming increasingly ill when the coup first occurred.
Thereafter, the struggles for power between .Malenkov, Beria,
and Khrushchev occupied the Soviet leadership.

With these

concerns, the initial lack of interest and later confusion
which they displayed toward a small, albeit important,
nation in an area which their influence was extremely
limited was not only understandable, but almost certainly
predictable.
The earlier years of Nasser's leadership provided much
with which the Soviet government could take umbrage.

Nasser

initially sought the aid of the United States in modernizing
his army and in constructing the Aswan High Dam.

Nasser

always looked to the West first and foremost in any matter
of importance to Egypt.

At the same time, however, he did
In August

seek to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

1953, the Soviets signed their first agreement with the new
government in Egypt.

This pact, which instituted inter-

national banking cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet
Union, was the harbinger on many more ties which were to
8

develop between the two countries.

One year later, there
9

was an agreement on trade between the two nations.

Agree-

ments of this sort were typical of Egyptian-Soviet relations
until July 19, 1955.

The two nations maintained cordial, if
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not intimate, relations typical of the sort of diplomatic
relations which are maintained by most nations in a relatively stable geopolitical situation as a matter of course.
On July 19, l955, Egypt made an agreement with
Czechoslovakia to trade cotton, rice, and textiles for
machinery.

The true nature of the agreement was not im-

mediately announced by either country.

As the world was to

discover later, the agreement was not a simple commercial
accord between two countries that were attempting to establish solid trade relations.

It was in actuality a deal for

250 million dollars worth of Soviet military equipment which
Czechoslovakia was to provide to Egypt as an intermediary
for the Soviet Union.

The Egyptians were to receive exten-

sive supplies of relatively modern equipment which included
MiG jets, 100 tanks, six submarines, artillery and various
10
other weapons.
The Egyptians had been seeking this sort of arms
package for more than a year.

Initially, they had looked to

the United States to supply them with the armament that they
desired.

Nasser tried hard to obtain the arms from the U.S.

The American government equivocated for a long while, refusing to give Nasser a definite answer.

When Nasser

finally forced the issue, the Americans refused him the arms.
As Admiral Arthur W. Radford of the U.S. Navy said before a
U.S. congressional committee hearing, "The Egyptians wanted
11
the kind of arms we [the U.S.] did not want them to have."
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The Egyptians also tried to obtain arms from the British
following the Anglo-Egyptian Pact.

The British turned a

deaf ear to the purchase requests of the Egyptians as the
Americans had before them.
Nasser was determined to obtain modern armaments for
the Egyptian armed forces.

He apparently felt that such

armaments were imperative if Egypt was to survive and to
grow as a free and independent nation.
by Israel.

He felt threatened

He saw the Baghdad Pact as a threat to Egypt's

prestige in the Arab world which had been initiated by the
United States and Great Britain to maintain their domination
12
of the Middle East.
The Baghdad accords coupled with Israeli
raids on Egyptian territory - the Gaza raid of February 1955
in particular - led Nasser to seek armaments elsewhere.
Nasser's desire for arms led him to the Soviet Union
via a very convoluted path.

It started with his trip to the

Bandung Conference in April of 1955.

On his way to the con-

ference, he met China's Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, in
India.

They became cordial, and in the course of their con-

versations, Nasser inferred to Chou that he would be interested in obtaining arms from the Soviet Union.

Chou indi-

cated to Nasser that the Soviet Union would quite possibly
be willing to sell Egypt the arms it needed.

Indeed, Chou

recommended exactly that course of action to the Soviets in
13
a report he made on Nasser to Moscow.
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About six weeks after his return from Bandung, Nasser
was approached by the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, Daniel
Solod, at a reception.

Solod informed Nasser that he had
14
"an answer to the question you posed to our friends." An

appointment was set up for the next day.

In that meeting

Solod told Nasser that the Soviet Union would be willing to
supply the arms that the Egyptians desired and that a committee would be set up in the Soviet Union to decide the
15
exact nature of the armaments that would be supplied.
Nasser now had a firm offer for the arms that he
desired.

He preferred American arms, however.

Since this

was the case, he gave the United States one last chance to
supply him.

According to Mohammed Heikal, he delayed his

acceptance of the Soviet of fer in the hope that an American
16
arms package would come through.
The United States continued in its stubborn refusal to supply the types of weapons
that the Egyptians felt were imperative for them to obtain.
Finally, although the U.S. tried every means at its disposal
other than force or acquiescence to prevent the deal, Nasser
consummated the Czech Arms Deal in July.
The interim between the forging of the Czech Arms Deal
and the announcement of its true nature was not a period of
complete quiet between the Soviets and the Egyptians.

To

some extent Nasser had given up on the United States and
decided to improve his relations with the world's other
superpower.

Therefore, he decided to make other pacts with
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the Soviet Union and their friends.

On September 6, exactly

three weeks before the Czech Arms Deal was announced, a
barter agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt was
signed.

Under the terms of this accord, Egypt was to supply

the U.S.S.R. with 60,000 tons of rice in return for 500,000
17
tons of crude oil. Eight days later, the Egyptians exchanged
trade offices with the Chinese.

These agreements were quite

possibly intended - at least secondarily - as warnings to the
U.S. that the Egyptians would not wait much longer for a
change in attitude.

As it turned out, they did not.

The Czech Arms Deal with Egypt was the first major
Soviet breakthrough into the Middle East.

It was of major

significance for both signatories and, indeed, the entire
world.

It allowed the Soviets to break through the con-

tainment barrier of NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO that
the Americans and the British had attempted to set up.

It

also gave the Soviets a foothold in an area that was ripe
for the expansion of their influence because of its blossoming nationalism and independence.

Egypt gained the arma-

ments that it needed and, more importantly, an alternative
to the West as a source of aid.

It now had leverage in its

political dealings with both the West and the Communist
bloc.

As later events were to prove, this leverage was to

become an important factor in maintaining an independent
18
course for Egypt in its policies.
The Czech Arms Deal opened the door for improved
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Soviet-Egyptian relations.

It did not, however, advance the

Soviet Union to the position of Egypt's closest friend and
ally, nor did it make the Soviets the nation that Egypt
looked first and foremost to when it sought major aid packages.

In fact, the Soviets offered the Egyptians aid for

the Aswan High Dam on October 10, 1955.

The Egyptians, how-

ever, chose not to immediately pursue this informal offer by
the Soviets for what was the most important project on the
agenda for Egypt.

What the Czech Arms Deal did do immediate-

ly was cause the Egyptians to accept a great many more minor
assistance packages from the Soviet Union and its allies.
In February 1956, Egypt and the Soviet Union came to agreement on the cooperative exploitation of atomic energy for
Egypt.

In March, Egypt concluded a trade agreement with the

People's Republic of North Vietnam which exchanged Egyptian
cotton for Vietnamese coal and cement.

Also in March, Egypt
19
and Bulgaria concluded a trade agreement. These accords
were typical of Egyptian relations with the Soviet bloc
following the Czech Arms Deal.

They were indications of the

quickly growing friendship between Nasser and the Soviet
Union.
While the relationship between the Soviets and Egypt
was becoming more and more cordial, the West was by no means
excluded from Egypt.

In December of 1955, Great Britain and

the United States tendered offers of economic aid for the
Egyptian project of building a large modern dam on the Nile
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at Aswan.

Aswan was the site of an already existing dam,

but it was inadequate for Egypt's needs.

Nasser and the

Egyptians had long dreamed of augmenting their hydroelectric
capabilities as well as the cultivatable acreage of Egypt by
improving the facilities at Aswan.

As a result, they had

been attempting to get assistance for this project almost
since the successful completion of the Egyptian revolution
in 1952.

The Western powers had long procrastinated about

granting this aid to Egypt, but following the Czech Arms
Deal and the subsequent Soviet offer of aid for the project
20
at Aswan, they began to view the granting of aid to the
Egyptians as an imperative step in weaning Egypt away from a
possible turn toward the Soviet Union.
The first step in the Western aid package for what was
to become known as the Aswan High Dam Project was the advancement of a 270 million dollar credit package from the
World Bank to Egypt.

The assistance offered by the World

Bank was made contingent upon British and American funding
of the project as well as large amounts of Egyptian capital.
It contained many conditions that President Nasser found
objectionable.

He felt that the inspection and supervision

clauses in the off er amounted to an attempt by the West to
gain control of the Egyptian economy.

Further, he feared

the stage by stage supply of aid was an attempt to wrest
total control of his nation's economy and political life
from him by making each stage of aid contingent upon more
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and more conditions until Egypt was nothing more than a
puppet dancing to Western tugs on its strings.

Eugene Black,

president of the World Bank, flew to Cairo to discuss the
problems with the aid program with Nasser.

After a dis-

cussion that lasted several days, Black and Nasser came to
21
an agreement upon the conditions of the loan.
One important
provision that remained unchanged was that the loan would be
conditional upon American and British aid packages.
Great Britain and the United States had sent their aid
packages along with that of the World Bank, following its
report that the project was financially feasible.

They made

their offers contingent upon the same conditions as had the
World Bank.

When they made their offers of aid, both the

British and the Americans intended to reassert their influence in Egypt.

As John Foster Dulles, then American Secre-

tary of State, told Nasser through Eugene Black, "I want
Nasser to understand that the Russians can give him weapons
22
for death, but we alone can give him and his people life."
An admirable sentiment, and one that almost certainly would
have - if carried through - defused the nascent EgyptianSoviet friendship.

However, the British and American offers

of assistance were to be withdrawn almost as soon as Black
returned from his mission to Cairo.
The reasons for the sudden reversal of the Western
position are extremely confused and unclear.

Some students

of the question claim that the Americans and the British de-
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cided that Egypt could not pay her share of the dam's costs
23

because her economy was unsound.

(Under the terms of the

loans, Egypt was to match the funds supplied by the West with
an equal amount of her own money.)

Since the dam was a

financially unsound project, according to this line of reasaning, the American and British offers were withdrawn and
the World Bank's loan automatically lapsed.
In his memoirs, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime
Minister at the time, also asserted that the Egyptian economy was becoming increasingly unsound.

Finally, Eden says

that there was only so much aid that the West, especially
24

Great Britain, could afford.

The British had more important

projects in the aid department (e.g. helping their close
ally, Nuri a-Said, in Iraq).
Another claim as to the reasoning behind the withdrawal of the loan offers is that American internal political problems caused the Americans to withdraw their loan
25
offer.
This line of reasoning holds that Dulles was annoyed
at Nasser's independence.

In the face of tight congression-

al purse strings, arguments that the money was better used
at home, and the Zionist lobby, Dulles reneged on his part
of the offer when Nasser recognized the People's Republic of
China.

This action caused the China lobby to side with the

other forces that opposed the loan.

With such strong oppo-

sition in Congress, the loan for the Aswan was almost certain to be rejected.

This being the case, Dulles wished to
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avoid an embarrassment for the Administration and so withdrew the proposal.
A fourth suggestion as to the reasons for the withdrawal of the aid package to Egypt is put forward by Kennett
26
Love.
He advances the notion that the assistance funds were
withdrawn because of the failure of an American initiative
for peace on the Palestinian issues between Egypt and the
Israelis.

Love blames this failure on David Ben-Gurion

whose obstinancy led him to set conditions on the peace proposals that were impossible for Nasser to accept.
There are other notions as to why the West dropped its
offer to loan Egypt money for the Aswan High Dam Project.
Some of these are Nasser's unreasonable foreign policy be27
havior, Eden's personal enmity for Nasser, and that the
West's more obedient Arab allies

(Iraq, etc.) pressured

against Nasser and Egypt receiving aid in preference to them.
Most of these reasons undoubtedly carry a modicum of
the true reasoning behind the withdrawal of the Western
offers.

From the point of view of the West, a point of view

that was still deeply imbued with the Two-Camp view of the
world, Nasser was unreasonable, especially in foreign policy
matters.

He refused to acquiesce to Western foreign policy

dictates in such important matters as the signing of the
Baghdad Pact and the recognition of the People's Republic of
China.

He had allowed the Soviets to break through the ring

86
of encirclement the West had placed around them when he coneluded the Czech Arms Deal.

He continually attempted to re-

move Western influence from the Arab nations and to replace
i t with his own.

He further contributed to the rise of

neutralism and independence in the policies of Third World
nations by supporting and attending the Bandung Conference.
All of these factors combined to make Nasser and his
policies objectionable in the eyes of the West and its
leaders.

His refusal to defer to Anglo-American policy in

return for aid made it difficult for the West to aid Nasser.
This was especially true in view of the internal politics of
the West at the time.
In Great Britain there was a strong lobby that demanded the cessation of British aid to Egypt.

They felt

that Nasser was bent upon destroying Britain's influence in
the Middle East.

They were adamantly in favor of the harsh-

est possible measures being taken against him.

This lobby

was strongly imperialistic and was highly critical of Great
Britain's declining role in the post World War II world,
especially during Eden's tenure as Prime Minister.

They

insinuated that Eden was a weakling, a jibe to which Eden
28
was particularly sensitive.
The United States also had a strong faction in its
legislature that opposed aiding Egypt in its Aswan High Dam
Project.

The opponents of the loan contended that, since

Egypt was unwilling to follow the American line in return
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for aid, there was no good reason for such a large expendi29
ture of money.
This reason combined with those of the
pro-Israeli lobby in Washington to make it difficult to get
Congressional approval for the loan.

However, Congressional

reluctance is rarely a sufficient reason for an American
administration to abandon a foreign loan, especially one
that has already been offered (e.g., the 1982 American sale
of the A.W.A.C. radar system to Saudi Arabia).

It would al-

most have to be combined with other strong reasons for an
administration to kill such an important foreign policy
initiative.
The argument that Dulles and Eden felt that Egypt was
unable to carry its economic share also has some credibility.
30

In fact, Eden himself even lends it credence in his memoirs.
Certainly Dulles and Eden might have believed this despite
the assurances of Eugene Black and the World Bank that the
Egyptian economy was sound and the project was feasible ten
31
short days before the withdrawal of the American offer.
Throughout the period from his meetings with Nasser in
late January of 1956 until the official withdrawal of the
British and American offers of aid on July 19th, Black rnain32
tained that the High Darn was "entirely feasible." He stated
on several occasions that Egypt was capable of contributing
its share of the expenditures.

When the United States and

Great Britain withdrew their offers of aid, Black regarded
their contention that "

. the ability of Egypt to devote
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adequate resources to assure the project has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made," as both an untruth and a cruel diplomatic ploy designed to damage
33
Nasser's position. Black's belief in the Egyptian economy
was later given support by Senator William Fulbright.

In

his statement about the findings of the Senate Subcommittee
on Foreign Relations which he chaired, Senator Fulbright
indicated that they had not found any evidence to give
credence to the claim that the Egyptian economy was rapidly
deteriorating.
Another set of indicators that discredits the American
and British claims that the Egyptian economy was becoming
incapable of carrying its share of the load for the Aswan
High Darn Project are the economic statistics for the
Egyptian economy during the period in question.

First,

during the two-year period from 1955 to 1957, the Egyptian
national income increased from 918 million Egyptian pounds
to 1086 million Egyptian pounds.

Second, the Egyptian

foreign debt decreased from 34 million Egyptian pounds to
31.2 million pounds.

The claim that Egyptian foreign ex-

penditures (especially those for arms from the Soviet bloc)
were going up in proportion to national income are also
demonstrably false.

In 1955, imports by Egypt as a percent-

age of their national income were 28 percent.
same ratio was 27 percent.

In 1956, this

Finally, in 1957, the percentage
34
of income that imports provided was 25 percent.
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These figures indicate that, if anything, the Egyptian
economy was becoming more sound, not less so.
income was increasing.
national debt.

Its national

The Egyptians were reducing their

The Egyptians were also decreasing their

foreign expenditures.

These conditions are directly opposite

to those that the American and British governments were
claiming had been the cause for their withdrawal of their aid
packages.
Given these indicators of the strength of the Egyptian
economy, one must look elsewhere for the reasoning behind the
withdrawal of the Western aid packages.

Was the American

withdrawal of aid simply a blunder based on misinformation,
or was it a concerted attempt at disciplining a wayward
foreign government?

Whichever is the case, it was certain-

ly one of the most disasterous blunders made by the governments of the West in the Middle East since World War II.
The American withdrawal of aid to Egypt for its Aswan
Dam project caused a chasm to be opened between the West and
Nasser that could never be bridged.

Nasser turned to the

Soviets first and foremost from that point in time until his
death.

It cost the West any hope for the friendship of the

most influential Arab nation in the world.

It gave their

Soviet opponents a strong position in a thitherto inaccessible area of the world.

It further polarized a world that

was already near the brink of the final holocaust.

What was

worse from the American point of view is that it was an error
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that could have been avoided simply by honoring a commitment
that had already been made.

Whether Egypt's economy was in

a state of disrepair or not, from hindsight it is quite
obvious that the investment of Western funds in Egypt's
Aswan High Darn Project would have paid much greater dividends
than it could have cost.

It would have decreased the aid

needed to rebuild the armies of the region by almost certainly limiting the rise in tensions that led to hostilities that
led to the Arab-Israeli wars that were to follow.

It would

have delayed, if not totally prevented, Soviet encroachment
into the Middle East.

It would have slowed the rise of

enmity in the Third World toward the United States.

If all

of these benefits were not in themselves sufficient to grant
the aid package to Egypt, there are also the humanitarian
benefits that would have come from having a lasting monument
to the generosity of the West.
The most immediate benefit of honoring the commitment
to aid Egypt in the construction of the Aswan High Darn became apparent immediately after the withdrawal of the aid
packages was announced.

Nasser's reaction to the Western

renege was not long in corning.

Exactly one week after the

United States withdrew its offer to aid Egypt in the construction of the Aswan Darn, Egypt nationalized the Suez
Canal Company.

It had owned this company in conjunction with

Great Britain and France prior to the act of nationalization.
Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal came
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four days after the United States announced the withdrawal
of its aid package for the construction of the Aswan Dam.
According to Mohammed Heikal, Nasser's decision to nationalize had come almost immediately after he learned of the re35
nege.
He delayed in making this response public until he had
ascertained the military strength of Great Britain in its
Middle Eastern protectorates and dependencies.

When he was

convinced that the British were incapable of immediate military action against him, he announced his decision to nationalize the Egyptian holdings of the Suez Canal Company in a
speech delivered in Alexandria on the evening of July 26th.
This decision by Egypt's leader came out of annoyance toward
what he perceived as the West's mistreatment of Egypt.
Nasser felt that the withdrawal of aid by the United States
and Great Britain was unconscionable.

In Nasser's eyes, the

West's cancellation of the aid packages was an attempt to
pressure him into making concessions to Israel over the
issue of Israeli passage through the Suez Canal (Egypt had
blockaded both terminals of the canal, refusing the allow any
Israeli shipping through) .
The nationalization of the canal seemed to Nasser to be
the perfect response to the pressure he perceived emanating
from the West.

Beyond indicating to the West that Egypt re-

fused to be pushed around, the nationalization of the canal
provided Egypt with another major source of income.

The

profits from the canal could be applied to building the
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Aswan Dam in place of the withdrawn Western funds.
The British response to Nasser's action was immediate.
The entire nation was outraged.

The London Times commented

that "an international waterway of this kind cannot be
worked by a nation of as low technical and managerial skills
36

as the Egyptians."

The leader of the British opposition
37

party, Hugh Gaitskell, denounced Nasser as another Hitler.
These reactions were typical of the tide of sentiment that
was sweeping through Great Britain at the time.

The nation-

alization of the canal was condemned on political, moral,
and economic grounds by an outraged British populace.
The most important reaction of anyone in Great Britain
was that of Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister.

Ac-

cording to Anthony Nutting, his Foreign Minister at the
start of the crisis, the nationalization of the Suez gave
38

Eden the opportunity for which he had been waiting.

Eden

had been spoiling for an opportunity to destroy Nasser.

He

now had his chance to take down the man whom he so detested.
Whether or not Nutting's characterization of Eden's
motives is correct, his description of the response of Eden
as ".

. an all-out campaign of political, military

pressures on Egypt .

." is a particularly apt appraisal of

what the British did under the leadership of Eden.

When Eden

heard the news of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez, he was
dining with King Feisal of Iraq, Prince-Regent Abdullah, Nuri
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a-Said, Lord Salisbury, and Selwyn Lloyd.
as outraged as was Eden.

They were nearly

The Iraqis encouraged Eden and the
39

British to initiate an immediate harsh response.

This re-

action on the part of the Iraqi leaders probably came out of
their long rivalry with Egypt for a position of primacy in
the Arab world, as well as pique from the failure of Nasser
to inform them of his intentions in advance.

Whatever the

motives behind the Iraqi reaction, it gave Eden political
support from an Arab nation in his chastisement of Nasser.
From Eden's point of view, things could not have worked out
better, or so it seemed.

He had what seemed to be the per-

feet opportunity to reassert British influence in the Middle
East and even had Arab support in doing so.
The day after Eden was informed of the nationalization
of the Suez Canal, he began to take steps to regain the
British interest in the canal.
Britain were frozen.
materiels was banned.

Egyptian assets in Great

The export of arms and military
A formal note of protest was sent to

the Egyptian Embassy in London.

The note was returned to
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the British in its own envelope.
These were the major steps taken by Great Britain in
the initial period following the Egyptian seizure of the
property and assets of the Suez Canal Company in Egypt.
immediate military action was taken.

No

Nasser had been care-

ful in his planning to be sure that there was insufficient
force available to the British in the Eastern Mediterranean
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region for them to force an immediate solution favorable to
their cause.
The other major stockholder of the Suez Canal Company,
France, was also harsh in its condemnation of Nasser's act of
"piracy."
~alled

They, just as had Mr. Gaitskell of Great Britain

the nationalization of the canal an act that compared

to Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland in the late 1930's.
They refused to accept the situation passively.

They, just

as Great Britain, were determined that Nasser would not be
allowed to have complete control of the so-called "throat"
of Europe.

The loss of their interest in the Suez Canal

Company was a severe economic blow to the French.

In an

attempt to counter that loss, they paralleled the British
move and froze Egypt's assets in France.

The French de-

manded that harsh and immediate action be taken against
Egypt.

Their Prime Minister, Christian Pineau, claimed that

if the West did not react strongly, the Middle Eastern oil
pipelines would be nationalized within three months and that
Europe would, as a result, be at the mercy of the Arabs.

He

demanded American approval for the diversion of two squad-
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rons of Mystere IV jets that were bound for NATO to Israel.
While the reaction of the West was in general, outrage
and dismay, the rest of the world reacted quite differently.
The Arab countries, and to some extent the rest of the Third
World, were the scenes of outpourings of popular sentiment
favoring the nationalization of the canal.

Even the Iraqi
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leaders, who had initially encouraged harsh British action,
were forced to ameliorate their stand in favor of one which
was more in tune with the grass roots sentiments of the
42

Iraqi populace and supported Nasser's act.

The Soviet Union

was also evenutally supportive of Nasser's move to take over
the running of the canal.
ately to Egypt's side.
period of silence.

The Soviets did not come immedi-

Instead, they maintained a brief

Presumably, the Soviet delay was en-

gendered by a desire on the part of the Soviet leadership to
wait and see how things would turn out when the dust had
43

settled.
After Nasser made his nationalization speech on July
26, silence was the only thing emanating from !1oscow on the
subject.

In fact, according to Mohammed Heikal, the Soviet

Union was so cautious in its response that on the day the
canal was nationalized, no member of the Egyptian Embassy
could do so much as "contact even a third grade civil servant
in the (Soviet) Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

The caution of

the Soviet Union is highlighted even more strongly when one
considers that this was only two days after the Soviets had
renewed their offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam.

It

took a day before the Soviet leadership decided upon its
response to Nasser's bold act of political defiance.
The Soviet hierarchy from Khrushchev down to the lower
echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy for foreign affairs began
to issue statements that were warmly supportive of the
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canal's nationalization.

In a statement made in noscow on

July 31st, Krushchev urged the international community to
react calmly to the takeover.

He claimed that "nationaliza-

tion was an action that the Egyptian government, as a sovereign government, is entitled to take."

He also said,

We think that the policy of putting the pressure
on Egypt is a mistaken one.
Rashness and haste in
this matter can only bring undesirable consequences
for the cause of peace and can only damage the interests of the Western Powers themselves in the
area. The Suez Canal's nationalization does not
affect the people of Britain, France, the U.S., and
other countries. Only the former Suez Canal
Company, which received profits from the canal's
exploitation, is now being deprived of the possibility of self-enrichment at Egypt's expense. The
Soviet Union, directly interested in the freedom of
shipping through the Suez Canal and noting the
Egyptian government's statement to the effect that
the Suez Canal will remain free for all, considers
that there is no grounds for alarm and concern over
this matter. We are confident that the situation
in the Suez Canal will not become aggravated if it
is not artificially aggravated from the outside. 44
Most of the other initial statements made by the
Soviet leadership and their press organizations were also
reasonable and relatively conservative in their support for
Egypt and their warnings to the West.

Izvestia, the

semi-official voice of the Soviet government, took a somewhat more radical stance on the issue.

It denounced the

"threats of war" made by some Israeli leaders "aided and
abetted by external imperialist quarters" against Israel's
"peace-loving neighbors."

The "external quarters" referred

to in Izvestia were undoubtedly primarily France, which had
an extremely close relationship with Israel at the time,
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and secondarily, Great Britain.

Perhaps this hard-line

statement in Izvestia represented one element of opinion
within the Communist Party hierarchy, or as it has been suggested elsewhere, it was simply a sop to Arab opinion.

What-

ever the case, it was a harbinger of the stance that Moscow
was to take as the crisis over the canal's nationalization
deepened.
After the initial uncertainties which followed the
nationalization of the Suez, relations between all of the
interested parties began to settle into a pattern.

The

British and French governments established a pattern of escalating pressure with which they attempted to force Egypt
to return the canal to its previous owners.
resisted all pressure quite firmly.

The Egyptians

They maintained a calm-

ly reasonable tone in all of their replies to what were
quite often vitriolic and extremely unfair and mendacious
attacks by the British and French.

The Soviets issued

statements of support for Nasser and his government, and
made increasingly bellicose threats directed against the
46
West.
The United States supported the British and French,
but only to a limited extent.

The Americans attempted to

aid their allies in gaining the return of the Suez Canal
Company's assets through negotiations and also through
economic and political pressure aimed at Egypt.

Despite

this support for the cause of the British and French govern-
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ments, the Americans did attempt to restrain them from any
rash actions such as a military invasion of Egypt aimed at
retaking the canal by force.

In this atmosphere of bluster

and economic and diplomatic warfare, the first stage of the
Suez Canal crisis unfolded.

It was an event that was to

have major political consequences for the British, the
French, the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Soviet Union,
and even the Americans, in the ensuing years.
During that first stage, the British, fueled by Eden's
undisguised enmity for Nasser, began a series of diplomatic
strategems designed to nullify Nasser's nationalization.
Their first step was to meet with representatives of the
French and American governments.

In these meetings, Eden

hoped to come to an agreement which would involve the United
47

States to the utmost in forcing a settlement of the crisis.
The French also were insistent upon American involvement.
it.

They wanted the Suez back.

They had, after all, built

Beyond that, Nasser's action would have profound con-

sequences for their entire position in North Africa, said
the French.
fresh heart.

The nationalist elements in Algeria would take
The Algerian nationalists would look to Egypt

for even more support since it had successfully defied the
will of the French.

The Egyptians would undoubtedly supply

such support in terms of both arms and clamor.

As it turned

out, the French had correctly predicted the course of events
that would follow the conclusion of the Suez Canal crisis in
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Algeria.

The Americans were unsympathetic to these argu-

ments, probably because of their inveterate distrust of
"colonialism."

The French put forth another argument.

The

nationalization was a response to the renege by the
48

Americans and the British on the Aswan High Dam loans.
Therefore, they should take some responsibility for the consequences of their action.
The Americans proved unwilling to accept any sort of
responsibility for the nationalization.

They took the posi-

tion that Nasser had been planning this move for a long time
and it was not retaliatory in nature.

The Americans did

agree, however, that some action was necessary.

Their con-

tention was that the best solution to the situation was
international discussion of the problem.

They felt that the

U.N. was not the ideal forum for the situation.

Instead,

Dulles suggested that some sort of international committee
would be better suited to deal with the exigencies of the
49
situation.
The American proposals for an international conference
were soon to become reality.

The final outcome of this

round of British-French-American tripartite discussions was
the proposal of an international conference which was to
take place in London in August l956.

While the three

Western powers were conferring in London, the Soviets and
Egyptians were having discussions of their own.

According

to Mohammed Heikal, the Egyptians were careful not to appear
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to be coordinating their policy with the Russians.
However,
Nasser's conference with the Soviets on August 6 and other
hints of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, such as Nasser making
the announcement that the Soviets were going to attend the
London Conference before the Soviets had officially accepted
the invitation to attend, gave many reason to believe that
the Soviets and Egyptians were in collusion.

Eden was cer-

tainly one of the many who held this belief.

In his memoirs

he states, "Egypt took up a rigid position, after consultation with the Russians.
The contacts between the two
51
countries were close." Eden's statement of the nature of
Soviet-Egyptian relations during this period is undoubtedly
(given the evidence of Nasser's statement about Soviet
attendance at the London Conference and the frequency of
Soviet-Egyptian meetings) much closer to reality than is
that of Heikal.

Although there was undoubtedly little

strategic or tactical coordination between the two countries,
there was probably a great deal of information sharing and
political cooperation between them.
The cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
Egyptians continued through the first London Conference
which was held from August 16 to August 23.

The confer-

ence was one of the key events of the early stages of the
Suez crisis.
conference.

Twenty-four nations were invited to the
Eight of them (Egypt, France, Italy, the

Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, Russia, and Great Britain) were

101
asked to attend because they were signatories of the 1888
Convention on canal use.

The other sixteen were invited

because large amounts of their commerce passed through the
canal.

The nations who were asked to attend because of the

frequency with which their ships plied the canal included
Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, West Germany, Greece,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Portugal, Sweden and the United States.

Of the nations

which were invited, Egypt and Greece were the only nations
that refused to attend.
Egypt did not completely refrain from participating in
the conference.

Instead of sending active delegates to the

proceedings, the Egyptians sent a party of observers to the
conference.

The delegation was headed by Ali Sabri.

The

Egyptian party of observers was sent in order to present the
Egyptian point of view without giving Egyptian sanction of
the conference and also to report the results of the proceeding to Nasser.
In the stead of an active Egyptian delegation, the
Soviets became one of the champions of the Egyptian cause.
In their statement of their acceptance of the invitation to
the conference, the Soviet leaders made it clear where they
stood.

They stated that the conference was convened in dis-

regard of a number of relevant provisions of the 1888 Convention, that the list of participants was biased (according
to Anthony Nutting, the British had purposely stacked the
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deck in their favor - a look at the participants and a close
look at their political positions at the time seems to confirm the charge), and that acceptance "in no way commits"
the Soviet Union to anything that could "harm Egypt's sover52
eign rights and dignity." Like India, Ceylon, and Indonesia,
the Soviet Union rallied behind Nasser at the Suez Canal
Users Conference in London.

The Indians, led by Krishna

Menon, were the main proponents of the arguments in favor of
the Egyptians' nationalization of the canal.

The Soviet

delegation acted as Menon's second in the debates.

The main

issue over which the two sides wrangled was the structure of
a proposed international group that was to be set up to aid
the Egyptians in the running of the Suez Canal.

The Anglo-

French bloc wanted a tight grouping that would effectively
take control of the canal away from Egypt and put it in
international hands.

The Soviets and the other pro-Nasser

nations argued for a loosely knit group, "a consultative body
of user interests with advisory, consultative and liaison
functions," the existence of which would be "without preju53
dice to Egyptian ownership and operation."
At the beginning of the conference, the Soviets had
argued that the nations which were now present on the territories of what had formerly been the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
as well as the other nations of Eastern Europe and the Arab
nations of the Middle East, should have been invited to participate.

By reiterating their pre-conference position that
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the list of attendees was biased, the Soviets were clearly
announcing their pro-Egyptian position.

The next argument

which the Soviet delegation, led by Dmitri Shepilov, advanced
was that no binding decision could be reached without active
Egyptian participation since much of what was at issue 54
nationalization - was an internal Egyptian concern. After
having made their basic position quite clear, the Soviets
aligned with India and the other supporters of Nasser to
block a British proposal which would have instituted "a
majority rules" policy on voted issues.

As a result, the

conference was reft of any teeth that it might otherwise
have had and became nothing more than a forum for the exchange of ideas.
The conference resulted in what can basically be
termed a stalemate.

Eighteen of the attending nations took

the position that the canal should be international, as the
British had proposed.

The other four participating

countries (India, Indonesia, U.S.S.R. and Ceylon)

supported

the Egyptian position of neutralization of the canal under
Egyptian sovereignty.

(Ironically, the British and the

Soviet positions on the issue of internationalization or
neutralization of the canal had switched from the positions
which the representatives of their respective nations had
taken in 1888 at the bargaining table of the Treaty of
Constantinople.

The Egyptian position, which the Soviets

supported, was nearly identical to the position that the
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British had assumed in 1888.

The British agitation for in-

ternationalization was quite similar to the position that the
Soviet Union had endorsed as recently as 1946.

Both sides

were quite fond of reminding each other of their respective
about-faces.)

The London Conference did not moderate

Nasser's position in any way.

If any affect upon the

Egyptian position was noticeable after the conference, it
was that Nasser and the Egyptians stood even more firmly behind their refusal to return the canal or have it internationalized.
The failure of the London Conference opened the door to
British and French military sanctions.
remained in the way of immediate action:

Only three obstacles
1) their armed

forces were not yet ready to invade; 2) the Egyptians had
given them no justifiable provocation to invade (true they
had seized a British and French-owned company; however, they
had not done injury to British or French citizens, nor had
they prevented British or French ships from plying the canal,
despite the refusal by the owners of British and French
vessels to pay dues to the Egyptian Canal Authority); and, 3)
the United States was strongly opposed to a military invasion.

Of these three obstacles, the second was the most

important to overcome.

The first problem only required a

bit of time to reach a solution.

The third was insufficient

in and of itself to stop the British and French from implementing a plan which they believed would bring them success
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on all fronts.

They were certain that military action would

result in a quick victory which would return the canal to
their control and at the same time wreak the destruction of
their hated nemesis - Nasser.
The French took the removal of the lack of sufficient
provocation into their own hands.

Without saying a word to

Eden or any British minister, the French had turned to Israel
for help in manufacturing a pretext for the invasion of
Egypt.

Inunediately after the London Conference, the French

began discussions with the Israeli Defense Minister, Shimon
Peres, which were aimed at recapturing the canal with Israeli
55
assistance.
While the French and Israeli governments were collaborating in the development of a plan designed to gain each
its respective desire vis-a-vis Egypt, the war of words between Egypt and its European opponents continued its rapid
escalation.

The mounting tension was highlighted by the

London Conference's decision to send a team of negotiators to
Egypt to try to arrange a settlement.

Ostensibly this would

seem to be a positive step toward achieving a peaceful solution to the crisis.

However, the emissary who was delegated

to head the negotiating team could hardly have been a less
suitable selection.

Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of

Australia, was made head of the delegation.

Henzies was

extremely pro-British and anti-Nasser in his public statements and his selection was made even more detrimental to the
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possibility of a successful negotiation by his personal
prejudice against non-Caucasians.

Menzies described himself

publicly as a "reasonably bigoted descendant of the Scottish
56

race."

Naturally, with an emissary like rlenzies, the peace

mission was a dismal and absolute failure.

A second major

step toward war came after the London Conference when French
troops were stationed on British-controlled Cyprus in preparation for an invasion of the Suez Canal Zone.
With the predictable failure of the Menzies mission,
the prospect of war loomed even more brightly on the horizon.
All that remained between the prospect and the actuality was
an acceptable pretext for a Franco-British invasion.

An at-

tempt toward providing themselves with just such a pretext
was made by the British at the second London Conference which
was convened on September 16th.

The conference resulted in

the setting up of an association of the users of the Suez
Canal (S.C.U.A.) which the British hoped would agree to divert all users' fees from Egypt to a fund controlled by the
membership of S.C.U.A.

The British hoped that this would

cause the Egyptians to deny ships of the S.C.U.A. members
passage through the canal and thus provide the British with
an excuse to invade.

The British hopes were dashed, however,

by what seemed to be an American insistence on maintaining
57

the then existent status quo.
The Soviet reaction to the Anglo-French military buildup was predictable.

They responded immediately to the prep-
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arations for war by the British and French militaries in
their press.

An editorial which was signed by an "Observer,"

a sobriquet which generally indicates that the author was a
member of the Politburo and that the statements contained
within the piece represent official policy, stated that the
Anglo-French troop movements were indicative of "a nervousness (that was) in no way justified."

The position put forth

in the editorial by an "Observer" was repeatedly put forward
by the Soviet press over the next few weeks.

The articles

were all indicative of both the Soviet desire to support
Egypt and their concomitant belief in the necessity to keep
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tension in the Middle East at a minimum.
The Soviet hope that the brewing storm in the Middle
East could be kept from breaking was to a large extent
matched by similar hopes among American policy makers.

In

an American statement on the subject which was reported by
Pravda on August 9th, President Eisenhower said that "force
is a bad solution to the Suez problem," but that he did not
59
oppose the use of force "under any circumstances." The
last phrase in Eisenhower's statement was undoubtedly motivated by the political necessities of the alliance between
Great Britain and France and the U.S., but it seems likely
that they had no greater significance given the evidence of
later American actions and the efforts of John Foster Dulles
to arrive at a legal solution to the crisis over the Suez
Canal such as the one represented by S.C.U.A.
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The next step taken by the British in "setting the
stage" for an Anglo-French invasion was to take the matter
to the United Nations' Security Council.

The British delga-

tion was led by Selwyn Lloyd who put forward six requirements
for a settlement that Eden felt would be unacceptable to the
Egyptians.

These requirements were to become known as the

Six Proposals, and they were:
1)

Free and open transit of the canal without discrimination, overt or covert;

2)

The sovereignty of Egypt would be respected;

3)

The insulation of the canal's operation from
the politics of any country;

4)

The manner of fixing tolls should be decided
by agreement between the users and Egypt;

5)

A fair proportion of dues should be alloted
to development; and

6)

In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt should
60
be resolved by arbitration.

The British proposed that these six principles be implemented
by an international board.
already rejected absolutely.

This was something that Egypt had
The Soviets were adamantly

against any strictures such as the ones the British proposed.
The Egyptians, however, surprisingly proved willing to
accept the original six proposals, but were still unwilling
to accept internationalization of the canal.

They were will-

ing to compromise as long as their sovereignty was not dimin-

109
ished.

Selwyn Lloyd, Mahmoud Fawzi, and U.N. Secretary-

General Dag Hammarskjold began discussions and eventually
were on the verge of a peaceful solution to the swelling
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crisis.
Eden and French Prime Minister Pineau were displeased
at the turn toward a negotiated settlement of the canal
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crisis.
Such a conclusion to the dispute would destroy,
temporarily at the very least, their plans for the eradication of Nasser and the restoration of Anglo-French influence
in the Middle East.

They did their best to delay the

process of negotiation by making false and antagonistic
accusations directed at the Egyptians in their public
speeches.

Their delaying tactics were successful enough to

keep a settlement from being reached before Israel had invaded Egypt.
During the period of verbal sparring following the
first London Conference, the French and the Israelis had
been quietly working out a plan in which Israel was to mount
a rapid attack on Egyptian positions in the Sinai.

Given

this opening, Britain and France would wait until Israel had
seized all or most of the Sinai and would then intervene
demanding that both sides withdraw their forces from the
Suez Canal.

The invasion by the two erstwhile controllers

of the canal would take place on the pretext that the AngloFrench forces were attempting to prevent the canal from sustaining damage during the fighting.

Given this scenario,
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Britain and France would have, according to the plan, a perfeet excuse for re-establishing their control of the Canal
Zone and for taking over the terminal ports which had hitherto been used by Egypt to implement their blockade of the
63
canal from use by Israeli ships.
The French presented this plan to Eden and his top
advisors on October 14.

As reported by Anthony Nutting,

Eden's reaction was scarcely concealed glee.

Despite the

objections and warnings of his Foreign Ilinister and his
Foreign Secretary, Nutting and Selwyn Lloyd, Eden went to
Paris two days after the French proposal had been broached
to him.

There he had several meetings with his French oppo-

site number, Guy Mollet.

In those meetings, he agreed to
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the French plan for an Israeli attack.
The Israeli attack took place on October 30.
a complete and rapid success.

It was

Inside of one week, the

Israelis had driven Egypt out of the Sinai in a series of
paratroop and armored attacks that devastated the Egyptian
army.

The Israelis had Franco-British aid in their attacks.

In addition to the physical aid of British and French air
strikes, the Israelis were benefited by the Egyptian preparations to defend Alexandria from an Anglo-French invasion.
The expectation of an attack from Cyprus helped the Israelis
65
to achieve a nearly total surprise of the Egyptian forces.
Almost immediately after the Israeli invasion, the

111

British and French governments sent an ultimatum demanding
that both sides cease hostilities and withdraw ten miles
from the Suez Canal.

If these conditions were not met, the

French and British threatened military intervention in
66

twenty-four hours.

Perhaps the most significant thing to

note about the ultimatum is that it demanded that the
Israelis withdraw ten miles from the canal four days before
they had even come near it.

By granting this territory to

Israel and allowing Egyptian forces only twenty-four hours
to withdraw (an impossible task), the British and French
served notice to anyone who cared to look that they were in
collusion with the Israelis.
By the time that Israel had consolidated its hold on
the Sinai (one week after their initial attacks), Britain
and France were prepared to intervene physically with their
own troops.

Their "efforts" at "peacemaking" had failed as

was intended, and they had provided the French and British
with an excuse to intervene since the Egyptians had not complied with the terms of their ultimatum.

So on November 5,

a force of Anglo-French paratroopers invaded Port Said.
Their invasion was the beginning of the final stage of the
Israeli-French-British plot to destroy Nasser.

According to

their plan, this last stage was to end with an Egyptian
popular revolt which was to oust Nasser.

If such a revolt

failed to materialize, the allies were prepared to invade
67

Cairo and eliminate Nasser themselves.
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The last stage of the plan came to an abrupt and
abortive halt on November 7.

The British pound sterling

had taken a nose dive on the world market and, as a result,
the British economy was in danger of collapse.

A cease-fire

in the Sinai was the price of American intervention to stave
off such a fiscal disaster for Great Britain.
The American desire for a cease-fire was the result of
their view of the Anglo-French adventure as a dangerous
folly.

They had agitated from its inception to halt it and

had tried to prevent i t from occurring in the first place.
The American view was generated out of a well-placed sense
of timidity.

Despite the bitter resentment of Nasser that

had been engendered in Dulles, the Americans apparently
realized what an armed incursion into an independent Arab
nation would do to damage their image in the Middle East
whether or not it was successful in its short term goal.
Any attack on Nasser would make him a martyr to the
rapacious desires of Western imperialism - especially if it
was successful.

If the attempt was unsuccessful, it would

heighten Nasser's prestige in the Third World also.

If it

was successful, it would probably cause a drastic shift
toward the Soviet Union.

Thus, any military action to re-

gain the canal could only result in a serious loss for the
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United States.
The Soviet Union had also agitated from the beginning
for a halt to the Anglo-French invasion.

Unlike that of the
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Americans, the Soviet role was limited to vociferous saber69
rattling that did little to end the conflagration.
The
Soviets were limited to a secondary role because, unlike the
U.S., the Soviet Union had no political and very little
economic leverage with the participants in the invasion.

The

Soviet leaders did gain much more than the United States as a
result of the invasion.

A drastic improvement in the Soviet

position in the Arab world was built into the situation.
They were able to be quite public in their condemnation of
the invasion of Egypt because their allies were not involved
in it.

The United States could not possibly gain anywhere

near the kind or amount of prestige that the Soviets did
despite the fact that its quiet machinations were the instrument that actually halted the allied agression.
Soviet saber-rattling came in a series of communiques
to Britain, France and Israel.

Implications that were read

into their communiques included the threat of nuclear war,
and the dispatch of communist volunteers to aid Egypt.

As

the result of such bellicose diplomacy, the Soviets have
often made the claim to have been responsible for the cessation of the hostilities between Egypt and her foes.

It is a

claim which is quite often given credence in the Arab world
(but a claim which even Nasser discounted) .

In their com-

munications with the Egyptian government, the Soviets were
much more cautious.

Perhaps the most significant communica-

tion with Egypt was one that came just after the Franco-

114
British invasion of Port Said.

It informed the Egyptian

government that no material aid was forthcoming and that
they (the Egyptians) would have to "strengthen their will to
70

resist."

Thus, the Soviet contribution to the Egyptian war

effort was limited to rhetoric and the agreed upon arms
shipments which stemmed from the 1955 arms deal.
risked nothing.

The Soviets

However, their minimal contributions did

provide them a great deal of benefit in the years to come.
When the hostilities were over, the balance sheet
seemed fairly clear.

The Israelis had achieved their prob-

able objectives by increasing their own territory and opening up the sea lanes.

The French had not succeeded in

quelling the Algerian revolution by destroying Nasser, but
then neither had they lost anything of significance.

They

were already friendless in the Arab world and their conduct
of the war cost them none of their other friends.

They had

regained a damaged and inoperative canal at minimal loss.
The British had won an easy military victory along with
their allies, but they had failed to dislodge Nasser, lost
prestige in the Arab world, and antagonized the U.S.

In

reality, they had gained nothing but woe for all of their
troubles.

A particularly apt description of the results

of the Suez war for Britain came from Dulles, who described
the British post-incursion position by saying, "Eden had
wrested one end of the (Suez) canal out of Nasser's throat
but the piece now stuck in his own and Eisenhower was pound-

115
71
ing on his back to get it loose."
The U.N. had shown itself to be ineffective by its

failure to keep the Israelis from invading, the manner in
which its authority was flaunted by the Anglo-French intervention and through their threats (albeit threats which none
of the participants seemed to take seriously) and vituperation.

The U.S. had gained some prestige through its role in

stopping the war, but its propaganda gains in the Third
World were severely tarnished by its continued alliance with
Great Britain.

The Soviet Union had, by bellowing its out-

rage, made important gains in attracting the Arab nations
toward its side.

They had also been provided with a diver-

sion from their own actions in Hungary.
military victory.

Egypt had lost a

The overwhelming force that had been

arrayed against it made such a defeat one without disgrace.
The very fact of the combined aggression against Nasser had,
instead of weakening him, made him even more clearly the
focal point of Arab unity.

He had emerged as one of the

major spokesmen for the entire Third World, but most
especially Africa and Asia.
With the cessation of hostilities, this episode in the
history of the Middle East entered a new phase.
over, but negotiations were just beginning.

Combat was

The negotia-

tions turned out to be one of the most unusual postwar
palavers that ever took place.
one-sided.

They were extremely

In itself this is not unusual, quite often the
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victors on the battlefield completely dictate the postwar
settlement as they did at Versailles in 1919.

The negotia-

tions following the Suez War were unique in that the military
victors were forced to give up their gains and the loser was
given nearly everything that it desired.

France, Great

Britain, and Israel were forced by political pressure and
economic fact to give up all of their military gains.

The

only concession that the allies were able to gain was a
face-saving measure.

Instead of immediately implementing a

total withdrawal, the 'victors' were allowed to withdraw
their troops in phases.
The end result of the Suez Canal War and its immediate
aftermath was the cementing of the friendship between the
Soviet Union and Egypt.

By concluding an amicable relation-

ship with the leader of the Arab world, the Soviet Union
succeeded in spreading the roots of its influence even more
widely in the politically fertile soils of the Middle East.
They accomplished an extremely important victory in the arena
of international influence without any immediate risk to
themsleves.

The Soviets had managed in one fell swoop to

acquire new friends in the Middle East and to strengthen
their ties with the region's leading Arab power.
Although the Suez Canal War improved the relationship
between the Soviet Union and Egypt, all of their contacts
were not necessarily positive.

For example, the Egyptians

disbanded their National Guard because of its apparent
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attempts to gain credit for the victorious settlement of the
Suez dispute by associating with the popular Soviets.

The

disbanding of the National Guard was greeted with intense
displeasure in Moscow because the Guard had strong communist
elements within its ranks.

Nasser also made attempts to im-

prove relations with the United States which caused consternation in Moscow that they might be losing their recently
acquired gains.
According to Mohammed Heikal, these attempts to improve
relations with the Soviet Union's primary foe were the result of Nasser's gratitude for the role which the U.S. had
played in halting its allies' incursion, as well as a conscious

~~licy

another.

of playing the two superpowers off of one

Because of the relatively tight bipolar makeup of

the world political system at the time, this was obviously
bound to be displeasing to the Soviet government.

Another

indication of the minor abrasiveness that still pervaded the
the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was the closure of a Soviet
film festival in Cairo by the Egyptian authorities.

The

Egyptians called the films blatant communist propaganda and
no amount of Soviet effort was able to get the film festival
reopened, even though they did make strenuous attempts in
this regard.

They even went as far as sending the Minister
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for Cultural Affairs to straighten out the contretemps.
Contacts between the two nations were increased
despite the problems which occasionally developed between
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them.

After the cease-fire was declared, an Egyptian Trade

Union delegation was sent to the Soviet Union by the Nasser
government.

This was the first step in the resumption of a

more normal pattern of cultural and economic relations between the Soviet Union and the Egyptians.

In the days fol-

lowing the cease-fire, the Soviets also continued to support
the Egyptian position vis-a-vis their opponents when they
threatened to allow Soviet "volunteers to go to Egypt's aid
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should there be no foreign withdrawal."

In December, Nasser

publicly declared that he was seeking closer ties with the
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Soviet Union in a speech he made over Radio Moscow.
The year following the Suez War was one of continued
tightening of the ties between the Soviet Union and Egypt.
In mid-January, a Soviet industrial fair opened in Cairo.
Four days later, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China both demanded that Great Britain, France, and
Israel pay Egypt reparations for the damage done in their
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joint invasion of Egyptian territory.
In February, a delagation of atomic physicists from the Soviet Union visited
Egypt to participate in discussions with their Egyptian
counterparts regarding the development of nuclear power in
Egypt.

These and other like meetings resulted in the July

6 announcement from Moscow which stated that an atomic
electric station was to be set up in Egypt with Soviet aid.
Between the visit of the Soviet physicists to Egypt and the
announcement of Egypt's entry into the production of electric
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energy via the use of atomic power, there were other important contacts between the Nasser regime and the Soviet
government.

Two of the most important were the May visit to

Egypt of a Soviet governmental delegation and the visit by
members of the Egyptian Trade Union to the Soviet Union in
that same month.
The Soviet governmental delegation was headed by its
Foreign Minister, Dmitri Shepilov.

It is quite probable

that the two major topics which the Soviet delegation and
Nasser's government discussed during the conferences were
the forthcoming atomic electric plant and the renewed possibility of Soviet aid in building Egypt's Aswan High Dam.
The Western renege on their promise to help Egypt build the
dam has been cited previously as one of the proximate causes
for the Suez Canal War, and getting such a project under way
was still in the forefront of Nasser's thoughts.

Nasser

still believed that the improvements in irrigation and
electric production that would result from the project were
a vital step in bringing Egypt into the modern world as an
equal with the nations of the West.

Building the dam would

increase Egyptian agricultural production, thus increasing
both its capacity for feeding itself and the levels of crops
such as rice and cotton which it had available for export.
It would help it industrialize.

The dam would provide

power and raw materials for the development of industries
like the steel industry and the chemical fertilizer industry.
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The latter would again be beneficial to agriculture and
further fuel its growth.

The dam would also be extremely

valuable as a tool to control the destructive flooding of
77
the Nile such as that which occurred in 1955. With advantages as important to the growth of the Egyptain economy as
these, it is little wonder that Nasser felt that without
such a project, Egypt would never be anything but a poor
relation unable to stand on its own two feet in the economic and political world that was developing around it.
Curiously enough, despite their earlier assertions
that they were willing to aid Egypt in the Aswan High Dam
project, the Soviets did not immediately make a firm offer
of aid to the Egyptians after the dust of the Suez Canal
crisis had settled.
lowing year.

They did not make an offer in the fol-

They did not make an offer to aid the

Egyptians' project until October 1958, nearly two years
after the West's withdrawal of aid had precipitated the
Suez Canal crisis.

When the Soviet offer finally came, it

came at a time when Soviet-Egyptian relations were beginning
to feel the strain brought on by another of Nasser's campaigns against the Communist Party of Egypt.
During the interim between the end of the Suez Canal
War and the Soviet of fer of aid for the Aswan High Dam,
diplomatic contacts between Egypt and the Soviets continued
apace.

The contacts were, however, on a substantially lower

policital level than had been the case during the Suez Canal
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and its immediate aftermath.

In fact, 1957 and 1958 most

accurately would be called a period of consolidation, a
period when the developing friendship between the two
countries was cemented by the broadening of the infrastructure of middle-level contacts in the realms of economies, culture, and the military.
During the nearly two dozen months between the signing
of the Aswan Dam deal between the Soviet Union and Egypt and
the placement of the U.N. peacekeeping force in the war zone
around the Suez Canal, there were twenty-six agreements or
exchanges which helped to widen and deepen the scope of contact between the U.S.S.R. and the Egyptians.

Nearly half of

them were cultural in nature, but the rest ran the gamut from
diplomatic initiatives to military coordination and economic
cooperation.

By the end of this period, the infrastructure

of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was sufficiently well
established to allow Nasser to visit Moscow for consultations with Soviet leaders about the stance and course of
action which each of their respective nations would take in
reaction to the international crisis in Lebanon in July of
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1958.
There were two events of major international significance in which either the Soviet Union or Egypt was involved
in 1957 and early 1958.

Ultimately, neither had much direct

effect upon the relationship between the two countries.
first, the Soviet Union's launch of the first artificial

The
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satellite to orbit the earth, was important both because of
its impact upon the scientific communities of the United
States and the rest of the world and because of its effect
upon the thinking of the military strategists in the West and
79

the Soviet Union.
were minimal.

Its immediate effects upon Egypt, however,

Over the long term the ancillary benefits of

the Soviet space program (such as the improvements in its
guided missile technology and launching capacity) had an important effect on the world strategic situation, and thus the
ability of the Soviet Union to assist its allies, and in its
political and military strategy.

In these respects, there

were long term effects upon the relationship between Egypt
and the U.S.S.R. from the launching of the Sputnik satellite
and its effect on world politics.
The second event of note occurred in February 1958 when
Syria and Egypt signed an accord which bound the two nations
in a federal republic.

Known as the United Arab Republic,

the union between the two Arab nations did not last long.
As a result, it had little overall effect upon the relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt.

In fact, the

little effect it did have was negative, not positive as one
might expect.

Instead of applauding the assumption of con-

trol of the presidency of Syria by their ally, Nasser, the
Soviets were somewhat dismayed by the prospect (which
eventually did become a reality) of Nasser suppressing the
strong and growing Communist Party of Syria.
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Nasser's suppression of the Syrian and Egyptian Communists later in 1958 did engender quite a bit of tension in the
80

relationship between the Soviets and Egypt.

Yet the strain

was insufficient in October to stop the process begun years
earlier which resulted in the Soviet loan of 80 million dollars to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

In

mid-October, Egyptian Vice President Marshal Amir went to
Moscow.

During Amir's visit, Khrushchev announced the Soviet
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decision to aid the Egyptians in the building of the dam.
The signing of the agreement between the Egyptians and
the Soviets on financing the Aswan Dam was the beginning of
steadily increasing Egyptian economic and military depend-

ence upon aid from the Soviet Union.

It was also the final

act of the first period of cordial diplomatic relations between the two countries which had begun with the Czech Arms
Deal.
The deterioration of the relationship between the
Soviets and the Egyptians had its roots in Nasser's anticommunism and in Khrushchev's unwillingness to accept
Nasser's decision to suppress the communists of the U.A.R.
without at least attempting to do something to stop it.
Nasser's drive against the Communists in the U.A.R.
was brought on by two parallel developments.

The first, a

purely internal matter, was the result of the political
situation in Syria.

Unlike the parties in Egypt before its
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revolution, the political parties of Syria were broadly
based and deeply rooted.

They ran the gamut from the ex-

treme left to the far right.

Another difference between the

situations of the two countries when they came under Nasser's
sway, and perhaps the one which ultimately was the key to the
failure of the union between Syria and Egypt, was the position of Nasser himself in relation to the political structure
of the country.
In Egypt, Nasser had been a member of an indigenous
group of political elites which represented the aspirations
of the majority of the Egyptian populace.

He had solidified

his position as the dominant figure in the political hierarchy because of his understanding of Egypt and the
Egyptians and the latent political desires of the mass of
the Egyptian elite.

In Syria, on the other hand, Nasser was

an outsider, albeit an outsider who was looked upon by much
of the Syrian political elite as some sort of demigod, but
an outsider nonetheless.

He did not understand the Syrians

nor did he comprehend their political system.

Without the

basic knowledge of the Syrians and their political system
that a native would have possessed, Nasser made a series of
political miscalculations that destroyed the political alliance that had resulted in the Syrian request for union with
Egypt.
While the twists and turns in the political situation
in Syria that would eventually rupture the U.A.R. were
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taking their course, the second of the two developments that
helped to bring about Nasser's drive to suppress Syria's
communists was taking place in Iraq.
In July 1958, the Iraqis had overthrown the Hashemite
monarchy which had long been in place in their country.

In

its place, there emerged a "progressive" government which
was composed of several different factions, including Iraq's
communists.

This new regime in Iraq immediately recognized

the Soviet Union and soon thereafter established relations
with the rest of the world's communist states.

The Soviets

hailed General Abdel Kareem Kassem, the leader of the new
Iraqi government as "a truly democratic ruler."

Suddenly,
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Iraq had become more democratic than Egypt and the U.A.R.
The foundation of a new regime in Iraq which had a
strong communist element and which seemed to be Moscow's

new darling in the Arab world caused two distinct problems
for Nasser.

First, along with the communists, there was a

strong pro-Nasser element in the Iraqi coalition, including
83
the Ba'ath party. The Ba'ath party, the Sunni Moslem minority, and the other pro-Nasserites were led by General Abdel
Salaam Aref and they sought union with the U.A.R. on much the
same basis as that upon which Syria had joined Egypt.

The

Communists, the Kurds, the majority of the Shi'ite Moslems,
and other elements were led by Kassem.

While at first they,

too, desired links with the U.A.R., they wanted a very loose
federal arrangement which would have kept their country
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autonomous for the most part.
The two factions in Iraq quickly clashed.

The opening

salvo of their battle was fired in November when Kassem had
his Deputy Prime Minister, Aref, arrested.

As a result of

the arrest, the groups which opposed union with the U.A.R.,
including the Communists, gained predominance within the
government of Iraq.

In December, the pro-union group led by

Rashid Ali Gaylani attempted a coup.

It failed.

U .A.R. faction gained even more strength.

The anti-

In late February

and early March of 1959, the pro-Nasser forces in Iraq made
one last-ditch effort to change the political course of
Iraq.

Led by Colonel Abdel Wahhab Shawwaf, they once more

attempted to overthrow Kassem and his supporters by force.
They failed once again, and with their failure the last
hopes for an Iraqi union with the U.A.R. died.
The defeats of the Nasserites in Iraq bolstered the
position of the Iraqi communists and strengthened their dislike for Nasser and his policies.

They began to agitate

vigorously against Nasser and sought the breakup of the
U.A.R.

Along with Kassem and the other foes of Arab union,

the communists made sure that it would not come to pass in
Iraq.
That was the first problem which the new Iraqi government presented Nasser.

The second had its roots in the

struggle for preeminence in the Arab world which had existed
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for centuries between Cairo and Baghdad and which had resurfaced with the political duels between Nasser and Nuri
a-Said.

The emergence of a viable new regime in Iraq with

the support of the Soviet Union could threaten Egypt's
cultural and political dominance (and with it Nasser's own
prestige) and possibly represent an alternative center for
Arab unity.

This, in turn, threatened the relatively weak

ties which had been established between Syria and Egypt.
Both the growing power of the Iraqi Communist Party
and its support against Nasser encouraged the Syrian communists to begin to work actively against the Nasser regime.
In November of 1958, soon after the arrest of Aref in Iraq,
the Syrian Communist Party issued a thirteen point program
which assailed the recently formed Union and asserted that
Arab unity would fail unless more democratic freedoms were
allowed and the differing conditions in each country were
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fully considered. What made the charges of the Syrian
communists particularly damaging to Nasser and the Union was
the accuracy of their commentary.
Nasser began the suppression of the Syrian Communist
Party in December.

He effectively shattered their organiza-

tion with the arrest of the majority of their leaders.
During the process of the destruction of Syria's communists,
Nasser leveled a series of broadsides at both the Syrian
party and its Iraqi counterpart.

Indirectly, these attacks

were also aimed at the Soviet Union.

The first of Nasser's

128
verbal assaults came on December 23 at Port Said, where
Nasser accused the Syrian Communist Party of attempting to
85

undermine Arab unity.

Nasser's choice of time and place for

the opening salvo of the war of words between him and his
communist adversaries was extremely significant.

He chose

Port Said, the symbol of Egyptian resistance to the foreign
incursion by Britain and France in 1956, on the anniversary
of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces.

At least

subtly, Nasser was equating communism with Western imperial86
ism.
Freed by Nasser's barrage, the Egyptian press unleased a violent polemical campaign against Arab communism.
At the same time, they tried to soften their statements for
the Soviets to some degree by coupling them with assurances
of the goodwill of the U.A.R. toward the Soviet Union.
Despite these attempts to lighten the blow, the attacks by
the Egyptian press aroused Soviet ire.

Khrushchev took up

the gauntlet at the 21st Party Congress of the CPSU and
attempted to defend his fellow communists against the un87
just attacks.
The Egyptians parried Khrushchev's attack by claiming
that he was attempting to violate the principles adopted at
the Bandung Conference by interfering in the internal
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affairs of the U.A.R.
By April, Soviet-Egyptian relations
had deteriorated to the point where Khrushchev and Nasser
had begun to exchange personal insults, and the Soviets were
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threatening the withdrawal of their aid.
Eventually, the war of nerves between the two erst-

while allies subsided.

The Egyptians apparently realized

that a break with Moscow was not in their own best interests.
As a result, they halted their public attacks on the U.S.S.R.
The Soviets, on their part, came to understand that a break
with Nasser would only benefit the West.

So they also de-

cided to call a halt to the hostile comments directed toward
Egypt by their press.
However, in less public situations, there were still
problems bewteen the two nations.

For example, the condi-

tions under which Egyptian students in the Soviet Union were
living began to worsen.

The students were forced to live

two to a room when in the past they each had been provided
with a single room for themselves.

The Egyptian students

were also forced to attend classes on communist doctrine
which was a violation of the agreement between the two
governments that there was to be no indoctrination of exchange students, an agreement which was one of the bases
upon which they had been sent.
In October, Nasser and the Egyptians withdrew their
students from their schools in the U.S.S.R.
to the U.S. instead.

They sent them

They arrived there in a blaze of

publicity and enrolled in the various U.S. universities in
90
which places had been made for them.
Incidents of this
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sort, while having relatively little significance in and of
themselves, nevertheless kept the relationship between Egypt
and the Soviet Union from progressing smoothly.

They kept

tension at a level where neither side could really trust the
other or consider it an ally.
In January 1960, both sides determined that things had
gone far enough and decided to further ease the tension that
had beset the Soviet-Egyptian relationship for more than a
year.

The Soviet Minister of Power Stations, Ignatti

Novikov, came to Egypt early in the month to attend the
start of work on the Aswan Dam.

He brought with him a

polite message from Khrushchev and a modest gift.

Nasser

met him and during the discussion of the forthcoming celebration of the dam's opening, Nasser showed Novikov a medal
which he had struck to commemorate the occasion.

Nasser

told Novikov that he wanted to send one of these medals to
Khrushchev in honor of the role that he and the Soviets had
played in bringing the plans for the construction of the dam
to fruition.
Later in the conversation, the question of the status
of the dam project came up.

Novikov pointed out that the

distinction between the first and second stages of the dam
was artificial and that it was going to result in a good
deal of wasted effort.

Nasser agreed, and asked, "But would

Mr. Khrushchev be willing to discuss the second phase now?
91
I am making this request officially."
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Novikov got in touch with Khrushchev and after a few
days he received Moscow's reply.

In a Politburo meeting on

January 17, the Soviet leaders had decided to help finance
the second stage of the dam.

The agreement was made official

in an exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Nasser.
The attempts at reconciliation between the countries
had finally borne fruit.

The Egyptians were being relative-

ly friendly toward the Soviets in the press, while the
Soviets were allowing Egypt to conduct its own affairs without Soviet interference.

Overt Soviet participation in

Egyptian affairs was now limited to that which the Egyptians
themselves had requested - arms supply and economic loans.
As Khrushchev put it at an embassy party in Hoscow, "We have
forgotten our quarrels with Egypt.
92
standing and a waste of time."

It was all a misunder-

The crisis in Soviet-Egyptian relations had passed.
The two countries were now successfully patching up many of
their quarrels and the Soviet supply of aid was flowing undiminished to Egypt.

Still, the problems in the relation-

ship between the two countries had not yet quite come to an
end.

During the final months of the year, beginning at the

November meeting of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in
Moscow, the Soviets started to shift their foreign policy
toward a new more militant posture which outside pressures,
such as their growing conflict with China, had forced them
to adopt.
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The changes in foreign policy were in large part only
differences in their ideological stance upon certain issues.
Perhaps the most important alteration in Soviet policy came
in regard to the stance which they took on the internal
structure of the nations of the underdeveloped world.

The

new Soviet ideological posture was predicated on the existence of a "new" stage of political development which
nations went through on the path to socialism.

This new

phase, the phase of so-called "national democracy," was
defined as being a period in which a state consistently upheld its political and economic independence and fought
against imperialism and its military blocs; a period in
which a state fights against new forms of colonialism and
the penetration of imperialist capital; a period characterized by a state's rejection of dictatorial and despotic
methods of government and by the assurance of broad demo93
cratic rights and freedoms for the people.
Another question which the new Soviet foreign policy
line took a different tack toward than the old one had was
the role of Communist parties in national liberation movements (during the phase of national democracy as well as
during earlier periods).

It was a question which had been

ignored for the most part by the Soviets since Stalin's
death.

Now, at least temporarily, the Soviet hierarchy,

led by Boris Ponomarev, advocated Communist ascendancy at
94

all times.
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With these changes in attitude toward the countries of
the Third World, tension between the Soviet Union and Egypt
was bound to rise once more.

A series of articles attacking

the repressive policies of the Egyptian government appeared
95
in the Soviet press. According to the Soviet journalists,
the U.A.R. was resorting to "dictatorial" and "repressive"
methods and therefore was not "a state of national
democracy."
Initially, this campaign did not have too much effect
upon the relationship between the Soviets and the U.A.R.
The top leadership of both countries seemed content to let
the issues raised in these articles remain undiscussed.

In

May 1961, however, a serious breach of the temporary truce
that had been arranged between the two nations occurred
during Anwar Sadat's visit to I1oscow for the Hay Day celebrations there.

When Khrushchev received Sadat in his

office on May 3, he launched into a tirade during the
course of which he lambasted everything American.

When

Sadat tried to placate him, he told Sadat that Arab
"nationalism wasn't the summit of happiness."

He went on to

claim that the Arabs were politically backward and that they
were falling into an imperialist trap.

Sadat was shocked,

but he refrained from responding until he had consulted with
Nasser.
Nasser was furious.
strongly.

He told Sadat that he must answer

Sadat responded in a written draft that was pre-
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pared by Heikal.

It defended Arab nationalism and suggested

that Khrushchev was making the same mistake as the imperialists were when he claimed that his was the only path to
political maturity and happiness.

Sadat concluded with the

suggestion that there were alternative paths to political
96
adulthood and that each nation must choose its own.
Sadat's letter ended the incident, and a period of
relative calm in the relationship ensued.

Mid-level con-

tacts between the two nations were still maintained, and
cooperation in the economic, military, and cultural realms
continued to develop.
The breakup of the union between Egypt and Syria in
September 1961 coincided with new less repressive policies
at home in Egypt.

Nasser's belief that the U.A.R. had been

sabotaged by the Syrian feudal and bourgeois classes and by
conservative elements in the rest of the Arab world caused
97

him to cling more tightly to the ideals of Arab socialism.
His adherence to those principles isolated him in the Arab
98
world, and was one of the factors which led to the beginnings of rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt in
1962.
During 1962, the levels of trade between the two
nations once again increased sharply.

Other indicators,

such as cultural contacts, showed that important new connections were being developed between the U.S.S.R. and
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Egypt.

The ideological questions raised in late 1961 were

still obstacles to smooth relations, however.

They were

still under debate and Khrushchev, the primary force in
Soviet politics behind the U.S.S.R.'s interest in Egypt, was
in the midst of a period of relative political decline in
99
his personal power because of the U-2 incident. As a result, there were no high-level exchanges between the two
100
countries during the year.
In the meantime, the ideological
debate was continuing in the Soviet Union, with Ponomarev
and the Ideological Department for Foreign Policy of the
Central Committee coming down in favor of the hard-line
stance discussed in the preceding paragraphs, and experts
on the Middle East and its affairs like Georgi Mirskii and
R. Ulianovskii adopting a more positive attitude toward
101
Egypt.
The. favorable stance of the Middle Eastern experts
was in part a reaction to the new National Charter which
Nasser and the Egyptians had instituted in May 1962.

In

it, Nasser created a new party, the Arab Socialist Union,
which took up the mantle of the National Union as Egypt's
sole political party.

The charter also declared Egypt's

rejection of the capitalist path and emphasized the need to
eliminate class differences within the country.

Finally,

it reserved 50 percent of all parliamentary seats for the
elected representatives of the workers and the peasants.
The positive outlook that Soviet Middle Eastern ex-
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perts displayed toward Egypt was also partially due to
Egypt's intervention on behalf of the republican forces in
Yemen in late September.

Nasser's intervention on behalf

of the Yemeni revolutionaries was a sign of just how important the role that he could and did play in Arab politics
was.

Clearly, there were practical advantages to be derived

from - as well as theoretical justifications for - dealing
with him as a friend and ally.
The theoretical dispute over foreign policy continued
to rage unabated in the U.S.S.R. in 1963, but the Middle
Eastern experts seemed to slowly be getting the upperhand in
influencing decisions regarding regional affairs in their
own area of expertise.

Nasser's generally progressive

stance in both his domestic and external policies seemed to
be overcoming the miasma of negativism that his anticommunism had engendered among the members of the Soviet
political elite.

In June, Khrushchev sent Adzhubey back to

Egypt as his proxy.

His mission was to try to convince

Nasser to try to relax his hard-line anti-communist position.
The Soviet politician argued that the cessation of the
attacks upon Egypt's communists by Nasser and the state apparatus would remove the last obstacles in the way of the
improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the
Egyptians.

Nasser relented.

He must have seen that there

was relatively little point in the continued persecution of
Egypt's communists.

He had already effectively destroyed
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most of their influence in the country and severely crippled
their organization.

He no longer had any reason to worry

about their subversive activities.

In July, he announced

that all political prisoners were to be released, that concentration camps were to be closed, and that communists were
to be invited to the ASU as individuals and to aid it in the
building of socialism.

This change in policy was greeted

with enthusiasm in the Soviet Union and resistance to a
102
visit by Khrushchev evaporated.
Khrushchev visited Cairo in May 1964.

The visit, his

first to Africa, was in honor of the completion of the first
phase of the Aswan High Dam.

The Egyptians accorded

Khrushchev a massive reception and invited him to perform
the opening ceremony for the dam.

During his speech at the

dam's opening, Khrushchev awarded Nasser and Amer (then
Vice-President) the honor of naming them each a "Hero of
103
the Soviet Union."
Khrushchev's visit to Egypt lasted sixteen days.

The

visit has been called a "festival of Arab-Soviet coopera104
tion." And, to a certain extent, it was. The Soviets had
proffered a 250 million dollar loan for economic development, and they had made Nasser and Amer "Heroes of the
Soviet Union."

Most importantly, the occasion for

Khrushchev's visit was the completion of the first phase of
the most important symbol of Arab-Soviet cooperation that
has been constructed to date, the Aswan High Dam.

The
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visit also had its low points.

One example is the row be-

tween Khrushchev and Iraqi President Aref over that country's
communists.

Another is Khrushchev's embarrassment of Gromyko

and Marshal Andrei Grechko, his Minister of Defense, at a
105
luncheon in Alexandria.
Both the positive and negative aspects of Khrushchev's
performance played a minor role in the political events which
106
took place in the Soviet Union over the next few months.
They were added to a long list of faux pas and political
blunders which Khrushchev had made during the course of the
years he spent in power.

These errors cost Khrushchev his

position in October when the other members of the Politburo
dismissed him from both his job as Prime Minister and his
position as First Secretary of the Communist Party.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt
during the period in which Khrushchev was in power in the
U.S.S.R. was one of "sturm und drang."

There were tremen-

dous highs like the Czech Arms Deal and the intervals which
the building of the Aswan Eigh Dam produced, but there were
also years of strain and tension which were brought about by
the tempestuousness and flamboyance of both Khrushchev and
Nasser.

Those came about when Khrushchev could not contain

himself in the face of what he saw as the extreme provocation of Nasser's anti-communism and his attempts to improve
relations with the West.

Nasser reacted in kind, bickering

with Khrushchev and the Soviets despite the strong friendship
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which had developed between the two men.
The friendship between Khrushchev and the Egyptians
was the basis for a good deal of consternation following his
dismissal.

The loan agreement which Khrushchev had arranged

for the Egyptians was rumored to be in jeopardy with the
change of leadership in the Soviet Union.
Egyptians need not have worried.

Nasser and the

In November 1964, the

Egyptians sent Amer and Heikal to Moscow to attend the
annual Military Day parades in Hoscow.

During their first

meeting with Leonid Brezhnev they were told they had nothing
to fear.

"What happened has nothing to do with you or our

policy towards the Arab world .

. ," said Brezhnev.

"Our

relations with you are based on long-term decisions taken
108
by the party, not by Khrushchev."
The collective leadership did have some criticisms of
Khrushchev's method of dealing with Egypt.
his personal style of diplomacy.

They disliked

Contacts with Egypt had

only developed between Nasser and him.

They claimed that

there was no solid basis for contact with Egypt outside of
109
Nasser.
Some members of the oligarchy - most notably
Hikhail Suslov - took up the argument of the local Arab
CP's that the stronger Nasser became, the weaker they would
become, and if he achieved Arab union, they would find them110
selves dissolved.
The arguments about which course of foreign policy the
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Soviets should pursue in the Third World were flaring once
more.

Suslov, Ponomarev, and Nikolai Podgorny backed the old

hard-line stance, while Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and
Alexander Shelepin favored the more moderate position.

This

time, however, the ideological arguments did not have a signif icant effect upon the relationship between the two
countries.
In December, Shelepin followed up Amer's visit with a
visit of his own for the victory day celebrations at Port
Said.

His visit underscored the desire on the part of the

new Soviet leadership that their relations with Egypt stay at
the same high level at which they had been when Khrushchev
had been ousted.
goal.

They were successful in achieving their

Throughout the first half of 1965, a potpourri of

cultural, military, economic, and governmental delegations
passed between the two countries.
The middle level exchanges between the Soviet Union and
Egypt paved the way for a five-day visit by Nasser to the
111
U.S.S.R. in August.
It was his first meeting with the new
leaders and was intended to develop a personal rapport between the leaders of the two countries.

Huch of the visit

was spent at a hunting lodge just outside of !1oscow where
Nasser and his entourage got to know the leaders of the new
112
Soviet oligarchy better. At the end of his visit, Nasser
decided to find out just how close his new relationship with
Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and the other leaders of the
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Soviet Union could be.

He asked the Soviets to cancel some

of the debt which the Egyptians had incurred from arms purchases from them since 1962 when they began their intervention in Yemen.

The Soviets agreed that the Yemeni civil war

was a war of "national liberation" and decided to cancel 500
113
million dollars of Egypt's debt.
During the next two years, the Egyptian-Soviet relationship was smooth and stable.

Contacts between the new

regime in Moscow and the old one in Cairo were strengthened
and personalized.

In May of 1966, Kosygin came to Cairo to

ensure that the positive contact that had been established
the previous August during Nasser's visit between the new
Soviet leaders and the Egyptian head of state were maintained.

During the course of the visit, Kosygin apologeti-

cally informed the Egyptians that the Politburo had not yet
had time to respond to an Egyptian request for more arms
which had come just before his departure from Moscow.

He

explained that such requests must now come far in advance
because the Soviet Union had a planned economy and each request must be carefully weighed before it could be acted
This was his reply to an Egyptian request for addi114
tional wheat supplies as well. He told Nasser that he could
upon.

not promise anything; Soviet wheat supplies were a weak point
in the economy, and nature and the entire Politburo must
decide.
Two months later, the Egyptian request for wheat was

l42
answered positively.

The Soviet harvest had been sufficient
ll5
and the Politburo was willing. From the foregoing, it is
clear that the new Soviet regime was much more deliberate
and dependent upon the wheels of bureaucracy than the impetuous and headstrong Khrushchev had been.

Despite this
ll6
and the occasional flareups which it caused, the new Soviet
leadership and the Soviets were beginning to understand one

another and build a strong, stable, mutually beneficial relationship.
Nasser wanted Brezhnev to visit in 1967 to cement the
newly developed relationship.

Tentative plans were made,

but they were abandoned when the Soviets had second thoughts.
Apparently, the Soviets were concerned that such a visit
would be compared unfavorably with that of Khrushchev in
1964.

They excused themselves on the grounds that 1967 was

the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution and
Brezhnev must focus his attention at home in order to prepare
for the occasion.

There had also been some criticism of
117
Brezhnev for the amount of time he was spending abroad.
Gromyko came instead.
in Cairo.

In March, he spent three days

While he was there, Nasser brought up the subject

of arms, a topic which was often in his thoughts during the
period just before the Six Day War.

A considerable portion

of Nasser's preoccupation with armaments and Israel may have
been derived from a series of Soviet intelligence reports
which were purportedly transmitted by Soviet naval vessels
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in the Mediterranean to Egypt and Syria.
These documents
contained information that Israel was preparing to attack
Syria.

Coupled with a string of vitriolic expostulations by

Israeli leaders, the documents and the Soviets' own apparent
concern would certainly have alarmed Nasser and convinced
him that the period of calm between Israel and the Arab
states was about to end.

If that was the case, he must have

reasoned, Egypt had to stockpile arms and prepare for war.
Early in 1966, a new regime seized power in Syria.
Led by Dr. Nureddin al-Atassi, an extremely radical and
pro-Marxist wing of the Ba'ath party took control of the
Syrian government and declared its increased support for
Palestinian efforts at "national liberation."

The Soviets

were quick to recognize and encourage the isolated and
politically insecure new regime in Syria.

Izvestia, in

particular, was effusive in its praise of the new Arab
119
government.
The Soviet leadership, while somewhat more
restrained toward the Syrians than Izvestia, also gave them
strong support and began to pressure Nasser into helping the
new Syrian regime as well.
Nasser was still suspicious of the Syrian Ba'athists.
His caution stemmed from the ill-fated attempts at union between Syria and Egypt.

However, Soviet pressure and Israeli

threats and attacks convinced him to conclude a mutual
defense pact with the Ba'athist regime in Syria in November
1966.
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The pact with Syria was the first in a series of events
120
that led Nasser into what has been termed by some a trap.
Oddly enough, the Soviets, who in November 1966 had
counseled restraint, seemed to be promoting a more belligerent attitude on the part of the Egyptians.

In fact, the

Soviet actions and the attitudes which they expressed in
early 1967 could only be characterized as inflammatory.
'They gave Nasser unsupported information about American and
Israeli troop movements and joint intents and persistently
urged him to take a more militant stand vis-a-vis Israeli
"provocations."
Throughout early 1967, the Syrians and the Israelis
had been engaging in air battles, artillery duels and other
hostilities.

While this was taking place, the Egyptians

were having abuse heaped upon them by the Syrians,
Jordanians, and Saudis for

11

l1iding behind the skirts of the

D.N. Emergency Force" and failing to aid their Syrian
brothers against the Israelis while at the same time they
121
were killing their fellow Arabs in Yemen.
In April, the growing crsis advanced another step.

On

April 7, one of the by now routine artillery battles between
the Syrians and Israel escalated sharply into a large scale
aerial dogfight.

The Israelis shot down six Syrian jets and

then "flew on to Damascus, making victory swoops over the
city."

Two weeks later the Soviets warned the Israeli

ambassador about Israel's provocations in areas near the
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Soviet Union.

On the 25th of April, the Soviets once more

called Israel's ambassador to the Soviet Foreign !1inistry.
There he was given a note warning the Israelis about their
troop concentrations on the borders of Syria.

Two days later

an Egyptian parliamentary delegation arrived in !1oscow for
consultation with the Soviets.

It stayed two weeks.

By mid-May, tension on the Syrian-Israeli border had
reached the critical level.

The Soviet press had joined with

that in the Arab countries and began calling for a united
122
Arab front and condemning the Israelis.
On I1ay 15, following
a series of inflammatory speeches by Israeli leaders and the
return of the Egyptian delegation from Hoscow, a state of
alert was declared in Egypt.

The following day the Egyptians

requested a limited withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force
from their posts on the Sinai border.

U Thant, the U.N.

Secretary General, informed Nasser that either a full withdrawal or none at all was the only acceptable alternative as
far as the U.N. was concerned.

Egyptian troops were already

moving east across the Sinai in order to occupy the UNEF
positions, so Nasser was faced with a difficult choice humiliating retreat or another step along the path toward war.
He chose the latter, perhaps hoping that he still had
time to prevent the approaching conflict.

In articles in

Izvestia, Krasnaia Zvezda, and Pravda, the Soviets lauded the
123
Egyptian actions.
The Egyptians formally requested the withdrawal of UNEF forces on May 18.

The Egyptians occupied all
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of the U.N. posts on their side of the border except the
crucial post of Sharm el-Sheik.

Nasser hesitated to take

this key port on the Gulf of Aqaba because it would have
meant barring Israeli shipping from the Tiran Straits which
would have brought the lliddle East to the brink of war.
On the evening of May 21, due to a combination of the
pressure from Arab public opinion and the Egyptian military's
wish to avenge its defeat in 1956, Nasser took the final step
and occupied Sharm el-Sheik.

Two days later the Egyptian

Defense Minister, Shams Aldin Badran visited the U.S.S.R.
During his visit, the Soviets emphasized the necessity of
124
avoiding military conflict.
They expressed their willingness
to support Egypt to the hilt diplomatically, but stressed
that military assistance would not be forthcoming from the
U.S.S.R.
At the end of Badran's visit to r1oscow, an unfortunate
incident occurred.

11arshal Grechko told Badran, "Stand firm.

Whatever you have to face, you will find us with you.

Don't

let yourself be blackmailed by the Americans or anyone else."
As i t turned out Grechko did not mean exactly what he implied,
125
he was just giving Badran "one for the road." But Badran was
the wrong person to say such things to.

A militant, he was

one member of the Egyptian upper echelons who wanted Nasser
to take a hard, aggressive stance.

He returned to Cairo and

told Nasser that the Soviets had pledged unconditional support to Egypt in its conflict with Israel.
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On Hay 30, the Jordanians, despite their many contretemps with both Egypt and Syria earlier in the year, joined
the Syrian-Egyptian mutual defense alliance.

By doing so,

they physically encircled Israel and gave the Israelis one
more excuse to start hostilities.

An American mission came

to Cairo to try to find a solution to the impending conflict.
Apparently i t had some success and there was some possibility
of the two sides reaching an agreement.

Zacharia Hohieddin

was scheduled to visit Washington on June 7 to work out a
solution in conjunction with the Americans.

Nutting quotes

Dean Rusk as saying that this helped "to press the trigger"
of war by making the Israelis fearful that a solution would
be imposed upon them before they could teach the Arabs a
126
lesson.
The story of the Six-Day War has already been told.
The Soviet role in the conflict was limited to support for
Egypt and the other Arab states in their press, diplomatic
pressure, and eventually, convincing the U.N. to censure
Israel.

In the eyes of most Arabs, this support, such as it

was, was insufficient.

They believed that the Soviets

sllould have physically intervened to save them from what many
believed to be a joint American-Israeli attack.

The failure

of tlle Soviets to enter the arena of combat engendered
long-term hostility in the Arab populace.

However, despite

the Arab view that the Soviets had deceived and abandoned
them, they still needed Soviet support to shore them up after
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the war.

In fact, they needed it now more than ever.

Egypt, as Israel's main target in the brief conflict,
was the most devastated by it, and it needed the most bolstering.

Nasser, in particular, was in a tenuous position.

He had been the architect of both Arab radicalism and
Egyptian policy.
tered.

His plans and strategems had been shat-

In the aftermath of the war, a distraught Nasser had

decided in conjunction with his military advisors that, since
the Israelis had inflicted such a humiliating drubbing upon
the Egyptian military in the war which his policies had led
to, he must resign.

He did so, but almost immediately was

back in power because the Egyptian populace, upon hearing of
his decision, had responded with a spontaneous groundswell
of emotional backing and demanded that he remain as head of
state.
Nasser remained in power, and soon consolidated the
three most powerful offices in Egypt in his hands by adding
the Secretary-Generalship of the ASU to his own portfolio.
He also conducted a mini-purge of the military, getting rid
of both those responsible for the debacle in the war against
Israel and those whose discontent might make them dangerous.
Having strengthened his power base, Nasser turned his
attention toward rebuilding the Egyptian military which had
been devastated by the war.

To accomplish this task, he had

to turn once more to the Soviets for massive aid.

There was
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some concern on the part of Nasser and the Egyptians that the
Soviets would be unwilling to resupply them given the breadth
of the military losses.

Another factor which undoubtedly ag-

gravated Egyptian disquietude was the exchange of recriminations and charges of responsibility (or lack of it) that had
been going on between the Egyptian military at all levels and
its Soviet advisors.
be baseless.

The Egyptian misgivings turned out to

The Soviets were indeed willing to resupply the
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Egyptian military and to do so rapidly.
By this time Nasser had decided that he had to use
diplomatic proxies to deal with the Israelis.

He was certain

(probably with more than adequate justification) that any
direct negotiations with them would be just like the Germans'
efforts at negotiating with the Allies at Versailles fruitless.

Nasser believed that the Israelis would simply

dictate terms to the Egyptians which the Egyptians would be
forced to accept.

The Soviets seemed to be the perfect

choice of proxies for the Egyptians.

They could deal with

the Americans as one superpower to another.
be intimidated by the Israelis.

They could not

They could represent them-

selves as a relatively disinterested party.

Host important-

ly, they were willing to assume the role of mouthpiece for
the Egyptians.
Therefore, Nasser made i t a policy to increase Soviet128
Egyptian involvement whenever and wherever he could.
He was
quite successful in doing so.

Soviet military, economic,
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and diplomatic involvement with Egypt all rose drastically
after the June war.

During the next three years, the re-

lationship between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was smoother and
the policies of the two nations were more closely coordinated than they had ever been before.
The desperate needs of the Egyptians caused them to
rely more and more heavily upon the largesse of the Soviets.
To some extent, it appeared that they were forced to give up
their sovereignity in return for the aid which the Soviets
In fact, they did abandon some of the policies

provided.

which had been followed during the previous years of tJasser's
dominance of Egyptian politics in return for a clear increase
in the commitment of the U.S.S.R. to the Arab cause.

Nasser

gave up any thoughts he may have had of resuming the persecution of the ECP.
policies.

Egypt pursued more radical internal

And in response to Soviet suggestions, the purge

of the military following the June war included its right
129
In return, the Soviets identified themselves with the
wing.
Arabs, going so far as to conunit their own personnel, firstline weaponry, prestige, and capital resources to what at
times may have seemed to be a bottomless pit.
Despite this seeming dependence upon the Soviets,
Nasser never gave up control of Egypt's policies or of its
destiny.

He never made any changes which he would not quick-

ly reverse.

Even when he promoted the pro-Soviet faction in

the ASU to positions of enhanced power, he kept enough con-
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trol over them to eliminate any threat to his position or the
130
policies which he wanted to institute which they might pose.
In these instances, and others like it, Soviet wishes were
clearly not a determining factor in any way.
On the diplomatic front, the Soviets championed the
Egyptians.

The U.N. Security Council had been in nearly con-

tinuous session since the fighting had begun on June 5.

On

the 13th of June, the Soviets proposed a resolution branding
Israel as an aggressor and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from the territories which
131
they had seized. The bill was defeated by a coalition of
nations spearheaded by the U.S., which was committed to a
veto of any plan which would eliminate Israeli gains without
giving them a complete peace in return.

With American oppo-

sition blocking any progress in the Security Council, the
Soviets turned to the General Assembly.

Even there, the

Soviets were unable to garner sufficient support for the
Arab cause to censure the Israelis and force a withdrawal.
While the U.N. deliberations were in progress, the
Soviets also resorted to other avenues to try to aid Egypt
and the other Arab countries.

On June 9, the states of

Eastern Europe attended a conference in Moscow which was held
to discuss the crisis in the Middle East.

The conference

produced a declaration which condemned Israel and promised
"to do everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab
132
countries give a firm rebuff to the agressor .
All
II
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of the nations involved in the conference except Rumania
signed the declaration and, by June 11, they all (again with
the exception of Rumania) had severed diplomatic relations
with Israel.
Twelve days after the Soviets and their East European
allies condemned Israel, the first major Soviet diplomatic
mission to Egypt arrived in Cairo.

Led by President

Podgorny, the mission, which also included Chief of Staff
Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov, was crucial for Nasser and the
Soviets both.

It provided Egypt with massive military and

economic aid and the promise of political support.

This

ensured that Nasser had the means to carry on the struggle
with Israel and thus to avoid the diktat which he feared.
By providing Nasser and Egypt with massive aid and political
encouragement, the Soviet visit demonstrated the solidarity
of the U.S.S.R. with Egypt and curbed to some extent the
anti-Soviet sentiment which was spreading through the
Egyptian populace.
Soviet efforts at mediation of the Arab-Israeli crisis
continued throughout the months following the cessation of
active hostilities.

In mid-July, they presented a proposal

to Nasser which they had developed in conjunction with the
Americans on the basis of a suggestion put forward by a group
of Latin American countries.

Since it called for Israel's

withdrawal from all Arab territories coupled with immediate
Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist, the superpowers
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considered the proposal to be the sort of compromise that
might satisfy both sides in the conflict.

However, despite

its possibilities, the proposal failed to address the
Palestinian problem, something which Nasser was politically
bound to try to solve.
Although the joint Soviet-American proposal of July had
failed as had the earlier Soviet attempts to mobilize the
U.N., both the Soviets and the Egyptians continued to seek a
diplomatic solution to the problems at hand in the Middle
East.

On November 7, the Egyptians called a meeting of the

U.N. Security Council.

Over the next two weeks the Egyptians

and their Soviet allies fought to get a favorable resolution
adopted.

On November 22, the Security Council adopted Reso-

lution 242.

Despite some discrepancies in the wording of
133
the text of the resolution in various languages, the resolu-

tion in essence called for Israeli withdrawal from Arab
territories which would be accompanied by the acknowledgement of the right of all states to exist within recognized
boundaries in peace.

It also maintained that there should

be freedom of navigation through international waterways in
the region, that a just solution of the refugee problem
should be sought, and that a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East would be found with this resolution as its basis.
Resolution 242 became a weapon with which both Egypt
and the Soviet Union would scourge the Israelis in the years
to come.

,,
~
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The Israelis opened themselves up to such assaults
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when they stopped abiding by the spirit of the resolution and
began to fortify the territories which they had occupied (the
Bar Lev line, the fortifications in the Golan Heights and
along the West Bank) and announced that they were in those
134
territories to stay. This made them vulnerable to charges of
bad faith which were put to good use by the Soviets and the
.•

Egyptians when they were attempting to mobilize opinion in
the U.N. and other international forums.
Even for the Egyptians, however, this diplomatic
byplay was little more than window dressing because, according to Heikal, "Nasser was always skeptical about Resolution
242."

He believed that what was "taken by force can only be

recovered by force," and that, "If you look at what the
Israelis are doing in the occupied territories, it is perfectly obvious that they are never going to evacuate those
135
territories unless they are made to do so."
The strengthening of the ties between Egypt and the
Soviet Union was progressive.

The next step came on January

7, 1968, when Kirill Mazurov led a Soviet delegation to Egypt
to help celebrate the eighth anniversary of the start of work
on the Aswan Darn and the tenth anniversary of the first
Soviet-Egyptian economic agreement regarding the construction
of the dam.

The visit was played down by the Egyptians and

at its end a relatively terse joint communique was issued
which, by its omission of any statement of gratitude for
Soviet aid, did two things:

,,

i

1) i t implied that such assis-
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tance was a matter of course; and 2) that Egypt wanted the
136
levels of aid increased.
Later, in January, the first tangible sign of a change
in Egyptian internal policy which was specifically designed
to please the Soviets came when Nasser resigned the post of
Secretary-General of the ASU in favor of Ali Sabri.
""

Sabri

had long been identified with the pro-Soviet faction among
Egypt's elite and his promotion was greeted with muted ap137
plause in Moscow.
On March 30, another Egyptian internal development
which was viewed with pleasure in Moscow came to pass.
Nasser instituted a program of reforms which were intended
to move Egypt closer to Nasser's ideal of socialism.

The

Soviet press applauded Egypt's most recent reforms (as it
had others in the past) as another step forward in the
permanent process of revolution.

Like its press, the Soviet

government responded positively to Egypt's internal re138
structuring.
Cooperation between Moscow and Cairo was becoming in139
creasingly deep.
The Soviets seemed to be identifying themselves more and more with the Arab cause.

On July 1, at the

signing of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Kosygin presented a nine-point proposal for arms control which included
an arms freeze in the Middle East as one of its stipulations.
He linked the freeze with an Israeli withdrawal from occupied
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Arab territories.

The Soviets had apparently made obtaining

a solution to the crisis in the Middle East on Arab terms
one of their primary goals in the arena of international
politics.

Clearly, Nasser was succeeding in his attempts to

entangle the Soviets in his webs of diplomacy and dependence.
Nasser continued those efforts later in the year
during his visit to Moscow on July 7.

By the end of this

consultation between Nasser and the Soviet leaders, they had
agreed to issue a joint communique which set out joint
positions on most of the major issues of the day, thus
indicating a consonance of views.

A further indication of

the growing unanimity in world outlook of the two countries
which was brought to light in the joint communique was the
announcement in its text of the establishment of direct
140
party-to-party contacts between the CPSU and the ASU.
In September, Egypt started to raise the level of its
hostilities toward Israel along the Suez Canal.

Soon there-

after, both Egypt and the Soviet Union stepped up their
diplomatic activity as well.

On September 25, 1968, the

Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement sharply condemning Israeli intransigence.

Two days later, Al-Ahram

reported a peace plan which the Soviets had presented to the
U.S. two weeks earlier that called for an Israeli pullback
to its prewar borders, an expanded U.N. presence in the areas
evacuated, an Arab statement ending the state of belligerency which had existed since 1949, great power guarantees of
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peace, and the setting aside of the Palestinian issue for
141
later discussion. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. upped the
level of its military aid to Egypt.
The September initiatives of the Egyptians and their
Soviet allies were not successful in bringing peace to the
Middle East.

In the meantime, domestic pressures upon

Nasser had begun to mount.

In November widespread student

unrest and rioting spread through Egypt while, at the same
time, the military once again began to get increasingly
restive at being restrained from retaliating against the
Israelis.

The most important underlying cause for the

growing civil disorder and the impatience in the military
was Nasser's failure to liberate the occupied Arab territories and avenge the humiliation which the Israelis had
inflicted upon the Arab nations.

In response to the growing

discontent of the Egyptian populace, Nasser decided to
142
escalate the level of conflict along the Suez Canal.
In December, Moscow once more presented a peace plan
to the U.N. which was based upon Resolution 242.

At the

same time, Gromyko was sent to Egypt to discuss matters with
Nasser.

In the joint communique, which was the product of

the meeting between the Egyptian head of state and the
Soviet Foreign Minister, it was clear that the policies of
the two nations had once again converged.

Both realized

that the time had come to cause some movement in the situation in the Middle East.
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The new peace initiative which the Soviets presented in
the U.N. was a failure.

The Israelis once again rejected a

position which was based upon a maximalist interpretation of
U.N. Resolution 242.

By January 1969, Nasser was once again

speaking in terms of force rather than diplomacy as the
143
solution to the tense situation in the Middle East.
By the
end of February, a state of emergency had been declared in
Egypt.

The Soviets, realizing the costs of renewed warfare,

tried to dissuade Nasser from his chosen course toward war.
At the end of January, Shelepin returned to Cairo along with
a trade union delegation.

His mission was to try to convince

Nasser that political manuever was his best bet for an advantageous solution and that the resumption of open conflict
would be disasterous for Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Try as

he might, Shelepin could not persuade Nasser to alter his
course.

Nor could the other Soviet leaders alter Nasser's

decision without producing a clear change in the situation
between Israel and the Arabs, a change which, given Nasser's
intransigence, had to come on the terms of the Arabs, something which was extremely unlikely because of the stubbornness of the Israelis which matched or exceeded that of the
Arabs.
The Soviets were unsuccessful in their attempts to
avert the suddenly acute crisis.

As a result, on March 9,

1969, Nasser declared a new phase of the Arab-Israeli conf lict open - the "war of attrition" had begun.

The "war of
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attrition", while begun witlwut Soviet approval, was the
perfect tonic for the maladies which beset Egypt.

The com-

mando raids and artillery duels gave the Egyptian army a
taste of the action for which its officers had been spoiling.
The renewal of conflict with Israel gave the populace a
measure of renewed pride and diverted their attention from
the other factors which had led to the student rioting
earlier in the year.
At this juncture, the Soviets were determined to do two
things if they possibly could - give Egypt their full support, and at the same time lower the level of conflict in the
Middle East.

They were successful in the former, but the

latter proved to be more difficult.

The Soviet press mounted

a campaign for a peaceful solution to the hostilities along
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the Suez Canal.

The mild pressure of a press campaign was

completely unable to convince Nasser to moderate his position.

In one last effort to change Nasser's mind, the

Soviets sent Gromyko back to Cairo.

The Soviet Foreign

Minister's mission was a failure just as that of Shelepin
had been.

At the end of Gromyko's three-day visit, Moscow

finally accepted the fait accompli and endorsed the Egyptian
stance in a short joint communique.
The failure of the Gromyko mission was a harbinger of
things to come.

The Soviet acceptance of the Egyptian

position vis-a-vis Israel brought Soviet-American discussion
of the problems of the Biddle East nearly to a halt.

The
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fighting along the Suez Canal escalated once again in July.
In recognition of the Soviet acceptance and support of
Nasser's position, the Egyptians sent Ali Sabri to Moscow
again for a three-week visit.

The visit was intended to

assure the Soviets of the "progressive'' character of Egypt's
145
government.
In another gesture of thanks to the Soviets,
Nasser also decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to
the DDR.
As the "war of attrition" raged on and Soviet weaponry
in the hands of the Egyptian military proved itself to be
inadequate to halt Israel, the Soviets were once again drawn
further into Nasser's webs of entanglement.

The Soviets had

been conducting desultory talks regarding peace in the
Middle East with the Americans, but in October the Soviet
leaders decided to break them off and proposed a resumption
of Four Power talks in their place.

The move was one which

Nasser had encouraged and the Soviet acquiescence further
encouraged "Arab belligerence" by making a diplomatic solution even more remote.
In November, Sadat went to Moscow on a mission intended
to raise the level of Soviet military assistance.

Israel's

air superiority had proven to be too much for Egypt to handle
and the Egyptian air defense system was now in tatters.
Israeli planes could now range freely throughout Egypt.
Sadat went to the U.S.S.R. to find some means of deterring
those attacks.

On December 12, after more than two weeks of
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discussions, the Soviets and the Egyptians issued a joint
communique which outlined the outcome of the talks.

The two

sides stressed the importance of improving bilateral ties.
More concretely, the Soviets agreed to take "urgent and con146
structive steps" to counter the Israeli attacks.
These "constructive steps" did not come quickly enough
for the Egyptians.

In mid-January, the military situation in

Egypt had deteriorated even further from the position that
had prompted Sadat's visit.

As a result, another indication

of just how close the ties between Nasser and the Soviets had
become became apparent almost immediately.

On January 10 a

Soviet delegation headed by Politburo member D. A. Kunaev
visited Egypt for ten days to assess the situation there.
Two days after the Soviet contingent departed, Nasser flew
secretly to Moscow to ask that direct military aid from the
Soviet Union be sent to Egypt forthwith.

The commitment

which he received during his four-day visit far outstripped
anything which the Soviets had previously been willing to
offer Egypt or any other non-communist country since the
Soviet regime had come to power in Russia in 1917: the
active involvement of Soviet military personnel in the
defense of a non-communist nation.
Nasser's plea to the Soviet leaders had come for a
variety of reasons which ranged from his own political instability to his avowed desire to enmesh the U.S.S.R. as
deeply as possible in the political imbroglio of the Middle
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East.

The Soviets had responded with a major commitment of

military personnel and hardware for an equally wide range of
reasons.

They had already invested a great deal of time and

effort in supporting Nasser and Egypt and his fall quite
probably would have been extremely expensive for them in
terms of both prestige and military might.

By making a major

commitment to Egypt, they were improving their strategic
position in the Mediterranean basin and, by extension, the
world as well as broadening - or at the very least maintaining - their political pull in Egypt and the rest of the Arab
world by bolstering the position of the man who they felt
was the key to their influence in the region.
The Soviets took responsibility for Egypt's air defense.

It was the first time that the Soviet Union had

undertaken such a task and committed its personnel to the
active defense of a non-communist country.

The Soviets sent

both fighter pilots and missile technicians to the fracas
along with their new SAM-3 missiles.

At the same time, the

Soviets took a stance which was more visibly supportive of
Egypt in its conflict with Israel.

Led by Kosygin, the

Soviets issued what were interpreted in the West as a series
of purely polemical statements which expressed their willingness to render all "necessary aid to the Arab states in
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strengthening their ability to uphold their just interests."
In reality, these statements represented the actual commitment of the Soviets to Egypt and its allies.
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In return for the Soviet commitment of its personnel
and their assumption of responsibility for the defense of
Egypt's air space, Nasser turned six airfields over to the
Soviet military.

He also gave them a free hand in the de148
ployment of Soviet weaponry and personnel. With these concessions, the Soviets now had control over both the Egyptian
skies and parts of Egyptian territory for the first time.
The military commitments of the Soviet Union were soon
matched by similar diplomatic commitments.

In March, when

the Soviet military presence had allowed Egypt to regain
some semblance of control of the air space over the area
west of the Suez Canal, the Soviets adamantly refused to
compromise their commitment to Egypt in any way when the
American government suggested such a move in order to de149
crease "tension" along the canal.
While the Soviets were rejecting the overtures which
had been made by the Americans, their Deputy Foreign
Minister for Middle Eastern Affairs, Vladmir Vinogradov,
went to Cairo to serve as a liaison between his government
and Nasser for the next six weeks.

His trip was indicative

of both the newfound closeness of the Soviet and Egyptian
governments and the importance which Egypt's problems had
taken on for the Soviets.

The implications presented by

Vinogradov's visit were to some extent confirmed when Ali
Sabri, who had once again recovered much of the power that
had been stripped from him, visited Moscow for the Lenin
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centenary and consultations with Soviet leader,s in April.
A little over a month later, two events took place

which were to have an important affect upon Middle Eastern
affairs.

The first of these was the submission by the

American government of the final draft of the so-called
150
"Rogers Peace Plan" to the Egyptian government on June 25.
The Rogers Plan offered a chance for negotiations between
the Israelis and the Egyptians on a mutually acceptable
basis as well as arranging for a cease-fire along the Suez.
The Rogers Plan precipitated the second of the two
developments which influenced the course of events in the
Middle East.

Four days after the American proposal was an-

nounced, Nasser flew to Moscow to discuss its ramifications
with the Soviet leadership.

He spent nineteen days in the

U.S.S.R., and after his discussions with Brezhnev, Kosygin,
Podgorny, Gromyko, Vinogradov, and the other members of the
Soviet ruling elite, the two sides issued a joint communique which reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to
one another and to the search for a "just peace."

The

communique also announced that Brezhnev had agreed to make
his first visit to Egypt and that Kosygin and Podgorny had
accepted invitations from the Egyptians for them to return
151
there.
On July 23, the real reason for Nasser's visit became
more apparent than it had been from the communique.

The com-
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munique had not mentioned the Rogers Plan at all; however,
that afternoon, three days after he had returned from the
Soviet Union, Nasser announced Egypt's acceptance of the
American proposal at a stormy session of the ASU party congress and agreed to a three-month cease-fire along the Suez.
The announcement incurred the wrath of the radical Arab
regimes and the PLO.

Both groups hurled invective and

charges of treason at the Egyptians.

Nasser scoffed at the

charges and soon thereafter began a crackdown on the radical
Palestinian organizations in Egypt.
Nasser's crackdown on the radical Palestinians within
his borders was followed by a much harsher assault by
Jordan's King Hussein on the Fedayeen in his country.

The

trouble in Jordan had been brewing for a long time and in
mid-September, Hussein decided to send his army against
Palestinian units throughout his country.

In order to stop

the internecine warfare in Jordan and to keep it from involving much of the Arab world (the Syrians were threatening to intervene on the side of the Palestinians and the
more moderate regimes of the Arabian Peninsula were offering
to aid Jordan if the Syrians should take military action),
Nasser, whose health had been deteriorating for some time,
interrupted a rest which had been prescribed for him by his
physicians.

He invited the two sides to Cairo for dis-

cussions with each other and the other Arab heads of state
which he would mediate.

The conference proved successful in
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heading off the incipient tempest in Jordan, but it also
152
brought about a drastic deterioration in Nasser's health.
The downturn in Nasser's health quickly proved fatal.
He died on September 28.

Nasser left a legacy of a diplo-

matic involvement between the Soviet Union and Egypt that to
varying extents had helped to shape the foreign policy of
both countries and the internal policy of Egypt.

Both

countries became involved with situations that they might
not have otherwise.

Egypt would have been unable to pursue

its internal development and modernization if the conduit
for necessary Soviet economic aid had not been developed by
Nasser's diplomacy.
The political ties between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. had
given Egypt valuable support for its positions in such international forums as the U.N. and S.C.U.A.

They had pro-

vided Egypt with a staunch ally which lent both military and
economic support when the Egyptians needed i t most.

The re-

lationship had provided an avenue for cultural contacts
which, to some extent, broadened the cultural horizons of
the Egyptian people.
The benefits of relations with the Soviet Union for
Egypt are clear:

It received money, arms, and technical ex-

pertise when it needed it; it was given diplomatic support
which bolstered its positions during such international contretemps as the Suez Canal crisis and the Six-Day War; and,
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the relationship gave Egypt flexibility in its overall international posture by providing it with an alternative to the
West as a source of aid and support.
While the benefits of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship
to the Egyptians are evident, the advantages to the U.S.S.R.
are also apparent, even if they are for the most part intangible.

First, the Soviets gained egress to an area from which

they previously had been excluded by Western influence.
Second, they had gained some influence in the affairs of a
region which for a variety of reasons had an important impact
upon the Soviet Union and on world politics.

Third, the

Soviets had also gained prestige throughout the Third World
by helping Egypt to assert its independence from the West.
Despite the obvious benefits to both countries, the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was often stormy.
During periods like l958-59 and 1963-64, distinct chills in
the association between the two nations were manifest as a
result of Egypt's suppression of its Communist Party and the
ineffective attempts by the Soviet leadership to pressure
Nasser into halting his anti-Communist drives.

In 1969

Soviet dismay at their lack of influence upon Egyptian
policies was again evident in the Soviet press when Brezhnev,
Kosygin, and other Soviet leaders were unable to dissuade
the Egyptians from plunging headlong into the "war of attrition" with Israel.
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The causes of the discord between the Soviet Union and
Egypt are evidence that the controlling influence in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt lay in Nasser's
hands.

Nasser was always able to control his own destiny, at

least insofar as his dealings with the Soviet Union were concerned.

Whenever he chose to pursue a course of action, he

did so, and there was little or nothing that the Soviets
were both willing and able to do to stop him.

Eventually,

despite whatever reservations the Soviet leaders may have had
about a course of action which Nasser took, they would, however grudgingly, give him their support.

Nasser's entrance

into the "war of attrition" is particularly illustrative of
this facet of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship.

The Soviet

leadership "begged" Nasser not to embark upon what they considered to be a rash course of action.

He did so anyway.

When his adventure proved disasterous, they bailed him out
of what might have proved to be a situation which would have
153
led to his humiliation and political downfall.
By 1970, Soviet policy in Egypt and the entire Middle
East had become based upon Nasser and his influence to such
an extent that they clearly believed that - if they were to
maintain the level of influence in the region which they had
attained - it was imperative for them to support him at almost any cost.

However reluctantly, they gave him some of

their most advanced defensive military equipment to fight
his wars despite the risk of its eventual capture by the
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Israelis.

They spent hundreds of millions of dollars on and

in his country.

They even went so far as to send their own

troops to defend him when his fate hung in the balance.

The

situation which one might have expected - Egyptian dependence upon Soviet arms, money, and technical support - had
come to pass; the Egyptians did need the arsenal and the
economic support with which the Soviet Union had supplied
them to pursue both their domestic and foreign policies.
Unfortunately, from the Soviet point of view, the Soviets
had fallen prey to a countervailing pressure:

they had be-

come so dependent upon Nasser and his influence throughout
the Arab world that their dependence upon him played a
greater role in determining the interrelationship between
the two countries than did Egypt's dependence upon the
material and spiritual support which the U.S.S.R. provided to
it.
In part, Soviet dependence was a result of the situation which the two nations faced:

the issues upon which the

two governments collaborated were usually ones which Nasser
chose.

They were questions in which Egypt was more deeply

involved and upon which Egypt inherently had more influence
because of its more direct involvement.

As a result, Egypt

was more concerned with the solutions of the problems with
which the two countries were forced to cope and the U.S.S.R.
was primarily interested in its relationship with Egypt and
only secondarily in the problems themselves.

Because of
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this divergence in the primary concerns of the two nations,
the Soviet Union was placed in a support role while Egypt
took the lead and acted as its leaders felt best whether or
not the Soviets approved.
It was within this context that the Soviet-Egyptian
relationship developed.

The two nations cooperated closely

on issues which were essential concerns of the Egyptians and
Nasser, while the Soviets, who were less concerned with the
issues themselves, put the weight of their prestige and
power behind the positions which the Egyptians took.
relationship flourished.

The

The Egyptians were allowed to pur-

sue policies which they might not otherwise have been
capable of pursuing.

The Soviets gained prestige and in-

fluence in both the Third World in general and the Middle
East in particular.

The relationship deepened throughout

the years in which Nasser was in power in Egypt despite
temporary fluctuations in the level of agreement and cordiality between the two countries which occurred when the
Soviet Union's leadership disapproved of a course of action
which its Egyptian counterpart chose to take.
In general, it can be said that both sides benefited
from the relationship although each occassionally paid a
price in situations where their chosen ally cost them some
of the flexibility they might otherwise have had.

Usually

this influenced the Soviet Union more than it did Egypt, but
the Egyptians were also affected in situations where either
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the U.S. would have been more effective as an ally or no
ally at all would have been more useful.

(An example of the

former is the building of the Aswan Dam, where superior
Western technology and more freedom in the choice of spare
parts suppliers helped to make the U.S. and the rest of the
West Egypt's first choice as a partner despite greater surface costs.

1'he latter situation is exemplified by the

situation which arose from the Soviet suppression of the
Hungarian revolution, a circumstance which put the Egyptians
in the position of having to at least nominally support what
was ostensibly an imperialistic war because of its own international situation, i.e. the diplomatic machinations which
followed the Suez Canal crisis.)

Despite its occasional

debits for both sides, the diplomatic relationship between
the U.S.S.R. and Egypt during the years from 1953 to 1970
seems to have been one from which both nations benefited
enormously and one with which, on balance, both sides were
satisfied at the time of Nasser's death.
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.....
NOTES (Chapter III)
1)

See Anthony Nutting, Nasser, pp. 39-45, for an account
of the first few weeks after the revolution in Egypt.

2)

The break between the RCC and the old parliamentary
system had begun long before, but it hardened into its
final form when the Wafd party stubbornly resisted the
reforms which the Free Officers wanted to institute.
See Nutting, ibid, pp. 52-53.

3)

This drive and the military and middle-class backgrounds
of the majority of the members of the Revolutionary
Command Council were among the many reasons which helped
to develop strong initial distrust in the Soviet
leadership for the new regime in Egypt. See Nutting,
Nasser, pp. 43-44, 54, and 57. Also see Walter Laqueur,
The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York:
Praeger, 1959), p. 195. George Lenczowski brings up
Soviet suspicions (which were probably unfounded) that
the Egyptian revolution was actually the product of a
CIA operation.
If true, CIA involvement would bring
into question the standard accounts of the chain of
events that led to the military coup in Egypt like the
one Nutting provides. Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in
the Middle East, p. 76.

4)

The Cormnunist Party of Egypt - much diminished because
of Nasser's drive against it after the revolution - also
supported Neguib against their old adversary. For a
discussion of the political events of this period, see
Marlowe, A History of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, pp. 381-407, and Nutting, ibid, pp. 56-73.

5)

The ECP had actively worked against Nasser. The Soviets
on the other hand initially were very quiet about the
Egyptian revolution. Presumably they had other things
on their minds (such as the impending death of Stalin).
Although Soviet statements were initially somewhat
hostile, they were few and far between. See Heikal,
The Sphinx and the Commissar, pp. 53-54; Lenczowski,
op cit, p. 75-76; and Laqueur, op cit, p. 195.

6)

See the articles on the Anglo-Egyptian Pact in Pravda
and Izvestia on October 21 and 22, 1954.

7)

Robert O. Freedman points this out in Soviet Policy
Toward the Middle East Since 1970, where he suggests
that it was in large part due to the premiership of
Georgi Malenkov. Freedman, p. 10.

8)

This agreement, which was related to cooperation between
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the banking and financial institutions of the two
countries, will be more fully discussed in the following
chapter.
9)

Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p. 11.

10)

For a more complete look at the Czech Arms Deal and the
rest of the Soviet-Egyptian military relationship, see
Glassman, Arms for the Arabs.

11)

Nutting, op cit, p. 104.

12)

The Baghdad Pact was the Middle Eastern link in the
chain of defense treaties which the U.S. and its NATO
allies were attempting to forge to place as a containment barrier around the Communist Bloc.

13)

For a discussion of the evolution of Chou En-lai's
mission and the text of his report, see Mohammed Heikal,
op cit, pp. 57-60.

14)

Ibid, p. 5 9 .

15)

Ibid, p. 59.

16)

See Heikal's description of the negotiations with the
Americans about financing for the dam.
Ibid, pp. 68-69.

17)

See Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, #1 (Winter 1956) for
a report of this agreement, as well as a chronology of
the key events in the foreign relations of the nations
of the Middle East during the quarter. The agreement is
also mentioned in McLane, Soviet-Middle Eastern Relations, p. 35.

18)

Anthony Nutting cites Joseph Broz Tito as being Nasser's
teacher - the man who instructed him on the advantages
of playing the West and the Soviet Bloc off of one another (Nutting, op cit, p. 117). Nasser continued to
use this technique throughout his sojourn in power.

19)

The agreement with the Bulgarians was signed on March
17. See Middle East Journal, Vol 10, #3 (Summer 1956),
p. 282.

20)

The Soviet offer came on October 11, 1955, when Solod
came to Nasser with a proposal for Soviet aid in the
building of the dam that was to cover a 25-year period.
Love, Suez, p. 255.

21)

Love, ibid, p. 311. The discussions were apparently
long and arduous and had to overcome initial antipathy
between Nasser and Black.

174
22)

See John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York:
Macmillan, 1957). Dulles commented further that the
loan to Egypt was "a cheap price to pay for peace."
Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice
of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), p. 38.

23)

This contention is brought out by both Nutting and Love
in their discussions on the subject. Nutting, op cit,
pp. 141-142; and Love, op cit, p. 316. It also appears
in Chester L. Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978), on pages 94-99. Black,
who had determined otherwise for the World Bank, always
considered such a contention ridiculous. Nutting, p.
135 and Love, p. 316.

24)

Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston:
Co., 1960), p. 469.

25)

The most detailed versions of this contention appear in
Cooper, ibid, pp. 95-98, and Love, ibid, pp. 323-324.
The contention also appears in Nutting, ibid, p. 135.

26)

Love claims that this angered Dulles so much that it was
responsible for his abrupt change of heart regarding the
financing of the dam. Love, ibid, pp. 307-310.

27)

Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Story of the Suez
Conspiracy (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 35-37.
Robertson supports the claim that Nasser was unreasonable. Nutting, who was Eden's Foreign Minister as the
Suez crisis evolved, is one of the foremost proponents
of enmity as a primary cause. See his statements regarding Eden's dislike for Nasser in Nasser, pp. 89,
136, 183, and 383, and No End of a Lesson, (New York:
Potter, 1967), pp. 23, 40-41, and 45-46. Love is even
more certain that Eden's enmity was a factor and repeatedly makes and remakes the point in Suez.

28)

The Daily Telegraph was often a spokesman for this
lobby. It was one of its editorials that resulted in
Nutting saying he had "never seen Eden so stricken" when
it impugned Eden's courage. Nutting, No End of a
Lesson, p. 26.

29)

Nutting, ibid, p. 24.

30)

Eden, Full Circle, pp. 468-469.

31)

The costs of Soviet armaments were relatively high for
the Egyptians. However, later events and Black's assurances both argue that they were not too high. See footnote #23 for Black's reaction. A few years later, the
U.S. Embassy in Cairo reported that the yearly costs of
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the first three arms deals between the Egyptians and the
Soviets were 25 million dollars and "no strain on the
Egyptian economy at all." Love, Suez, pp. 316-317.

"'
32)

Black made this statement in a speech before the
Connecticut Chamber of Commerce on May 8.
He steadfastly held to this position thereafter.
Love, ibid,
p. 314.

33)

Love, ibid, p. 316.

34)

See The U.A.R. Yearbook for the years 1955, 1956, and
1957. The gross national product figures given there
are compared with the import figures and the given percentages result.

35)

Heikal chronicles the role of Nasser in the nationalization of the Canal and the events immediately thereafter on pages 67-69 of The Sphinx and the Commissar.

36)

Love, op cit, pp. 362-363.

37)

Gaitskell was endorsing a comparison originally made by
Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister.
Love, ibid, p.
383. A similar comparison had been made about the first
years of the new Egyptian regime. See Laqueur, op cit,
p. 195.

38)

Nutting spends a good deal of time making the point that
Eden was spoiling for Nasser because of what Eden perceived as Nasser's role in the dismissal of General
Glubb by the Jordanians. Nutting, No End of a Lesson,
pp. 40-47. Eden's distaste for Nasser is also readily
apparent throughout Eden's memoirs.

39)

Nutting, ibid, p. 47.

40)

Eden, Full Circle, p. 478. See pp. 477-478 for Eden's
description of the actions taken by the British as retaliation for the nationalization of the Canal by the
Egyptians.

41)

Pineau also claimed that the Suez Canal Company had
ordered its employees to defy Egyptian work orders, a
claim that was untrue.
Love, op cit, p. 367. For more
on the role of the Suez Canal Company in the crisis,
see the memoirs of its head, Jacques Georges-Picot, The
Real Suez Canal Crisis (New York:
Harcourt Brace
Jovanich, 1978).

42)

The popular unrest in Iraq over Nuri a-Said's friendship with the French and the British is mentioned along
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with a similar upheaval in Jordan on pages 173 and 193
of Nasser by Nutting.
43)

Love reports that initially Khrushchev "told workers at

at a stadium rally that the West had reacted with 'too
much excitement'".
Love, op cit, p. 377. The reasoning
that the Soviets were slow to get involved in the Suez
crisis out of simple caution only addresses a part of
the whole situation. The Soviets also had their hands
full in Hungary and Poland at the time and, as a result,
could do little of substance to support the Egyptians.
Their Hungarian adventure, which began on October 24,
was also a weak spot in their international posture.
Undoubtedly, it was another reason that they kept a lower
profile than they otherwise might have.
44)

The speech was reported in Pravda on August 1, 1956.

45)

See the articles in Izvestia on July 31 and August 3, 4,
and 5, 1956.

46)

To get an idea of the increasingly belligerent and intransigent stand the Soviets took in support of the
Egyptians (in response to the clearly hostile intent of
the British and French), see Love, op cit, pp. 428, 580,
612-613, and 652.

47)

The specter of this hope appears throughout Eden's
recollections of the genesis and evolution of the crisis.
See Eden, op cit, pp. 481-489.

48)

This information comes from Eden, ibid, pp. 485-486, who
attributes the French charge to Christian Pineau, the
French Foreign Minister.

49)

Love, op cit, pp. 376-381.

50)

See Heikal's description of the events following nationalization on pages 65-73 of The Sphinx and the Commissar.
According to Heikal, the reason behind the placement of
this calculated distance between Egypt and the Soviets
by the Egyptians was the need to maintain an independent
road in foreign relations.

51)

Eden, op cit, p. 493.

52)

Pravda, August 10, 1955.

53)

Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York:
Press, 1981), p. 198.

54)

For a record of the arguments of the Soviet delegation
and the other participants in the Conference, see The
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Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1956). This
compendium presents the statements and proposals made
at both users' conferences as well as a record of the

Menzies' mission to Egypt.
55)

Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 56-57.

56)

Menzies' statement appears in Love, op cit, on p. 412,
where Love points out Menzies' lacks in the way of
qualifications for the task which he was purportedly
attempting to accomplish.

57)

Love, ibid, pp. 435-442.

58)

See the articles in Pravda on August 3, 6 and 10, 1956,
for a look at the Soviet response to the Anglo-French
buildup.

59)

Pravda, August 9, 1956. Also see Finer, op cit, pp.
114-115, for an analysis of Dulles' reaction.

60)

The "Six Principles" were dictated "off the cuff" by
Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, during his
visit in New York in October. Love, ibid, pp. 445-446.

61)

Love, ibid, pp. 445-452.

62)

According to Nutting, Eden was "distraught". The French
however, had their Israeli ace up their collective
sleeve. For more on this, see Nutting, No End of a
Lesson, pp. 66-69.

63)

The Franco-Israeli plan was presented to Nutting and
Eden by General Maurice Challe and French Labor Minister,
Albert Gazier. Nutting's reaction was immediate rejection. Eden, on the other hand, thought it was a
wonderful idea and convinced Lloyd to accept it. See
Love, ibid, pp. 449-452.

64)

Love, ibid, p. 452. This entire episode is described in
detail by Nutting in No End of a Lesson on pages 90-99.
A much more self-righteous version of the story appears
in Eden, op cit, pp. 569-574.

65)

See Love, ibid, pp. 495-497 for an account of Egypt's
preparation for the invasion from Great Britain and
France which Nasser feared.

66)

Eden discusses the events leading up to the notes from
the British and French to the Egyptians and Israelis,
and the Egyptian rejection of theirs, but he fails to
give the terms of the notes. Eden, op cit, pp. 584-592.
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The text of the notes appears in Love, op cit, p. 386
and in Nutting, No End of a Lesson, Appendix VIII,
pp. 193-194. Coming as they did at a time when the
Canal was still approximately 100 miles behind the
front, these notes stand out as one of the many transparent pretexts throughout history for an undeclared
invasion of a sovereign country. Nutting was, for
example, indignant at such bald-faced aggression and
resigned his post in the British government. See No
End of a Lesson, p. 116.
67)

This plan is reported by Nutting on pages 163-164 of
Nasser, where this perfidy is attributed to Guy Mollet
in his discussions with David Ben-Gurion.
It may not
have been an element in the British conception of the
scenario, however. Certainly, Eden does not mention it
in his memoirs despite his ill-concealed dislike for
Nasser.

68)

Ultimately, as Karen Dawisha has pointed out, Nasser was
the chief beneficiary of the prestige in the Arab world
which was derived from the conclusion of the Czech Arms
Deal and his victory over the Anglo-French-Israeli
alliance at the postwar conference table. Dawisha,
Soviet Policy Towards Egypt, p. 15. The losses which
the U.S. would have suffered would undoubtedly have been
much like those the British and French were forced to
endure as a result of their roles in the Suez adventure.
Both suffered through a long period of poor economic and
diplomatic relations with the Arab nations of the Middle
East.

69)

Arguably, the Soviet role was somewhat more important.
Heikal states that, "Russian attitudes made a significant contribution to the final result." Heikal, The
Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 72. However, even he-admits that it was American, not Soviet, pressure which
ultimately forced a positive resolution to the situation
for the Egyptians.

70)

Love, op cit, p. 610.

71)

Love, ibid, p. 633.

72)

Heikal provides this information on page 74 of The
Sphinx and the Commissar.

73)

For more on this see Chapter V. Also see Dawisha, op
cit, p. 195, and Spector, The Soviet Union and the
Muslim World, 1917-1958, p. 261.

74)

Nutting reports this in No End of a Lesson, on p. 144.
In the U.N. Security Council emergency meetings, the
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Soviets even went so far as to propose a joint SovietAmerican military action against the Anglo-French
forces if those forces failed to withdraw.
The threat
to send Soviet volunteers appeared in Pravda and

Izvestia on November 11.
26 for the English text.

See CDSP, Vol. VIII, #45, p.
~~

75)

The speech was made on December 27.
It is cited without
reference to the location from which it was given in
Middle East Journal, Vol. 11, #1 (Winter 1957), p. 76.
The location is given in Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 8,
#2 (February 1957), p. 85.

76)

In the aftermath of the 1955 flooding in Egypt, the
Soviets sent gifts of food and medical supplies to the
country for relief of the victims. These were the first
of many gifts and packages of aid with which the Soviets
were to supply the government which Nasser and the other
Free Officers had set up.

77)

The crisis in Lebanon was brought about when the Moslem
minority of the country rebelled against the reelection
of Camille Chamoun as president, a post which, under the
Lebanese Constitution, was to be in the hands of a
Christian. The Moslem rebellion brought American
marines into Lebanon in an effort to "protect American
citizens and their property." The Soviets and Arab
nationalists feared that it was merely a pretext to
bring down the U.A.R. government in Syria. As it turned
out, the Americans apparently were in Lebanon to achieve
their stated goals and not to stage an invasion of
Syria. Nasser, Chamoun, the U.S. and the leaders of the
Moslems reached an agreement whereby a compromise
candidate was placed in the presidency and the rebellion was stopped. Nutting, Nasser, pp. 218-244.

78)

The Sputnik launch brought a complete reorientation of
American education which was designed to eliminate the
perceived gap between American science and that of the
Soviets.
It also brought the threat of nuclear devastation - which had theretofore been confined to Europe
for the most part - to the entire world. Accordingly,
military strategists in both Moscow and Washington were
forced to recalculate the possibilities and dangers of
war.

79)

The suppression of the U.A.R.'s communists was the result of an ongoing campaign in Egypt and the banning of
political parties in Syria. The Egyptian CP was the
victim of continuing efforts to destroy it throughout
the year.
The Syrians, on the other hand, were left to
their own devices until December when Nasser and the
Syrian intelligence apparatus made its move to elimini-
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nate their influence.
80)

For more on the Soviet aid package for the building of
the dam, see Chapter IV.

81)

Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East, p. 84.

82)

The Ba'ath party was a part of an international organization of Arabs whose goal was the union of all of the
Arab people. In fact, their political philosophy has
been said to be the "purest milk" of Nasser's own
philosophy. Nutting, Nasser, p. 247. The headquarters
of the organization was in Damascus and Nasser's
banning of parties in Syria when the U.A.R. was formed
was a severe blow to the organization. That, along with
Nasser's subsequent failure to favor the Ba'athists as
much as they believed was their due, was a big factor in
the failure of the U.A.R. to survive.

83)

Mizan, Vol. VIII, #1 (January 1959), pp. 10-11, and
Dawisha, op cit, p. 22.

84)

Dawisha, ibid, p. 22

85)

Later, Nasser would call the Syrian and Iraqi communists
"agents of a foreign power." Dawisha, ibid, p. 22.
This crisis is described in detail in Oles Smolansky,
"Moscow-Cairo Crisis, 1959". Slavic Review, Vol. XXII,
#4 (December 1963), pp. 713-726

86)

Khrushchev called Nasser "a passionate and hot-headed
young man" who had "taken more upon himself than his
stature permitted." Laqueur, op cit, p. 85. Nasser
replied by claiming that it was the very passion and
hot-headedness of the Arab people that had prevented
Egypt from becoming a missile base with its weapons
pointed at Moscow. Nasser also suggested that the
Russians were trying to turn the Middle East into a
"red'' fertile crescent. Khrushchev reminded the
Egyptians that the Soviets hadn't forced their aid upon
them, thus intimating that perhaps it could be withdrawn if the Egyptians were afraid that the Soviets
were trying to fiscally blackmail them. See Smolansky,
op cit, pp. 715-723.

87)

Nasser made this charge in a speech he made at Damascus.
An excerpt of the speech is reported by Heikal, The
Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 104. Excerpts also appear
in Lenczowski, op cit, p. 87ff.

88)

Khrushchev made an oblique reference to this possibility in his speech to the 21st Party Congress. Heikal,
op cit, pp. 103-104. According to Nasser, however,
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the Soviets never threatened to stop their aid to Egypt.
For a discussion of the Soviet-Egyptian dispute see
Walter z. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East,
pp. 84-86.
89)

This incident is reported by Heikal on page 109 of
The Sphinx and the Commissar.

90)

Heikal, ibid, p. 110.

91)

Ibid, p. 111.

92)

Dawisha, op cit, p. 25. The U.A.R. came up short in the
last two categories of the definition for one reason:
its suppression of its communists.

93)

See Boris Ponomarev, "O gosudarstve natsionalnoi demokratii," Kommunist, Vol. XXXVIII, #8 (May 1961), pp.
33-49. Ponomarev also attacked the terroristic methods
of Nasser in the article. Prominent Arab Communists
such as Khalid Bakdash also took this position. It
seems likely, however, that their support had largely
ulterior motives.

94)

See Ponomarev, op cit, and articles in Pravda on January
20 and February 5.

95)

Heikal, op cit, pp. 112-114.

96)

Dawisha, op cit, p. 30. This belief was not entirely
accurate. Many of the problems arose from Nasser's own
mishandling of the situation. Others arose from the
opposition of the far left, particularly the Syrian Communist Party which was led by Khalid Bakdash. In fact,
Syrian opposition to the union was voiced by nearly
every element in its political spectrum by the time of
the U.A.R.'s dissolution.

97)

Nasser's move to the left isolated him from the right.
He was already alienated from the countries of the Arab
left (except Algeria, Iraq and Syria) by the events
which led to the dissolution of the U.A.R.

98)

For a discussion of the effect of the U-2 incident on
internal politics and foreign policy in the U.S.S.R.,
see Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York:
Viking Press, 1969).

99)

Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubey, did visit the
U.A.R. However, his official position in the Soviet
hierarchy was relatively low and this visit at least
could not be construed as a "high-level" contact.
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100)

See Heikal, op cit, p. 119, and Mirskii's article "The
UAR Reforms," New Times, #4 (1962), pp. 12-15, for
examples of the arguments that the Soviet Middle
Eastern expert made. Also see Dawisha, op cit, pp.
30-31.

101)

See for example the Pravda article of August 16 which
is reprinted in CDSP, Vol. XXV, #15, p. 20.

102)

Giving Amer the award was apparently one of many
"sins" which Khrushchev committed on his trip to
Egypt. Others purportedly included his promising the
Egyptians a substantially larger loan for the second
development plan than the Politburo had authorized
and engaging in a heated dispute with Aref, who was
now President of Iraq, having overthrown Kassem by
way of a military coup. Dawisha, op cit, pp. 32-33.
Khrushchev contended that the dispute with Aref was
not really heated. He also claimed that he had been
asked to respond to Aref by Nasser. Nikita S.
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1970), pp. 443-445.

103)

Heikal, op cit, p. 20.

104)

Khrushchev handed Gromyko a plate and told him to
"make music" and then told Gromyko to dance to the
tune. Heikal, ibid, p. 137.

105)

There were rumors that Khrushchev's favorable treatment of the Egyptians had been the cause of his downfall.
The new Soviet leaders disproved this hypothesis soon after they assumed power. Heikal, op cit,
p. 146.

106)

The relationship between the two men was characterized as a friendship by Nasser's confidant, Heikal,
when he discusses Khrushchev's downfall. Heikal, op
cit, p. 138. Nutting claims that Nasser was ''seriously put out by the fall of Khrushchev." Nutting,
Nasser, p. 358.

107)

Heikal, ibid, p. 159.

108)

Their claim was not entirely accurate. Close relations had been developed by the Soviet leadership with
Ali Sabri and other members of the "Soviet" lobby in
Egypt.
Their connections with Sabri played a major
role in his later demotions.

109)

The Egyptian Communist Party had decided to accept
Nasser's offer of entry into the ASU and had voluntarily dissolved itself. The other leaders of Arab
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CP's and Suslov obviously believed that this was a
dangerous precedent. Heikal, op cit, p. 156. Dawisha
claims that the dissolution of the Egyptian CP was
done with the encouragement of the Soviet leadership.
Dawisha, op cit, p. 35.
110)

Heikal suggests that Nasser's visit was in response
to a request from the new Soviet leaders that he visit
in reciprocation for Khrushchev's visit. According to
Heikal, the request had been precipitated by the
crisis at the second Afro-Asian conference in which
the Soviets and the Chinese had clashed. The Egyptians
had proven unwilling to support the Soviets and Heikal
says that the Soviet leaders interpreted this as a
sign of Nasser's lack of confidence in them.
Heikal,
ibid, p. 143.

111)

The visit is described by Heikal, ibid, pp. 143-147.

112)

Heikal, ibid, pp. 146-147.

113)

The Egyptians were being pressured by the Americans to
make changes in certain aspects of their foreign
policy - the incursion into Yemen in particular. The
American supplies of wheat which were being shipped to
Egypt were being used by the American government as a
lever.

114)

The 1966 Soviet wheat harvest was their best ever.
For statistical information on the 1966 harvest, see
Sel'skoe Khoziaistvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik
(Moscow: Statistika, 1971), pp. 161-171.

115)

An example of the flareups which occurred because of
the bureaucracy failing to take into account special
circumstances comes in Heikal, op cit, where he describes another incident when the Soviets attempted to
indoctrinate Egyptian students despite an agreement
not to. This time, however, it was a group of
Egyptian military officers studying in the U.S.S.R.
which was the target.
The incident was resolved much
more easily than the 1959 incident had been when the
Soviets stopped trying to indoctrinate the Egyptian
officers. Heikal, op cit, p. 166.

116)

Heikal, op cit, pp. 168-169.

117)

Israeli author Ilana Kass mentions these reports in
Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966-1973 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1978), p. 27. Nutting claims that these reports were
the product of "a clever combination of calculated
leakage, for the benefit of the Soviet Embassy in Tel
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Aviv, and fictious radio messages . . •
Nasser, p. 397.

II

Nutting,

118)

See Kass for a study of the reactions of the Soviet
press to the new Syrian regime. Kass, ibid, pp.
17-24.

119)

According to Nutting, the Israelis set a three-stage
trap which caught Nasser - despite his own reluctance
- up in a war for which he was unwittingly unprepared.
Nutting, op cit, pp. 383-402.

120)

See Kass, op cit, p. 27; Dawisha, op cit, p. 39; and
Nutting, ibid, pp. 392-397.

121)

Dawisha, ibid, pp. 38-39.

122)

See the articles in Pravda on May 15 and May 18 for
examples.

123)

Izvestia, May 17, 1967; Krasnaia Zvezda, May 17, 1967;
and Pravda, May 18, 1967. These articles are also reported by Kass. Kass, op cit, p. 243ff.

124)

The Soviets had apparently already realized that they
must do something to avert hostilities. Earlier in
May, in response to an Egyptian request for satellite
reconnaissance, they had suggested that Israeli troop
concentrations on the Syrian border might be defensive.
Heikal, op cit, p. 175. They did, however, continue to
send mixed messages. As late as June 3, Izvestia expressed Soviet willingness to help the Arab countries
"in every way." Izvestia, June 3, 1967.

125)

This incident is reported by Heikal. He gives it much
weight in Nasser's decision not to compromise with the
Israelis more quickly. Heikal, op cit, pp. 179-180.

126)

Nutting, op cit, p. 413.

127)

See Chapter II.

128)

Heikal, op cit, p. 191.

129)

See Kass for an account of the campaign in the Soviet
press for a purge of the military in the U.A.R. Kass,
op cit, pp. 40-41. Also see Dawisha, op cit, pp.
43-44. The Egyptians eventually dismissed over 800
officers in their post-war campaign.

130)

The demotion of Ali Sabri and those associated with
him in 1969 is one of the best examples of just how
quickly and easily Soviet preference could be dis-
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regarded when it suited Nasser.
131)

See Heikal, op cit, pp. 183-184.

132)

Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 13. Rubinstein
overstates the Soviet role in the conference when he
claims that the Soviets "mobilized" the countries of
Eastern Europe. Heikal says that the idea for the
conference originated in Yugoslavia and attributes a
major role to the Yugoslavians in its organization
and outcome. Heikal, op cit, pp. 182-183.

133)

All but the English version of the text contain the
word "the" in the key phrase, "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from the territories occupied in the
recent conflict." For more on the importance of the
precise wording of this phrase, see Rubinstein, ibid,
p. 39.

134)

Nutting, op cit, p. 438.

135)

Mohammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York:
Quadrangle, 1975), p. 54.

136)

Rubinstein, op cit, p. 44.

137)

See the article in Izvestia, January 26, 1968, for the
Soviet response. Ali Sabri's fortunes often shifted
quickly. He was demoted from his new post by March.

138)

The Soviets provided Egypt with a 200 million dollar
credit for the expansion of the Helwan complex six
weeks after the reforms were announced. Robert Slusser
and George Ginzburgs, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties,
1958-1970 (Rockville, MD:
Sitjen & Noordhoff, 1981).

139)

By August, the two nations were so closely aligned
that the Egyptians supported the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in a Radio Cairo broadcast. BBC/ME/
2858/A/l. Also cited by Rubinstein, op cit, p. 69ff.

140)

For a summary of this joint communique and others, see
Rubinstein, ibid, pp. 355-366, where the author summarizes all of the major joint communiques issued by
the two countries. This particular communique is summarized on p. 357.

141)

Rubinstein, ibid, p. 67.

142)

The fighting had almost come to a halt after the Nag
Hamadi raid in October. For more about the prelude
to the "war of attrition," see Edgar O'Ballance, The
Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-70, p. 45-.-
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143)

Rubinstein cites Nasser's speech to the National
Assembly on January 20, which clearly shows that Nasser
was growing pessimistic about peaceful methods of
solving the crisis.
Rubinstein, ibid, p. 77. Further
evidence of the interlinked policies of the Soviet
Union and Egypt appeared at the same time when Al
Ahram published another Soviet peace proposal 011"
January 19 - six days before the same proposal appeared
in Pravda.
Kass, op cit, pp. 71-72.

144)

See Rubinstein, ibid, pp. 82-84, for an account of the
Soviet press campaign.

145)

This was a fateful trip for Sabri. At its end, he was
shorn of his power. He and his closest followers reputedly were suddenly demoted because of Sabri's own
lust for power. One of the most important criticisms
of Sabri came from Heikal who suggested that Sabri
thought the road to power in Egypt lay through Moscow.
For more on the Sabri affair, see Rubinstein, ibid,
pp. 93-95.

146)

Rubinstein, ibid, p. 101.

147)

See the statements by Kosygin and the Soviet leaders
which were reported in the New York Times on February
5 and February 17, 1970, as well as others cited in
Rubinstein, ibid, p. lllff, for a more extensive look
at the Soviet stance vis-a-vis the situation in the
Middle East. The American response to the statement
by Kosygin (which had been made on January 31) was reported in the New York Times on February 3. According
to Sadat, the Soviet statement which was reported by
the Times on the 17th had come on the heels of the
first Soviet combat deaths in Egypt. New York Times,
January 5, 1971.

148)

This was not particularly well received by the Eygptian
military, the members of which generally disliked their
Soviet "advisors.'' See Chapter II, footnote 43.

149)

See for example, a statement by Brezhnev which underscored the hard-line which the Soviet leadership had
taken vis-a-vis the Israelis and the Americans.
Pravda and Izvestia, April 15, 1970.

150)

The Rogers Plan was actually launched on December 9,
1969.
It was perhaps the most important element in the
solution to the "war of attrition."

151)

For a discussion of Nasser's visit to Moscow and the
subsequent communique, see Rubinstein, op cit, pp.
118-120.
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152)

For a discussion of this conference and its ramifications for inter-Arab politics, see Heikal, The Road
to Ramadan, pp. 98-102.

153)

Cindy Roberts cites this incident as an example of a
pattern in Soviet arms exports to its allies, a
pattern which demonstrated Soviet willingness to support its allies with sophisticated defensive weaponry
when it perceived the existence of the regime to be
threatened. Cynthia Roberts, "Soviet Arms-Transfer
Policy and the Decision to Upgrade Syrian Air
Defenses," Survival, Vol. XXV, #4 (July-August 1983).
Ms. Roberts also provides a short but interesting
discussion of the question of political influence between countries. For relevant material, see pp.
157-158, 161, and 163ff.

CHAPTER IV
THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP:
HOW THE TIES WERE FORGED
One of the most important elements of the SovietEgyptian relationship during the period when Nasser was in
power was the economic relationship between the two nations.
The Soviet-Egyptian relationship was composed of two separate parts: economic assistance and trade relations.

The

former was, like military assistance, extremely undirectional.

The flow of aid was, predictably, exclusively from the

Soviet Union to Egypt.

Unlike military aid, however, eco-

nomic aid returned little to the Soviet Union in terms of
benefits that it could have gained only through Egypt.

Eco-

nomic aid did not provide the Soviets with bases or testing
grounds for equipment that were unique in their advantages.
It did make Egypt somewhat dependent on the Soviet Union for
machinery and spare parts.

This was true in part because

most Soviet aid to Egypt came in the form of project aid
which utilized Soviet personnel, Soviet equipment, and Soviet
training for Egyptian personnel.
Soviet economic aid to Egypt came in two different
types.

The most common type of Soviet assistance was a loan

or credit to Egypt for a specific project.

These loans,

like all Soviet loans and loans from one nation to another
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in general, provided the Soviets as lender with some return
on their investment.

That return was, however, minimal.

Usually, the loans were extended to Egypt in rubles and were
to be paid with 2.5 to 3 percent interest in equal yearly
installments over a ten to twelve year period, beginning a
l

year after the completion of a project.

Repayments were

generally made in Egyptian pounds, although most agreements
did contain a clause which stated that payments "may be converted to pounds sterling or any freely convertible currency
2
which will be agreed upon between the two governments." Apparently the Soviets never requested repayment from the
Egyptians in hard currency at any time - even after Sadat
expelled the Soviets from Egypt in 1975.
The other form of direct Soviet aid to Egypt, the economic grant, was utilized very rarely and the amounts of
Soviet grants were always quite small.

In fact, Soviet

grants to Egypt played a negligible role in developing
Egypt's economy and had little impact on Soviet-Egyptian
relations as a whole.

One of the few instances in which

anything which could be termed a Soviet grant to Egypt
played a significant role in supporting the Egyptian economy and in bolstering Soviet-Egyptian relations was during
the singular circumstances of the aftermath of the June 1967
war between Egypt and Israel.

Actually, even in that in-

stance, the Soviets did not provide a large grant to the
Egyptians outright, but instead simply cancelled half of
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Egypt's prior debt to the Soviet Union and rescheduled the
3

remainder.
The sum of these two types of economic assistance to
Egypt made up over 28 percent of the total of all Soviet aid
to developing nations and approximately 15 percent of its
total aid from 1954 to 1970.

Much of the dominant element

of project aid went toward the development of Egyptian heavy

4
industry and hydroelectric power.

Of this portion, the most

important single project was the building of the Aswan Dam
and its attendant industries.

The Soviet Union contributed

over 325 million dollars for the project, a sum which con5

stituted 27.7 percent of the total cost of the project.
Much of the remainder of the project aid with which the
Soviets provided Egypt was for heavy industry and came in
the form of complete industrial plants which the Soviets
shipped to Egypt.

This form of aid was especially prominent

in the mid and late 1960's when an average of approximately
80 million dollars worth of complete industrial plants were
sent to Egypt by the

u.s.s.R.

6

annually.

The element of economic assistance was added to the
Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship in the 1950's.

There

had already been a commercial relationship on a small scale
between the two countries for many years.

Begun in 1923,

the trade relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt
continued with few interruptions up to and through the Nasser
era (see Appendix A).

Throughout the Nasser era, trade be-
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tween the Soviet Union and Egypt was handled on a state to
state basis.

From the beginning of the Nasser regime until

its end, the commerce between the two countries increased
steadily from a minimum value of 15.6 million rubles in 1954
7
to a maximum of over 600 million rubles in 1970.
Soviet trade with Egypt was always of only minor significance to the Soviet economy.

This is particularly ap-

parent when that trade is viewed in light of the total
volume of Soviet trade with the entire world.

Soviet8

Egyptian trade made up only approximately 3 percent of the
entirety of Soviet trade.

Clearly, the Soviet Union was in

no way economically dependent upon its trade relationship
with Egypt.

That fact stands out even more when one con-

siders the fact that the major portion of Soviet imports
from Egypt came not in the form of some rare but crucial
mineral for industry that was not produced in the Soviet
Union, but rather in the form of raw materials - cotton and
oil - which the Soviets produced in quantities sufficient
or nearly sufficient for their own needs within their own
borders.
For Egypt, on the other hand, its trade relationship
with the Soviet Union was extremely important.

Not only did

its trade relationship with the U.S.S.R. and the other
centrally-planned economies of the world account for over
60 percent of its exports, but it was also dependent upon
the Soviets for machinery and technical expertise necessary
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9
for its industrial development.

This situation was ex-

acerbated by the nature of the Soviet-Egyptian trade relationship.

The commercial relationship between the two

nations followed a trade pattern that was characteristic of
much of Soviet trade: the bilateral trade pattern.

This

pattern heightened the dependence of Egypt upon the Soviet
Union by providing a single buyer for its cotton crop.

For

a single crop economy like Egypt's that could be disasterous
if it wished to retain its independence.

Dependence upon

the Soviet Union for its industrial supplies also put Egypt
in a position where it seemed to have little alternative
for assistance.

No other country could offer technical

familiarity or spare parts for the machinery on which Egypt
relied.

Given this situation, the inception of Egypt's com-

mercial relationship with the U.S.S.R. in 1954, while minor
in terms of capital, undoubtedly changed - and changed
drastically - the course of Egypt's economic development.
The economic relationship between Nasser's regime began quietly enough with the signing of a routine commercial
banking agreement between the two governments in August of
10
1953. It was the first official agreement of any sort between the two countries.

Although it seemed at the time to

be nothing more than a rather inoffensive and unimportant
step toward the normalization of relations between one of
the world's emerging superpowers and a nation which had only
recently regained its political independence, it was in
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reality the first step in a binding process which would
eventually shake the foundations of peace in the Middle East
and which, by doing that, would bring to the fore ominous
possibilities for the entire world.

The agreement itself,

however, was nothing more than an agreement by the commercial institutions of the two countries to honor each others
credit arrangements.
The commercial banking agreement between Egypt and the
U.S.S.R. opened the doors for much more extensive and important economic agreements between the two countries.

A year

later, the banking agreement was followed by the first trade
agreement between the revolutionary government of Egypt and
11
its Soviet counterpart.
The trade agreement itself had
relatively little immediate impact upon the economy of
either country.

It involved very little in terms of money -

the total flow in both directions for 1954 and 1955 amounted
to only 39.3 million rubles worth of goods - and exchanged
small amounts of unwanted surplus items such as Egyptian
cotton and non-crucial machinery from the Soviet Union.

It

was, however, the first step in the broader and much more
significant - particularly for Egypt - trade relationship
that was to develop over the next decade between the two
countries.
After 1954, the economic relationship between Egypt
and the Soviet Union quickly blossomed.

In January of 1955,

the Soviets sent their first direct economic aid to Egypt
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in the form of money and supplies for the relief of the
victims of the disasterous flooding of the Nile that year.
In April, the economic relationship expanded to include
the Soviet Union's erstwhile ally, the People's Republic of
China.

In September, the Egyptians and the Soviets signed

a trade protocol which was indirectly related to the Czech
12
Arms Deal which had been arranged at the same time.
These relatively minor steps toward an economic rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Egypt combined with
the much more ominous Czech Arms Deal to help prod the U.S.
and the United Kingdom to offer Egypt the financial assistance which it had been seeking to build the Aswan Dam.

The

terms of the aid from the West for the building of the dam
were too harsh as far as Nasser was concerned for Egypt to
accept.

He threatened to go to the Soviets for aid for his

project just as he had gone to them for arms when the West
13
had proven ''unreasonable." Despite Nasser's threat and
continuing evidence of the ever increasing number of connections between Egypt and the Soviets such as the cooperative agreement on the development of nuclear energy in
Egypt which had been announced by the two countries in
14
February of 1957, the United States withdrew its offer of
aid for Egypt in July.
soon follwed suit.

Great Britain and the World Bank

Nasser's response was the nationaliza-

tion of the Suez Canal.
Nasser's action led to the Suez Canal War and the
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international turmoil which followed from it.

Despite that

turmoil, the development of closer Soviet-Egyptian economic
relations continued apace.

In July of 1956, the Soviet

Union established a permanent trade mission in Cairo.

In

October, the Chinese, who were still relatively closely
allied with the Soviet Union, extended a credit to Egypt for
commodity purchases.

Most importantly, the negotiations be-

tween the U.S.S.R. and Egypt regarding Soviet aid for the
Aswan Darn which had begun casually in May now became earnest
discussions between two parties actively seeking mutual accornrnodation.
Serious negotiations between Egypt and the Soviet
Union about the Aswan Darn continued throughout 1957.

While

they were going on, agreements regarding other sorts of
Soviet economic assistance for Egypt were held in abeyance.
Only the expansion of trade between the two countries continued as before.

By 1957, trade between the Soviet Union

and Egypt had broadened to the point where Soviet exports
to Egypt had increased from their 1954 minimum value of 8
million rubles to almost 100 million rubles in value.
Egyptian exports to the Soviet Union had also increased
dramatically from their 1954 value of 7.6 million rubles to
15
74 million rubles in 1957. The figures for trade in 1957
represent a level for the value of trade between Egypt and
the Soviet Union which would not substantially change for
three years.
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Even after that initial three-year period, the total
value of trade would stay approximately the same for another
three years.

During that period, only the balance of trade

between the two countries would change.

By 1963, the value

of each nation's trade had been approximately reversed so
Egypt stood as the larger exporter of the two.
In January of 1958, the Egyptian Minister of Industry,
Samir Ibrahim, went to the U.S.S.R. and arranged a credit
agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt for industrial
projects.

It was the first in a series of middle level

meetings and economic agreements during 1958 which would
lead to the announcement in October of that year of an agreement between the two nations under the terms of which the
Soviet Union would provide Egypt with financial and techni16
cal assistance in the building of the Aswan High Dam. The
second step in the development of an economic infrastructure
which would facilitate the building and utilization of the
dam was an April protocol which specified uses to which the
credit which had been agreed upon in January would be put.
The April meeting regarding the uses to which the 175
million dollar credit with which the Soviet Union had provided Egypt would be put was followed by a June visit to
the Soviet Union by Egypt's Minister of Trade.

During

August, the Soviet Union's Minister of Agriculture visited
Egypt to arrange for closer cooperation between the two
nations in his realm.

In September, Aeroflot and the
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Egyptians reached an agreement upon air service between the
17
two countries.
The visits and agreements between the Soviet Union and
Egypt during the first nine months of 1958 were merely a
prelude to the vastly more important agreement between the
two nations regarding Soviet support for the first stage of
Egypt's Aswan High Dam project.

The October 23 agreement

between the two countries provided the Egyptians with a
credit worth up to 100 million dollars worth of technical
expertise and equipment for the building of the dam.

It was

by far the most important agreement of an economic nature
which had been or would be signed between Egypt and the
Soviet Union.
Some of the reasons behind the construction of the dam
were discussed in the previous chapters.

Others and their

ramifications still need to be reviewed.

By agreeing to

help the Egyptians finance their project, the Soviets were
guaranteeing that, for a time at least, they would be able
to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East.

To gain

this advantage, the Soviet Union had to agree to provide
Nasser with the low interest capital which he desired for
his project without forcing him to mortgage the entire
Egyptian economy in return.
a dream come true.

For Nasser, the Soviet loan was

He had successfully defied the West and

still gotten the economic aid he needed to modernize Egypt.
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The initial Soviet loan to Egypt to help the Egyptians
with the financing of the Aswan High Dam project was for the
first stage of the construction of the dam only.

As it

turned out, the Egyptians utilized 80 million dollars worth
of the possible 100 million dollars that the Soviets had
18
provided. The dam was scheduled to be built in four
stages.

The Soviets and Egyptians announced a Soviet loan

of 180 million dollars for the second stage of the dam on
July 27, 1960, shortly after the Egyptians had already received a firm offer of assistance from West Germany for the
19
remainder of the work necessary to complete the dam.
Over
300 factories in the Soviet Union participated in the Aswan
Dam project.

They manufactured over 500,000 tonnes of
20
equipment for the dam.
The Soviets provided the Egyptians with technical ex-

pertise and equipment and a portion of the financing for the
dam.

Just how great a portion of the financing the Soviets

provided is open to question.

According to Marshall Goldman,

the Soviets provided a total of 325 million dollars (100
million in the first installment and 225 for the second
21
stage) worth of aid for the Aswan High Dam project. Accepting that figure would mean accepting that the Soviets
financed only 27.8 percent of the total cost of the dam and
22
that Egypt bore the brunt of the costs. Another source
puts the total of Soviet assistance at 559 million dollars,
a figure which encompasses approximately one-half of the
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total cost of the project.
more credible.

The second set of figures seems

Despite some improvements in Egypt's finan-

cial situation, the Egyptian economy was far from capable
of producing a surplus of three quarters of a billion
dollars even for so vital a step in its industrialization as
23
the construction of the Aswan High Dam.
The Aswan Dam was completed in 1972.

Its construction

was vital to the Egyptian economy.

By 1974, it was supply24
ing Egypt with nearly 53 percent of its electricity.
It had

also allowed the Egyptians to reclaim approximately 590,000
hectares of land in the Nile Valley.

By aiding the

Egyptians in the construction of the dam, the Soviet Union
had made what was perhaps the greatest possible contribution
that could have been made to the Egyptian economy.

It had

helped to make possible the development of Egyptian heavy
industry, it had helped provide Egypt with an alternative
power source to the Sinai oil fields, and it had helped improve the agricultural situation of Egypt both by adding to
the arable land and providing irrigation systems and by
25
adding to Egypt's capacity to produce chemical fertilizers.
In the years following the initial Soviet-Egyptian
agreement on credit for the Aswan Dam, there were no other
agreements of comparable value.

The Egyptian-Soviet eco-

nomic relationship contined to develop despite that, however.

In January of 1959, an Egyptian business delegation

visited the U.S.S.R. to widen trade contact between the two
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nations.

In March, the Soviets gave the Egyptians mill

equipment for oil refineries.

In May, an accord on shipping

between the two nations was signed.

In August, a contract

between the two nations was signed under the terms of which
the Soviets would undertake the building of an irrigation
project in Egypt.

In September, the Egyptians signed a con26
tract to purchase Soviet factory equipment.
1960 saw the continued expansion of the economic
relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt.

In Feb-

ruary, protocols on the trade of oil and of pharmaceuticals
were signed.

In September, a protocol on the development of

the Alexandria shipyard was signed.

In September, an agree-

ment regulating trade between the two nations for the next
two years was signed when the Egyptian Minister of Economics
and Foreign Trade, Mohammed Shokose, visited the U.S.S.R.
In December, protocols on several industrial projects were
27

signed.
Along with the more mundane contacts detailed above,
discussions regarding the financing of the Aswan High Dam
continued in 1959 and 1960.

In May of 1959 for example, the

Egyptian Minister of Public Works, Mohammed Salama, was in
the Soviet Union for talks about continued Soviet support
of the dam project.

In November, Soviet experts on the

construction of dams visited the Aswan site in Egypt to inspect the progress of the dam.

In February 1960, the

Deputy Minister of Economics of Egypt visited Moscow for
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more talks with the Soviets about their continued financial
28
assistance in the construction of the dam.
In August, the efforts to reach an agreement on Soviet
aid for the next stage of the dam came to fruition.

Salama

returned to the Soviet Union where he signed an agreement
under the terms of which the Soviets would provide an additional 180 million dollars for the construction of the second
stage of the Aswan project.

The agreement, which was an-

nounced on August 27, marked an important step in the
cementing of Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union, coming as it
did in the face of a West German offer to aid the Egyptians
29

with the final phases of the dam.

The West German offer,

while genuine, should not be taken overly seriously however.
It would seem that neither the Egyptians nor the Soviets took
it extremely seriously.

Neither displayed any pressing ur-

gency to get the agreement signed.
quite leisurely.

The discussions were

Another fact which would seem to lend sup-

port to the argument that the West German offer was not a
serious challenge to the Soviet position in Egypt is the
level at which the discussions were held.

Unlike the dis-

cussions on the first phase in which Nasser and Khrushchev
participated directly, the discussions on the second stage
were held exclusively between middle-level members of the
two governments.

It seems unlikely that the Soviets would

be so laconic about the discussions if the West German of fer
was a serious threat to their position in Egypt.
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In 1961, another milestone in the development of
Egyptian industry occurred with Soviet assistance.
the first Egyptian atomic reactor was completed.

In July,
The re-

actor was small and played only a small role in the development of power for Egypt.

Egypt's joining the ranks of the

countries which produced atomic power had tremendous potential military significance, however.

It gave them the

potential capability of building an atomic bomb and using it
30
on Israel if they so chose.
July also saw internal changes in Egypt which ultimately had much greater effects on its economy than did the
development of a small nuclear reactor.

The last vestiges

of private investment in its major industries were removed
31
by Nasser's decree on nationalization. A program of
agrarian reform was also undertaken which spread the wealth
and land of the countryside more evenly among the peasantry.
Although these steps did make the economy of Egypt somewhat
more like that of the Soviet Union and were hailed in the
Soviet Union as a welcome change in the Egyptian economy,
the changes were accomplished without the Soviet Union
being actively involved in any way.
The Soviet Union was involved in the construction of
the Helwan steel mills.

In March of 1962, a contract was

signed between the Soviet Union and Egypt which provided
Soviet aid in the building of the steel plant.

In June,

V. F. Garbuzov, the Soviet Minister of Finance, was in
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Egypt where he arranged for a three-year agreement which detailed the trade between the two nations during that time
32
period. At the same time, the Egyptian Minister for the
Aswan Dam went to the U.S.S.R. to study dams and their
utilization in the Soviet Union.

Garbuzov also negotiated

an agreement by which the first two agreements between Egypt
and the Soviets were refinanced to ease the strains of repayment on the Egyptian economy.

In September, a pair of

protocols between the two nations was signed under the terms
of which the Soviet Union would aid Egypt in the building of
a new coal tar chemical plant and a calcium carbide and
33
ferrosilicum factory.
Economic contacts between Egypt and the Soviet Union
in 1963 continued in much the same manner as they had ended
in 1962.

In January, the Soviet Minister of Power was in

Egypt for the anniversary of the construction of the first
stage of the Aswan Dam.

While he was there, a protocol was

signed which guaranteed Soviet support for the final stages
of the dam.

In June, a credit agreement was signed which

gave Egypt the wherewithal to purchase Soviet power equipment.
Egypt.

At the same time, a Soviet aviation delegation was in
While there, the delegation arranged a new air ser-

vice agreement between the two countries.

In October, pro-

tocals regarding radio and a television plant were signed.
In November, the Egyptian Minister of Industry went to the
34

U.S.S.R. for talks about getting more Soviet aid.
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In February 1964, a cooperative agreement on fishing
was signed between the two countries.

February 1964 also

marked the completion of two major factories that the
Egyptians had built with Soviet aid.

One was a coking plant

and the other manufactured pharmaceuticals.

In March, a

contract for Soviet aid in building a chemical plant in
35

Egypt was signed.
On May 23, 1964, the third and last package of Soviet
aid for the Aswan High Dam project was announced.

Worth

over 250 million dollars, the third loan contributed significantly more Soviet financial capital to the project than
either of the first two aid agreements regarding the dam.
It brought the total value of Soviet assistance for the
project to over a half billion dollars.

The agreement was

followed by the June visit of a Soviet economic delegation
to Cairo.

The Soviet visit was the first in a series of

discussions about the specifics of the third aid package.
The next in this series of discussions came in August when
the Egyptian Minister in charge of the Aswan Dam project,
Mohammed Sidqi Sulaiman returned to the Soviet Union.

The

discussions were terminated in September when the two nations
signed a protocol which finalized the details of the aid
project's first half.

The last important economic contact

between the Soviet Union and Egypt in 1964 came when Egypt's
Deputy Prime Minister, Abdel Munim Qaysul, visited Moscow
and signed a protocol with the Soviets regarding trade for

205
36

the coming year.
The year 1965 opened with what the Soviets must have
considered an ominous note: the People's Republic of China
extended a credit to Egypt for industrial projects.

The

offer was the beginning of an attempt by the Chinese to more
actively assert themselves in the Middle East.

The Chinese

effort marked an escalation of their conflict with the
Soviets, a conflict which had been simmering at least since
1957 and which may well have begun earlier.
The Chinese threat was certainly something which the
Soviets had to take seriously.

Chinese relations with Egypt

and the rest of the Third World had been strongly positive
on the whole for some time.

The developing countries per-

ceived China as one of their own and had since the Bandung
Conference in 1955.

The Chinese also had the advantage in

their relations with the newly formed governments of the
Third World of being at the very minimum a match for the
Soviets in "revolutionary" prestige.

These factors forced

the Soviets to take the Chinese challenge in the Middle East
seriously even though China's economic infirmity ultimately
militated strongly against its success.

Still, the Soviets

weren't about to take any risks in any area which they had
just entered.

They maintained the pace of their assistance
37
to Egypt throughout 1965 as a result.
The year's contact between the Soviets and Egypt began
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with the February visit of a Soviet agricultural delegation
to Egypt.

The February visit to Egypt by Soviet agricultur-

al personnel was followed in June by a visit of Soviet
Deputy Premier, I. T. Novikov.

These two missions were the

harbinger of a Soviet credit of grain to Egypt in July.

The

credit was extended to prevent the possibility of starvation
there due to a projected bad harvest.

Contact between the

two countries for 1965 closed in December when the new
Soviet Minister of Trade, Nikolai Patolichev visited Egypt
and negotiated a new five-year pact detailing the trade re38
lationship between the two nations.
1966 marked the first year of the new trade package.
It also marked another active year for Soviet-Egyptian economic contacts of other sorts.

In January, a Soviet delega-

tion visited Egypt and signed protocols which promised
Soviet aid on several different industrial projects in
Egypt.

May was marked by an agreement between the two

nations through which the remainder of the package of aid
for the Aswan Darn was disbursed.

During June, another

Soviet trade delegation arrived in Egypt to arrange for
additional deliveries of Egyptian cotton to the U.S.S.R.

In

August, the Egyptian Deputy Minister for Electrical Energy
visited the Soviet Union to study the electrical industry of
the Soviet Union and a trade protocol worth 30 million
dollars between the two countries was signed.

In October,

Egyptian engineers visited the Soviet Union for a six-month
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study of cotton growing and irrigation in the U.S.S.R.
The next four years were probably the most active years

of the Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship during the years
that Nasser was in power in Egypt.

In January of 1967, the

Soviet Minister for Land Reclamation visited Egypt to inspect
its irrigation projects.
delegation visited Egypt.

During February, a Soviet trade
One month later, a Soviet dele-

gation visited Caiiro to discuss Soviet aid to the Egyptians.
At the same time, the Soviet Minister of Fisheries was in
Cairo to discuss cooperation on fishing between the two
countries.
After the Six Day War in June between Egypt and the
other Arabs and Israel, the Soviet-Eygptian economic relationship continued apace.

In July, the Soviets sent a gift

of foodstuffs to the Egyptians.

That month, a protocol on

an oil pumping station in Egypt was also signed between the
two countries.

Approximately one month later, a new trade

protocol was signed to regulate Soviet-Egyptian trade.
Finally, in September, a protocol detailing the shipment of
40
Soviet equipment for the Aswan Dam was announced.
During the course of 1968, there were seven major
economic developments which directly affected Egyptian-Soviet
relations.

The first was a protocol which detailed the

trade relationship between the two countries for the year.
The next three involved the extension of Soviet assistance
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in the development of Egyptian industry in such widely
diverse areas as the steel industry, the Egyptian telecommunications network, and the shipbuilding program which
was being built up in Alexandria.

In November, Soviet

Deputy Premier Mikhail T. Efremov visited Egypt to discuss
continued Soviet aid for the Aswan project.

During Efremov's

stay in Cairo, several more protocols were signed which detailed the administration of the aid which he agreed to extend in his discussions with Egyptian leaders.

The year

closed with two more important developments that affected the
Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship.

The first was almost

certainly the more important of the two.

The Soviets ap-

pointed a new Deputy Minister of Electrification whose sole
duty was to advise the Egyptians in the development of their
electrification, a network which was expanding with more and
more haste as the Aswan Dam approached completion.

Finally,

a joint Soviet-Egyptian commission met in Moscow to arrange
for heightened cooperation in the fishing industry between
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the two countries.
1969 was another busy year in the Soviet-Egyptian economic relationship.

In January, the work of the joint com-

mission on fisheries came to fruition when the two nations
signed an agreement on cooperation in the fishing industry.
At the same time, the two countries signed an agreement
which contracted for the Egyptians to build ships for the
Soviets in their Alexandria shipyard.

A month later, a
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trade protocol for 1969-70 was signed.

During May, the two

nations signed a protocol which arranged for joint oil
prospecting in Egypt.

A gift of industrial safety equipment

was sent from the U.S.S.R. to Egypt in June.
Egyptian Minister of Industry visited Moscow.

In July, the
During that

visit, he arranged for a protocol which called for the joint
Soviet-Egyptian development of an aluminum plant and a
phosphates plant in Egypt.

The Soviets signed an agreement

during November to purchase sheet metal from the Helwan complex.

At the same time, Deputy Premier V. N. Novikov was in

Egypt for talks about aid and an Egyptian delegation was in
the U.S.S.R. for a farm conference.

In December, an Egyptian

economic delegation visited Russia.

While there, they

arranged a trade protocol which supplemented the agreement
that had been reached in February.

Also in December, a

Soviet shipping delegation was in Alexandria.

As a result

of their discussions with their Egyptian counterparts, the
Soviet delegation negotiated a protocol which updated the
42

1959 agreement between the two countries on shipping.
In 1970, the last year of Gamel Abdel Nasser's life,
the Soviet Union and Egypt were in the midst of a period of
close economic cooperation.

Contacts between the two

nations were deep and frequent.

In March, Egypt's Minister

of Communication was in Moscow to arrange for Soviet aid in
the development of Egypt's communications industry.

Two

months later, a trade delegation from Odessa visited Egypt.
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At the same time, the director of Egypt's airline went to
the U.S.S.R. and bought commercial aircraft from the
Soviets.

During July, the Egyptian Minister of Industry

went to Moscow and opened an Egyptian industrial exhibition
there.

The Soviet Minister of Land Reclamation went to

Egypt to present the Egyptians with the gift of a mechanized
farm in early August.

In September, Soviet scientists made

a fishing survey of the Red Sea in order to investigate its
43

potential as a site for large-scale harvesting.
Economic contacts between the two nations came to an
abrupt but temporary halt on October 3 when Nasser died.
From the foregoing it is clear that economic contacts between the Soviet Union and Egypt were broad and deep.

The

economies of the two countries were completely intertwined.
The Soviets were involved in areas as diverse as fishing,
farming, and heavy industry.

The Egyptians depended on the

Soviets both as a buyer of goods that the Egyptians produced and as a supplier of the goods that they needed.
Soviet purchases (which were usually purchases of goods for
which the Soviets had little need) helped nascent Egyptian
industries like the shipyards in Alexandria and the Helwan
steel complex get off the ground.

They also helped keep the

economy of Egypt on an even keel during years like 1965 when
the cotton market was depressed.
As the years progressed, the dependence of the Nasser
regime on Soviet purchases and aid became more and more
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acute.

The increasing levels of dependence are demonstrated

by the progressive escalations of the ratio of Egypt's trade
with the Soviet Union versus its trade with the rest of the
world in 1957, l963 (see figure 5) and each year thereafter except l968.
Despite the dependence of Egypt's economy on Soviet
largess, trade, and technical expertise, the economic relationship between the two was not the Soviet-dominated
proprietary relationship that it might seem to be on the surface.

The Soviets were purchasing the influence in the

Middle East that they wanted so badly with their aid and
were trying to secure it by tying the Egyptian economy to
theirs through trade.

However, that influence was much more

limited than the Soviets would have liked because the
Egyptians nearly always had aid alternatives.

So curiously

enough, despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet economy,
it was Nasser, not the leaders of the Soviet Union, who controlled the relationship between the two countries.
For Egypt the advantages and disadvantages of its
economic relationship with the Soviet Union are readily apparent.

The first, and perhaps most important, advantage

which Egypt gained from its economic relationship with the
u.s.S.R. is obvious: it gained a partner that was willing
to finance a large portion of the Aswan Dam's construction
and which was willing to provide technical expertise as
well.

With the building of the dam came several ancillary
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benefits, such as irrigation systems, the reclamation of
large tracts of arable lands, and sufficient power for the
development of heavy industry.
Over the years, the tangible benefits of Soviet aid
built up as Egypt industrialized.
similarly tangible debits.

There were few if any

Perhaps American aid would have

proved more effective in building a lasting base for industrialization.

Even that seems debatable, however.

American industrialization programs in the Third World have
often proved ernpherneral.

It seems that the effectiveness

of Great Power aid in the industrialization of a Third World
nation often is much more dependent upon the wisdom of the
leaders of that nation than on which Great Power provided
the aid.

American aid may well have had costs which Egypt

simply could not afford to pay.

Certainly, that was ulti-

mately the case with regard to aid for the Aswan High Darn.
Soviet trade also provided advantages to Egypt that
were available in few if any other places.

One of the most

important of these was the ability of the non-market Soviet
economy to absorb surplus goods during periods when the
international commodity market slumped.

Another advantage

of trade with the Soviet Union was that the Soviets were
willing to provide Egypt with needed grain when the Soviet
Union itself was suffering from shortages.

A third advan-

tage of commerce with the Soviet Union was that the Soviets
were capable of providing Egypt with the technology neces-
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sary to industrialize and were often willing to provide it
gratis or for cut-rate prices that were scheduled for payment according to the ability of the Egyptians to pay.
Despite its manifest benefits for Egypt, there were
also several important disadvantages inherent in the SovietEgyptian economic relationship.
attached to Soviet economic aid.

First, there were strings
The most obvious of these

is Egypt's dependence upon the Soviet Union for that aid.
The dependence necessarily gave the Soviets some leverage
with which they could attempt to influence Egypt's actions.
An example of the attempted use of the economic lever
against Egypt is Khrushchev's attempt to pressure Nasser
into easing his repression of the Egyptian Communist Party
in the 1958-62 period.

In general, however, the economic

lever was left unused by the Soviets.

Such use was in-

effective and usually would have been counterproductive.
The West would have been quite willing to step in and fill
the Soviet shoes if the Egyptians found them to be demanding during almost any part of the 1954-70 period.
Like economic assistance from the Soviets, trade also
held drawbacks for the Egyptians.

Perhaps the most impor-

tant of these was the bilateral nature of that trade.

Bi-

lateral trade tends to limit the growth of a developing
country's economy by limiting its choice of imports and of
markets.

This is even more likely in the case of a one-

crop economy like Egypt's trading with a country like the
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Soviet Union in a barter type arrangement which pays in
products rather than hard currency.
partner creates dependency.
of Soviet goods.

Overreliance on such a

Another problem was the quality

Goods from the U.S.S.R. were often rela-

tively low compared to similar items available from other
countries.

Spare parts were also often in short supply and

deliveries were occasionally delayed.
For the Soviets, the advantages of its economic relationship with the Egyptians were fewer and less tangible.
They were nevertheless quite real to the Soviets.

The most

important of the advantages which it gained was something
that it gained from both its aid and trade relationships with
Egypt.

By entering into a broad-scale relationship with the

Egyptians which included an economic aspect, the U.S.S.R.
gained more leverage over Egypt than it would have had
through a simple military or military and diplomatic relationship with the Egyptians.

Granted, the leverage was still

ineffective, but that was due to the international situation
more than anything else.

Broadening the relationship with

Egypt also effectively solidified the political entry of the
Soviet Union into the Middle East.
To gain these subjective advantages, the Soviets had
to expend a great deal.

The Soviet Union had to provide

Egypt with large amounts of credit.

They had to give the

Egyptians a great deal of technical assistance.

They pur-

chased large quantities of cotton and oil which they didn't
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really need.

They had to supply grain to Egypt when grain

was in short supply in the Soviet Union.

They also had to

absorb Egyptian cotton surpluses when the world market was
down.

Finally, the economic lever over Egypt that they had

hoped to gain proved ineffective in most instances.
The advantages and disadvantages of the economic relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt are, like those
of their military relationship, multifold.

Unlike the mili-

tary relationship, for Egypt at least, any assessment of
long term value of the relationship would almost certainly be
positive.

The Egyptians accomplished their objective of

getting the Aswan Dam built and irrigation projects throughout the Nile Valley set up.

They also succeeded in getting

the industrialization of their country underway.

And they

gained all of the less tangible benefits mentioned in the
foregoing.

The advantages of the relationship probably out-

weighed its debits for the Soviet Union as well.

The actual

costs of their aid to Egypt, while great in Egyptian terms,
were on the Soviet scale relatively small, and the benefits
of the relationship, while seemingly intangible, were nevertheless concrete enough in Soviet eyes to make them willing
to pay the costs throughout most of the Nasser era and for
the first years after his death.
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CHAPTER V
EGYPT AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE CULTURAL DIMENSION
Like the other aspects of the relationship between the
Soviet Union and Nasser's Egypt, the cultural dimension of
the relationship between the two countries did not really
begin to become prominent until after the Czech Arms Deal
had been concluded.

See Appendix A.

The cultural aspect of

the relationship has certainly received less attention from
scholars than its economic, diplomatic, and military aspects
have. There are several reasons for this being so, including
the difficulty of assigning precise values to the effects of
cultural missions and cultural interaction on the relationship between the two countries and a general inclination to
downplay the importance of cultural relations in international relations, but the importance of the cultural ties
between the Soviet Union and Egypt during the period from
1954 to 1970 should be emphasized far more than it has been
heretofore.
There were several important yet diverse elements
which made up the cultural aspect of the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union which should be discussed.
The two countries interacted through exchanges of students,
religious personnel, films, newspapers, theatrical companies
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and other performing artists.

Tourism played an important

role in the cultural interaction of the two nations.

An-

other important element of the cultural relationship between
the two was the educational element.

The Soviet Union

helped to improve Egypt's educational system by sending
hundreds of academics to aid in the furthering of the
Egyptian development of higher education and also by helping
to build and develop technical training centers which emphasized the development of basic vocational skills, literacy
1
and management skills. Another important aspect of the
educational interaction between the two countries was the
aforementioned student exchange program which saw hundreds of
Egyptians travel to the Soviet Union and receive their higher education there.
Leaving aside the more traditional aspects of the
cultural relationship for the moment, a look at one element
which has often been disregarded because of its predictable
and, at times, ludicrous nature would be fruitful.

Propa-

ganda is the attempt by one culture to influence the mass
views of another in such a way so as to improve its image in
those views.

It is a tool which has been commonly used by

the Soviets throughout the world and one which has of ten
been ridiculed by Westerners.

Nevertheless, it has often

been an effective tool in swaying the opinions of illiterate
or unsophisticated audiences such as those which populate
many of the nations in the Third World.

It is also one of
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the most nebulous aspects of the cultural relationship
between the two countries and one for which it is difficult
to ascertain the exact effects.

In the case of Egypt, like

most if not all other Third World countries where the Soviets
have been active, it is one which has been used by the
Soviets to influence Egypt and has not been used by Egypt
to try to influence Soviet society in turn.
There are many tools which the Soviet Union used to
disseminate propaganda in Egypt.

Films, newspapers, and

magazines are among the most common of these.

However, the

most common, and probably the most effective, method by
which the Soviets attempted to influence Egyptian popular
2
opinion was the use of radio broadcasts in Arabic.
Radio
has several advantages to off er to a country wishing to
disseminate a message.
the others.

Two, however, do far outweigh all of

First, radio is a medium which can deliver a

message which is uncensored by the government of the target
nation.

Second, radio can reach peoples with low literacy

rates who could not otherwise be propagandized.
The medium of radio was used by the Soviet Union to try
to convince its Arabic listeners that the Soviets were "pro3

gressive," "peace-loving," and "democratic."

Much of the

radio propaganda broadcast by the U.S.S.R. was also aimed
at glorifying the so-called "Soviet model" of economic
development.

It was hailed as the most beneficial model of

development for Third World nations.

The economic develop-
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ment of Soviet Central Asia was held up an an example of
just how good a developmental model the Soviet model was
for the nations of the Third World.

In the words of Soviet

propagandists, the non-capitalist path of the Soviet Middle
East had "shown the whole world that all the oppressed
peoples .

.

. can throw off the imperialist yoke forever

The Soviet Eastern republics, like a bright torch,
were an example to those countries where the labour of the
peoples and the wealth of the country were still being
4
plundered and looted by the Western monopolists."
The Soviets also used the medium of radio to try to
discredit their adversaries.

Not only were the U.S., Israel,

and pro-Western Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
castigated in Soviet radio broadcasts, but China was also
villif ied, particularly when the Chinese attempted to exert
their own influence in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world
in the late 1960's.

Karen Dawisha cites as an example of

this a broadcast made in i967 which condemns Mao Tse-Tung and
China for advising Nasser to carry out a poeple's war against
Israel and claims that this sort of advice only proves that
the Chinese really come "out on the side of imperialism and
5
Zionism."
Another use which the Soviets made of the medium of
radio was to try to offset anti-Soviet propaganda which
characterized the Soviet Union as atheistic and an "enemy of
Islam."

The Soviets used testimonials from Islamic leaders
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from the Soviet Union and pro-Soviet nations in the Arab
world to try to emphasize its "democratic" nature and "that
religious freedom was one of the cornerstones of Soviet
6

life."

They also used this same sort of testimonial to try

to establish the organic nature of the role that the Soviet
Union played in the Middle East as a Great Power and supporter of the Arab cause.
Like radio broadcasts, the flow of printed matter and
films between the Soviet Union and Egypt was one-sided:
from the Soviet Union to Egypt.

Sales of Soviet films and

books steadily grew in Egypt after the flow began in 1955
when contacts between the Soviet agencies for books (Mezhdunarodnaia kniga), printed media (Novosti and Tass), and
films

(Soviet-export-film), and the Soviet Writers' Union

and the USSR Academy of Sciences and their Egyptian counterparts were established.

While Soviet film and book sales

never outweighed the combined totals of those from the West,
Soviet sales were nevertheless impressive.

The writings of

Marx and Lenin were sold openly; Tolstoi's and Gorky's works
were commonly available, as were those of many other Russian
writers; and Arabic versions of Soviet scientific texts were
7
used in many of Egypt's colleges and universities.
The Egyptians also showed quite a few Soviet films.

In

fact, there were several joint Soviet-Egyptian film festivals
held in Cairo.

However, the showing of Soviet films often

caused problems between the two nations.

One example of the
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type of problems that were generated is the closure in
October of 1957 of a film festival which was showing Maxim
Gorky's Mother, a film which was based upon a story in which
a woman's rejection of religion in favor of communism and
8
atheism is lauded. Nasser closed the film down calling it
blatant communist propaganda.

Even a visit by the Soviet

Minister of Communications was insufficient to get the
festival reopened.
The educational dimension of the cultural relationship
between Egypt and the Soviets was also quite one-sided, although perhaps slightly less so than either the propaganda
or the printed matter and film dimension of it.
scholars went each way.

The flow of

Egyptian scholars traveled to the

Soviet Union and Soviet scholars came to Egypt.

As mentioned

earlier, Soviet academics who visited Egypt were often there
as lecturers or instructors at Egyptian institutions of
higher learning.

Egyptian scholars who went to the Soviet

Union on the other hand, were usually there to learn rather
than to teach.

The few exceptions to this rule were usually
9
Egyptologists or specialists in Arabic culture or history.
Although their numbers never approached the numbers of
Egyptians who studied in the West (see figure 9), like older
scholars many Egyptian students decided to take advantage of
the educational opportunities that the Soviet Union offered.
Supported by their government, Egyptian students went to
universities in the U.S.S.R. to study in many different
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fields.

Usually, however, they concentrated upon either the

sciences or engineering.

Sending students to the Soviet

Union offered many advantages to the Egyptian government,
including the availability of more advanced training than
was available in the Middle East.

This sort of training was

also available in the West, but Soviet universities had one
advantage which their Western counterparts could not match:
their graduates always returned to Egypt.
Western universities did not.

Graduates from

In fact, 38 percent of all

Egyptian students who graduated from foreign universities
10
did not return to their native country. The percentage of
emigres from Western universities was obviously higher since
the graduates of Soviet universities invariably returned.
Although the advantages of sending students to study
in the Soviet Union were manifest for the Egyptian government, there were also apparently significant drawbacks for
students who attended Soviet universities.

One necessarily

had to learn to speak Russian, a language which few
Egyptians had acquired.

Western universities, on the other

hand, usually taught their courses in English or French,
languages with which many more Egyptians were acquainted.
Some Western universities even established institutions in
11
Egypt which meant that some courses were given in Arabic.
Another apparent drawback was political.

From 1952 to 1969

none of the 131 Egyptian cabinet ministers who had received
Bachelor of Arts degrees had received a degree from the

228
Soviet Union or had studied in the U.S.S.R. for any prolonged
12
period. This may have been due in part to the relatively
short time span of the connection between Egypt and the
Soviet Union, but it seems that it was due in large part both
to a pro-Western cultural bent of the Egyptian elite and the
scientific nature of the training which most Egyptians received in their studies in the Soviet Union.
The technical education centers which the Soviet Union
helped to build in Egypt may in the long run prove to have
been even more beneficial for Egypt than the training of its
students in the U.S.S.R.

Eventually, at least 43 institu-

tions of the sort were established in Egypt and tens of
13
thousands of Egyptians were trained in them. These centers
provided human material with technical and managerial skills
without which the Egyptian economy could not have expanded.
The utilization of the capacities of the Aswan Dam in particular, and heavy industry in general, was aided irnmeasurably by having technically trained Egyptian managers available.

What raises the value of these technical education

centers over the value of educational exchanges which had
similar benefits, is the fact that they would continue to
train Egyptians long after the Soviet presence in Egypt had
dwindled until it was only a memory.
Some of the other media which were used to promote
cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and Egypt were
much less undirectional than were radio and education.

The

229
flow of contacts through these media went both from the
Soviet Union to Egypt and from Egypt to the Soviet Union.
This bi-directional nature was particularly apparent in the
performing arts.

Egypt sent ballet troups, its puppet

theater, its national folk dance troupe, the Cairo Symphony
Orchestra, and famous singers like Om Kalthum to the Soviet

14
Union.

In return, the Soviets sent several ballet companies

including the Bolshoi, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and Tashkent
troupes.

They sent folk dance troupes from Moldavia,

Armenia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan, and Georgia.

They also

sent the State Puppet Theater and the State Circus to visit
Egypt.

Beyond simply sending troupes of artists to Egypt,

the Soviets were also instrumental in establishing a national folklore ensemble and a state circus in Egypt.
They also
15
helped to expand the Cairo Conservatory of Music.
One of
the more important contributions that the Soviet Union made
to Egypt's cultural life was its aid in the establishment of
the first ballet school in the Middle East or Africa which
16
was established in Cairo in 1958.
Exchanges of performing artists were, like so many of
the other media of cultural exchange between the Soviet Union
and Egypt, instrumental in the Soviets' attempts to show
Egyptians the elements of their culture which they wished
the Egyptians to see and appreciate.

Ballet troupes, puppet

theaters, circuses, and particularly folk dancers were essential in presenting

the ethnic and cultural diversity of
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the Soviet Union which the Soviets wanted to emphasize to the
Egyptians.

These types of groups also represented ethnic

minorities, many of which were Muslim, that seemed, at least
to some extent, to be thriving on the freedom to maintain and
display their own individual cultures and also to develop
other aspects of culture that were more European in their
origin.

Cultural and ethnic freedom and attainment was

exactly the image of itself which the Soviet Union wished to
project.

The medium of the performing arts was the perfect

medium through which to do so.

It was much more credible

than radio propaganda - or book or film propaganda - because
i t gave objective, if selective, evidence of its reality.
While the performing arts were perhaps the most easily
controlled of the elements of the Soviet-Egyptian interchange,
one that was not quite so easily controlled was tourism. Although both the Soviet Union and Egypt had controls on who
could come and go to and from their countries, once a tourist
had arrived at his destination, his interaction with the
local populace was to a certain extent unpredictable and uncontrollable.

Despite the unpredictability of tourism as a

medium of cultural exchange, limited arrangements for the
interchange of tourists between Egypt and the Soviet Union
were instituted in May of 1956.

Since that time, the ex-

change of tourists between the two countries grew to a peak
in the last year of Nasser's life (see figure 10).

The

tourist trade, like the interchange of performing artists
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offered a glimpse of cultural reality.

Because of its un-

official nature, however, it is improbable that tourism made
any major impact on the relationship between the two countries.

Certainly there are no documented cases that can be

cited which show any sort of impact.

Nevertheless, tourism

should not be completely discounted since it offered both
cultural reality and economic interchange between the two
nations.
Religious exchange was another of the elements of the
cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt
which, on the surface at least, showed a balanced flow between the two.

Religious leaders from both Egypt and the

Soviet Union visited their counterparts in the other nation.
The effects of the exchange on Egypt seem to have been
minimal.

There were few if any changes in the practice of

Islam that were attributable to the Soviet Union and the
effect of the religious interaction between the two nations
on Egyptian politics was minimal.

For the Soviet Union on

the other hand, the effects of the relationship have been
strong and direct.
Before Egypt and the Soviet Union entered into a close
relationship and the Soviet Union reformulated its policy
toward the Third World, Islam was denounced by the Soviets
as being the product of a class society which was being deliberately exploited by the West for "the enslavement of the

17
Eastern peoples."

Their criticisms of the religion were
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harsh and consistent.
After the Soviet Union and Egypt began to develop
closer ties and the Soviets began to become more intimately
involved in the Middle East as a whole, the U.S.S.R. began
to come under increasing fire from Arab leaders for the lack
of religious freedom and tolerance in its Central Asian re18
publics.
As the pressure from the Arab world began to mount,
the Soviets slowly began to change their official position
on Islam in order to improve their image in Arab eyes.

They

began to ease the strictures on the practice of Islam in the
19
Soviet Union. By l970, over 30 million Muslims were inhabitants of the Soviet Union, almost all of them in Central Asia
and the Transcaucasus.

According to Karen Dawisha, reli-

gious freedom and belief was much more prevalent in Central
20
Asia than in any other part of the nation.
Soviet Muslims
were allowed to visit Mecca in small groups.

Soviet Muslim

leaders visited Egypt and other Arab countries, and they
held conferences in which "all Soviet nuslims were urged to
take more active roles in the political and social life of
the country in order to extend the influence of Islam and
21
protect the rights of believers."
Along with the improvements in the life of its Muslim
population, the U.S.S.R. began to moderate the tone of its
propaganda.

Islam no longer came under attack for being one
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of the world's main reactionary forces.

By 1970, Soviet

criticisms of Islam were as mild as they could realistically
be, given the militant atheism which is integral to a Marxist
22
world view.
The ties between the Arabs of the Middle East and the
Muslims of Central Asia were largely responsible for the
moderation of Soviet views and practices regarding Islam.
The Soviets wanted very much to extend their influence into
the Middle East deeply and securely.

It was almost vital

for them in terms of their own image of what a "Great Power"
was.

They felt that they had a religious tool in the

Muslims in their own lands which could be used to help to
wedge them into the Middle East, and one which could wedge
them in to stay.

This tool existed because of the cultural,

religious, and historical ties between Soviet Central Asia
and the rest of the Islamic world.

These ties were rein-

forced by linguistic ones: according to Islamic law, the
Koran could only be read in Arabic.

This forced all Muslims

to have at least a passing acquaintance with that language.
The visits of Egyptian and other Arab clerics to the Soviet
Union pushed the Soviet government to allow more religious
freedom in Central Asia and thus made improvements in the
lives of Soviet Muslims inevitable.

How much positive

effect this had on Soviet-Egyptian relations is debatable.
Certainly, it didn't hurt them.

At the very least, it

partially removed one of the sore points which had made many
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Arab and Egyptian leaders hesitant about increasing their
ties to the Soviet Union.
The first two steps toward the opening of cultural
interchange between the Soviets and Egypt during the Nasser
years were religious in nature, and they occured almost
simultaneously.

Interestingly enough, they involved the

interchange of both Muslim and Christian personnel.

In

August of 1955, the month before the Czech Arms Deal was
signed, Soviet Muslim pilgrims stopped in Cairo on their way
to Mecca.

At the same time, the patriarch of Alexandria was

on his way to visit the Soviet Union's Eastern Orthodox
churches and to confer with the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow.

These two journeys, while in them-

selves relatively insignificant in terms of world politics,
signalled the beginning of the cultural relationship between
Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Their religious character was

significant because it emphasized that religion would play
an important role in the development of the cultural con23
nection between the two nations.
A month after the religious connection between the
Soviet Union and Egypt was established, a Soviet cultural
center opened in Cairo.

With the expansion of cultural con-

tacts between the Egyptians and the Soviets that

the open-

ing of a Soviet cultural center in Cairo represented and the
signing of the Czech Arms Deal, Soviet-Egyptian relations in
the cultural realm settled into a pattern that was to be
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maintained as long as Nasser was in power.

During that

time, the two nations consistently exchanged missions from
24

each of the diverse areas that comprise culture.
After the pattern was established, the next step in
solidly setting cultural interaction between the two countries into the pattern it had acquired was the May 1956
visit of a Soviet academic delegation to Cairo.

In August,

leading members of the Egyptian Teachers Union returned the
visit.

During November, another Egyptian delegation visited

the U.S.S.R.

These contacts between members of the educa-

tional communities of the two nations began the educational
aspect of their relationship.

Like religion, education was

to play a key role in the development of ties between the
25
two countries.
The pattern that had been established in the first
year and one-half of the cultural relationship between the
Soviet Union and Egypt continued in 1957.

In February,

Soviet nuclear physicists went to Egypt to help develop
Egypt's nuclear energy program as part of the agreement that
the two countries had entered into one year earlier, which
called for a cooperative effort to give Egypt the ability to
produce nuclear power.

A secondary goal of the mission was

to help to improve the capacities and abilities of Egypt's
26
nuclear physicists.
In May, an Egyptian Trade Union delegation went to the Soviet Union to broaden contacts between
the two nations.

Two months later, Egyptian journalists
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went to the Soviet Union and reaffirmed the connections
with Tass and Novosti that had been developed in 1955.
connections were still tenuous at best.

The

The lack of effec-

tive ties between the presses of the two nations is demonstrated by the continuing rancor which the official Soviet
press demonstrated toward its Egyptian counterpart in
articles in the Soviet press throughout the late fifties
27

and the early sixties.
In September, more Soviet scientists visited Egypt.
The following month, Nikolai Psurtsev, the Soviet Minister
of Communications, flew to Egypt, largely in response to the
"crisis" which had evolved from Nasser's closing of the
Soviet film festival which was being held in Cairo.
Psurtsev had flown to Egypt to try to convince Egypt's leader
that closing the film festival because of the nature of the
Soviet film being shown which was based upon Gorky's Mother
was unwise.

Despite his best efforts, he was unable to con28

vince Nasser to allow the film to reopen.
In 1958, the number of cultural contacts between the
Soviet Union and Egypt increased.

In January, another

Egyptian Trade Union delegation visited the

u.s.s.R.,

as did

a delegation from an organization which was based upon the
government's efforts to promote cooperatives in Egypt.

A

Soviet delegation came to Egypt in April to arrange for
cultural exchanges between the two countries.

Later in the

year, in June, an Egyptian delegation returned the visit.

237
Like its Soviet counterpart, the Egyptian delegation was
trying to arrange for increased cultural contact between the
two nations.
In May, the first of many delegations of Egyptian
scientists went to the Soviet union.

Unlike their counter-

parts from the U.S.S.R., the Egyptian scientists had left
their country not to teach but rather to be taught.

During

July, a delegation of Muslim leaders went to the Soviet
Union to visit their Central Asian opposite numbers.

In

September, another Egyptian Trade Union delegation was dispatched to the Soviet union to strengthen the ties between
the labor organizations of the two countries.

A month later,

Egyptian lawyers went to the Soviet Union to study its legal
29
system.
In late November, another delegation came from Egypt to
the Soviet Union in order to improve and broaden the cultural
ties betwen the two.

These delegations were the first steps

in an effort to regularize and plan cultural contacts for a
longer period of time.

Up to that point, the contacts had

been mostly one-shot connections.

There were very few ex-

changes which had been set up in advance.

The efforts to

regularize contact did not immediately bear fruit.

The

negotiations between the two nations took until late 1959
before anything concrete came of them.

At that time, an

agreement between the Soviets and Egyptians was signed which
outlined the course which the cultural interaction between
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30
the two nations would take for 1960.
Cultural contacts for 1960 began in much the same
fashion as they had left off.

In January, a Muslin delega-

tion from the U.S.S.R. journeyed to Egypt.

An Egyptian

Trade Union delegation visited the Soviet Union in May.
Like those before it, the Egyptian delegation was there to
broaden and deepen the contacts between the labor organizations which they represented and their Soviet counterpart.
During November, another delegation of Egyptian journalists
visited the U.S.S.R. despite the rancor with which the
Soviet press was treating them and their campaign in support
of Nasser and his efforts to suppress the Communist Party of
31
Egypt.
The agreement regarding cultural exchange which the
Soviet Union and Egypt had signed in 1959 outlined a program
of exchange in which a good deal less contact between the
two nations was scheduled to take place than had taken place
in 1958.

The lull in cultural contact between the two coun-

tries was largely due to the temporary pall which had
settled over the entire relationship between the two as a
result of the harsh anti-Communist campaign which Nasser had
been carrying out in Egypt since 1958.

The only contacts of

importance which occurred in 1960 were the November visit of
a Soviet delegation headed by a Russian Orthodox patriarch
in Egypt and the signing of an agreement between the two
nations regarding cultural exchange for 1961 and 1962.
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1961 was, like the year before it, a relatively slow
year in terms of the number of contacts between the Soviets
and the Egyptians.

In April Soviet Minister of Communica-

tions, Nikolai Psurtsev, once more visited Egypt.

His visit

this time was, however, for a much less "dramatic" reason.
He had journeyed to Egypt to arrange for broader film contacts between the two nations.

His visit to Egypt was

followed in July by the visit of a delegation of Soviet
journalists to Cairo for the celebrations which marked the
32
anniversary of the Egyptian revolution of 1952.
1962 was another relatively slow year in SovietEgyptian cultural relations.

In February, the two nations

signed a protocol which detailed their cultural exchanges
for the year.

An Egyptian Trade Union delegation visited

the Soviet Union in June.

Members of the U.S.S.R.'s labor

organizations returned the visit for the first time in July
when they came to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the
33
Egyptian revolution.
In 1963, the two nations returned to a more active
pace in their cultural relationship.

The political tension

which had arisen from Nasser's suppression of the Egyptian
Communists and his improved relationship with the West had
eased for the most by then.

In February, the Egyptian

Hinister of Education visited the U.S.S.R. to improve ties
between the two nations in his sphere of responsibility.

At

the same time, the two nations reached agreement and signed
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a protocol which outlined their cultural interchanges for
1963 and 1964.

The following month, a Soviet delegation of

educational specialists returned the visit of Egypt's Minister of Education to the Soviet Union the month before as
the first step in increasing cooperation in the realm of
education.

During April, an Egyptian delegation visited

the U.S.S.R. to study Soviet methods in radio.

A month

later, in May, A. I. Adzhubey, Khrushchev's son-in-law, and
the Editor-in-Chief of Izvestia visited Egypt at Nasser's
34
invitation.
Like the first half of 1963, the second half was quite
active.

In July, a Soviet Trade Union delegation visited

Egypt in connection with the anniversary of Egypt's revolution.

The following month, the Soviet Minister of Social

Affairs led a delegation to Egypt.

During October, the

Egyptians put on a major Soviet film festival which was
attended by a delegation from Soviet cinema organizations.
Unlike the festival in 1957, this film festival went smoothly.

Cultural contact for the year closed in December with a

visit to Egypt by the Soviet Minister of Health to arrange
for cooperation between the two nations in the many areas
35
under his purview.
In 1964 and 1965, cultural contact between the Soviet
Union and Egypt was at a minimum.

During 1964, the first

contact between the two nations came in January when a
Soviet Trade Union delegation visited Egypt.

In February,
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a Soviet academic delegation went to Egypt to strengthen
their ties with their Egyptian counterparts.

For the rest

of the year, the cultural front of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was curiously quiet.

Contact did not resume

until February of the next year.

At that time, the two
In Septem-

nations signed a protocol on cultural exchange.

ber 1965, an agreement was reached which outlined exchanges
in the field of television.

Finally, a month later, the
36
Soviet-DAR Friendship Society was founded in Cairo.
In 1966, cultural contacts between the two countries
picked up once more.

There were a total of four important

contacts in the cultural realm - as many as there had been
during the previous two years combined.

These contacts

ranged from scientific cooperation, such as the agreement
which the two countries signed in February which promised
Egyptian aid in tracking Soviet satellites and orbital
flights, to educational intercourse like the visits of the
Soviet Minister of Professional Education and the well-known
Soviet economist, Evsei G. Liberman, to Egypt.

Contact for

the year closed in December when an accord on cultural con37

tacts between the two nations in 1967 was signed.
In February of 1967, an Egyptian delegation went to
the Soviet Union to increase contacts between the two
nations in radio broadcasting.

At the same time, Yekaterina

Furtseva, the Soviet Minister of Culture, was in Cairo for
talks.

One month later, an Egyptian Trade Union delegation
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went to the U.S.S.R.

During April, their visit was returned

by a Soviet Trade Union delegation.

In August, the Egyptian

Minister of Tourism went to the Soviet Union.

While there

he arranged an agreement on the exchange of tourists between
the two nations.
In 1968, an Egyptian delegation went to the Soviet
Union in January to arrange for closer cooperation between
the two nations in the realm of higher education.

At the

same time, Egyptian nuclear scientists went to the U.S.S.R.
to participate in a conference there.

During flay, Egypt's

Minister of Education went to Moscow.

The result of his

visit was a protocol detailing the two nations' cultural relationship with each other for 1969 and 1970.

The Soviet

Union opened two new cultural centers in Egypt in June.

One

was stiuated in Cairo and the other was located in Alexandria.
In September, an Egyptian Trade Union delegation visited the
U.S.S.R.

September also saw the competion of the satellite

tracking station in Egypt which was built under the auspices
of the 1966 satellite tracking agreement.

Cultural contacts

for 1968 ended in December when the Deputy Minister of Social
Affairs for Egypt went to the Soviet Union for talks.
In 1969, cultural contacts between Egypt and the Soviet
Union began when Politburo member Aleksandr.· N. Shelepin led
a Soviet Trade Union delegation to Cairo for a conference.
At the same time, Soviet experts on space were in Egypt to
discuss the uses and utilization of the new satellite track-
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ing station.

In February, a Soviet delegation went to Egypt

where they negotiated a supplemental protocal on cultural
contact for 1969.

During the same period,

membe~s.

of the

Soviet legal profession went to Egypt to observe the workings of its legal system and an Egyptian educational delegation was in the Soviet Union for talks.
writers and scientists visited Egypt.

In March, Soviet

While they were in

Egypt, high officials from Egypt's trade unions were in
Moscow.

During April, a delegation of teachers from Egypt

went to the Soviet Union to enhance the relationship of the
two nations in education.

One month later, the Egyptian

Minister of Youth went to the U.S.S.R. for talks with
Komsomol leaders.

While he was there, a Soviet Trade Union

delegation visited Cairo.

In June, an Egyptian Trade Union

delegation reciprocated by visiting Central Asia, while
Egyptian food workers toured factories in European Russia.
The first half of 1969 ended when the Soviets sent a scientif ic mission to Egypt to aid in the continued development
38
of the sciences there.
1969 was the most active year in the cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt during the Nasser
era.

Like that of its first half, the pace of cultural con-

tact between the two in the year's second half was feverish.
In July, the Egyptian Minister of Higher Education visited
the Soviet Union for discussions.

Religious contact resumed

when the patriarch of Alexandria visited the U.S.S.R.

July
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also saw a visit to the Soviet Union by Egyptian woodworkers
to observe the work of their Soviet counterparts.

During

September, an Egyptian radio delegation went to the u.s.S.R.
and negotiated a protocol on broadcasting exchanges.

A month

later, the Minister of Education from the Soviet Union
visited Egypt.

While there he arranged a protocol which

called for Soviet assistance in the training of Egyptian industrial instructors and the building of a labor university
at Aswan.
In 1970, the pace of cultural contact between the
Soviets and the Egyptians slackened somewhat.

Contacts for

the year did not open until May when Egyptian radio officials
visited Moscow for the centenary of Lenin's birth.

Shortly

thereafter, the Egyptian Minister of Culture was in the
Soviet Union for talks.

May also saw the Lenin Peace Prize

awarded to an Egyptian author for the first time.

In Septem-

ber, a delegation of Egyptian Muslims visited Central Asia
where they negotiated an agreement with Soviet leaders which
provided scholarships to Egyptian universities for Soviet
Moslems.

The following month, October, the month that Nasser

died, contacts in cultural areas went on as usual.

Shortly

after Nasser's death, an Egyptian educational delegation
visited the Soviet Union for talks.

Contacts closed between

the two nations in November with a visit by officials from
Egypt's Ministry of Culture to Georgia.
The cultural relationship between Egypt and the Soviet
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Union is almost certainly the only facet of their relationship as a whole of which it can be accurately said that its
effects on each nation were solely positive.
had their cultural horizons broadened.

Both nations

Both were able to

show themselves off in a generally positive light.

The

Egyptians almost certainly gained more in absolute terms in
the way of aid, development, and cultural broadening from
the Soviet Union than they gave to it in return, but that
was based more upon the relative size of the economies and
populations of the two countries than it was upon what culture each had to offer.
The cultural exchanges and contacts between the two
countries ebbed and flowed with the changing attitudes of
the leaders of the two countries toward each other.

There

were clear oscillations in the frequency of contact that
were based upon displeasure or uncertainty toward the other
nation.

The 1959-1962 period is but one example.

During

that period, the Soviets demonstrated their displeasure with
Nasser's anti-communist campaign by cutting down cultural
contacts between the two countries.

As a result, the cul-

tural facet of the relationship was probably the most sensitive barometer of the short term political attitudes of the
two nations toward each other.
clear.

The reason for that is

The cultural relationship was the least vital ele-

ment of the entire relationship.

As such, it could be used

as an instrument with which each country could demonstrate
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its displeasure with the policies of the other.
Saying that there was a lack of negative effects in
the cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt
is not to say that there were no costs in the relationship.
There were.
change.

Both sides expended time and money on the inter-

Both had to compromise their attitude on certain

issues as well.

The change in the Soviet attitude toward

Islam is one example of such a change.
Despite the costs in time and money, and the necessities of changing long-held beliefs, the relationship ultimately did have many more positive effects than it did costs.
Unlike other facets of the relationship between the Soviet
Union and Egypt, the cultural aspect of that relationship is
one where there was a balance of power and benefit.

It was

the one aspect of the relationship in which the Soviets were
able to assert themsleves without hurting their ally unduly.
As a result, it was the one facet of their relationship in
which the Egyptians were least able to flout Soviet desires,
and it was the one aspect of that relationship in which they
seemed the least willing to do so.
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CHAPTER VI
THE LEVER AND THE FULCRUM: CONCLUSIONS
"I always tell my Arab friends and our own Egyptian
people that, even if the Russians are slow, in the end they
give us what we want.

That is the important thing; and it is

what makes them different from the Americans," Nasser told
1

Alexander Shelepin in January of 1969.

This perception on

the part of Nasser - and the reality that it reflected - is
perhaps the most important key to understanding the relationship that developed between the Soviets and the Egyptians,
why it developed, and how it developed during the period in
which Nasser was the head of the Egyptian state.
Throughout the preceding pages of this thesis, it has
been pointed out that, despite the relative disparities in
size, economic might, military power, and diplomatic influence between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Egypt consistently
showed the ability to use Soviet power and influence for its
own ends.

Nasser's statement to Shelepin points out two of

the most important facets of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship:
first, Nasser believed - and clearly he had strong grounds for
his belief - that no matter what he asked the Soviets for, he
would eventually get whatever he requested of them, whether
the Soviets were ready to grant those requests immediately or

252
not. The grounds for his belief were and are obvious.

He

knew that Egypt - and, almost as importantly, he - was the
key to the maintenance of a strong Soviet presence in the
Middle East.

The bases and port facilities that the Soviets

had been provided with in Egypt and Nasser's prestige and influence in the rest of the Arab world were almost indispensable for the Soviets' policies in the Eastern Mediterranean
basin.

It was this fact which he used as the fulcrum upon

which he used the lever of diplomacy - in both its persuasive
and intransigent aspects - to manuever the objectively more
powerful U.S.S.R. into acquiescing to his demands, often
against the best judgment of its leaders.

Second, and almost

as important, Nasser's statement reflected his belief that the
United States could not be manipulated quite so easily for his
own ends.

It would not accede so readily to his desires.

It

was this belief - one learned through the often bitter experiences of both Nasser and his fellow Arab heads of state - that
initially caused Nasser to turn to the Soviet Union, despite
his own original bias toward the West.
The ends which Egypt sought did not necessarily show a
one-to-one correspondence with Soviet goals and aspirations
in the Middle East.

The Egyptians were often capable of get-

ting their own way despite Soviet aims which ran counter to
2
the goals and intentions of Egypt. The Egyptians were capable
of manipulating the Soviets not because of any special
political ability on their part - although Nasser was an ex-
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tremely capable politician, as his humiliation of the British
and the French in 1956 demonstrated - but rather because of
the focus of the joint policies of the two countries.
Egypt nearly always had the upper hand when conflicts
arose between the two erstwhile allies.

This situation

developed because the joint policies of the two countries were
for the most part only those which were related to events and
3

relationships in the Middle East, an area where Egypt was much
more intimately concerned and therefore had more directly applicable political power.

It was also because of the very

fact that the resolutions to the situation which gave rise to
Soviet-Egyptian cooperation were so much more vital to Egypt
and to Nasser's own political power and survival.

For the

Egyptians the resolution of a problem on their own terms was
frequently simply a matter of life or death.

They needed to

have problems in the area settled in their fashion.

Often, it

turned out that this was not a manner which jibed exactly
with Soviet aims.
However, while necessity may be the mother of invention,
in international politics it is frequently insufficient in and
of itself to bring about a solution satisfactory to the
country which feels its weight.

There are ample historical

examples of nations which have needed to have certain
questions resolved in a specific way, but which have failed to
successfully achieve their aspirations and have perished as a
result.

The losers of many European wars and the leaders of
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the nations which fell victim to Western colonial expansion
would certainly attest to that statement if they were still
alive to be questioned.

Fortunately for Egypt, over the

nearly two decades during which Nasser held power, Egypt had
sufficient might in both the Middle East and in its dealings
with the Soviets to at least meet its "program minimum."

It

might not - and often did not - always achieve everything that
it sought or gain all that it asked from the Soviet Union, but
on any question which was vital to Nasser, the Soviet leaders
eventually gave him what he requested.

Nasser went along his

own chosen path, particularly in situations where Soviet
assistance was not requisite and Soviet disapproval was clear,
still confident that their need of him was greater than any
anger which his action might engender.
During the two decades which it spanned, the
Soviet-Egyptian relationship became quite broad.

As we have

seen, it encompassed most of the diverse aspects through
which states can interact with one another: military cooperation, diplomatic support, econmic intercourse, and cultural
exchange.

The military aspect of the relationship was the

first of these to really develop fully.

The Czech Arms Deal

of 1955 opened the door to Egypt for the Soviets, and through
it that to the rest of the Arab Middle East.
By concluding the Czech Arms Deal with Egypt, the Soviet
Union began to establish itself as a power to be reckoned with
in the Mediterranean basin.

While this achievement had
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historical roots which stretch back far into the imperial

4
period of Russian history,

it was not until the post-World

War II period that the Soviet government began to assiduously
5
press its suit towards countries in the area.
The first serious attempt by the Soviet Union to bypass
the West's containment barrier of Greece, Iran, Iraq, and
Turkey and assert its influence in the Middle East came with
its attempts to court the Israelis in 1947.

The creation of

the state of Israel had been viewed with antipathy by the
Soviets during the pre-war period.

They saw it as the

"expression of the exploiting and great power oppressive
strivings of the Jewish bourgeoisie .

(which) has turned

itself into a tool of British imperialism to suppress the
6
national liberation movement of the Arab masses."
Soon
after World War II ended, when it became apparent that the
United Kingdom was not terribly pleased with the Zionists'
aspirations in what was then Palestine, the Soviets began to
perform a complete turnaround on the question of whether an
Israeli state should exist.

In May of 1947, when Andrei A.

Gromyko made a speech at the U.N. supporting the partition of
Palestine if it turned out to be "necessary'', this turnaround
7

began to fully manifest itself.

The Jews in Palestine

greeted the Soviets' new attitude with pleasure.

It seems

unlikely that it was simply coincidence that the change in
the Soviets' attitude came at a time when they were first
becoming aware of their role as an international superpower,
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a superpower which needed to counteract its enemies' efforts
to nullify its potency.

Particularly when i t was also a time

when a new potential ally was becoming visible in the Middle
East.
The Soviet Union had completed its turnaround on the
Israeli question by December of that same year when the Arab
government of Syria suppressed its Communist Party.

By May

1948, the Soviets and the Americans were engaged in a race to
see who would be the first to recognize the newly founded
8
state of Israel.
The friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Israel was
shortlived.

Lasting only one year, i t was, however, in some

ways both a model for the Soviet-Egyptian friendship which
was to come and an indicator of the renewed interests of
Russia in the area.

In both the Israeli and Egyptian cases,

their friendship with the Soviet Union blossomed after a
sharp turnaround in Soviet bloc policy toward the new regimes.
In both cases, the relationship entered its "honeymoon"
period following an arms deal between the leaders of the

9
I1iddle Eastern country and Czechoslovakia.
After the Soviet-Israeli friendship ran aground, the
Soviets needed a new partner if they were to establish a
presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Seven years later,

after the death of Stalin and the Egyptian revolution had
altered the patterns of both Soviet and Egyptian diplomacy,
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the U.S.S.R. and Egypt "found" each other and began what
turned out to be a mutually advantageous relationship that
lasted nearly a score of years.

Unlike its brief Israeli

predecessor, the Soviet friendship with Egypt established a
presence for the Soviet Union in the Middle East which still
has an important impact on the region today.
Despite its superficial similarities with the transient
ties between the Soviet Union and Israel, the Soviet-Egyptian
friendship developed broad and what appeared to be deep
interreliance between the two countries.

The military re-

lationship, which started with a simple if massive arms deal,
grew into a series of connections which ended with Egypt
dependent upon weaponry, training, strategic and tactical
advice, and physical support from the Soviet military if it
was to maintain its aggressive foreign policy stance
10
vis-a-vis Israel.
In its turn, the Soviet Union developed a
more than passing reliance upon the bases and port facilities
which Egypt provided, and to a lesser degree, upon the testing grounds which were provided by the Arab-Israeli wars.
It was the military aspect of the relationship in which
Nasser's almost paradoxical ability to garner his needs from
the Soviets, despite their own reluctance, was most evident.
Perhaps it was because the military situation that Egypt
found itself in was so often so precarious, but in the realm
of military hardware and aid Nasser always eventually got
what he wanted from the Soviets.

The massive resupply of
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Egypt after the Six Day War and the sophisticated technology
with which it was provided in the last stages of the War of
Attrition are convincing proofs of Nasser's nonpareil ability
to overcome Soviet reticence.

Even more persuasive evidence

can be adduced from the unparallelled commitment of Soviet
combat pilots to Egypt's defense just before Nasser died.
The interdependence which grew out of the ties between
the militaries of the Soviet Union and Egypt brought with it
from its inception an increase in the diplomatic contacts
between the two states.

And what started as a simple increase

in the level of diplomatic intercourse between the Egyptians
and the Soviets soon became much more.

With the Suez Canal

Crisis of 1956, Soviet political support became an important
factor in the success of the political machinations of Egypt.
Egyptian support of the U.S.S.R., while a negligible factor
in many of the major international contretemps in which the
Soviets were involved such as those which followed the
crushing of the Hungarian revolt of 1956, the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
was instrumental in allowing the Soviet Union to cement its
presence in the Middle East by aiding the development of
Soviet ties with Syria, Libya, and the PLO.

In a somewhat

different fashion, Soviet-Egyptian friendship was also a
factor in the growth of the connections between the Soviet
Union and Iraq.

Without the prestige of Egypt and that of

Nasser himself, the Soviets might never have been able to
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break the containment barrier of the West.

As a result, it

might never have become a factor in the political calculations in the Middle East.

It almost certainly would not have

become a staunch supporter of Arab nationalism.

The Soviet

friendship with Egypt, along with the similar relationships
which i t developed with India and to some extent with Cuba,
also aided the Soviet position throughout the developing
world by making the Soviets appear to be the friend of the
Third World, something which the leaders of those countries
felt was important if they were to throw off the colonial yoke
11
of the West.
Again, Nasser's extraordinary ability to convince the
Soviets to aid him is readily seen in the realm of diplomacy.
The high level of Soviet diplomatic support for Egypt after
the June war (which rose still further in 1969 when Nasser
committed himself to what the Soviets believed was a
disastrous course of action, i.e. the War of Attrition)
demonstrates the extent to which the Soviets became entangled
in Nasser's webs of diplomacy.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt
continued to blossom beyond its military and diplomatic
aspects.

The connections which had been developed for

military and political reasons were soon used to institute
wide economic interaction between the two states.

Both low

interest loans from the U.S.S.R. to Egypt and bilateral trade
became important factors in the development of the Egyptian
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economy.

The rapid development of the Egyptian economy

increased the prestige of Nasser and Egypt in the Third World
in general and among Arab nations in particular.

This, in

turn, benefitted the Soviet position in world politics for a
plethora of reasons as had Soviet diplomatic support of
Egypt.
The low interest economic loans with which the Soviet
Union had provided Egypt had helped it to modernize rapidly.
They made Egypt, and by extension Nasser's regime, a model of
what was needed to throw off the chains of Western imperialism and to develop a strong independent nation.

The build-

ing of the Aswan Dam was crucial (particularly when combined
with Egypt's success in forcing a positive outcome of the
Suez crisis) in building an image of a strong, able Arab
regime in Egypt which was capable of accomplishing almost
anything.

After all, hadn't it overcome the military

efforts of the West to unseat it and accomplished its most
grandiose economic projects despite the "perfidious" attempts
of the U.S. and Great Britain to stop it?

It was this image

which allowed Nasser to overcome the nascent internecine
hostilities which plague the Arab world and forge the
ill-fated unions with Syria, and with Syria and Iraq.

Other

later loans helped to broaden this strong, newly visible
economic base which had been constructed in Egypt with the
help of Soviet loans for the Aswan High Dam.
If Soviet loans were the basis for the construction of
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a more modern economy in Egypt, its trade with the Soviet
Union was the basis for the exploitation of its new economic
strength.

Bilateral trade with the Soviet Union posed

several problems and provided many benefits for Egypt, many
of which were discussed in Chapter IV.

Bilateral trade pro-

vided only a limited number of commodities available for exchange.

It inhibited overall trade expansion by its very

nature and occasionally resulted in a glut of Egypt's main
money crop, cotton, on the world market when the Soviets resold excess cotton which they had received from Egypt.

This

caused a drop in world prices and the lowering of Egypt's
hard currency income.

In general, however, bilateral trade

was not a drain on either Egypt's currency reserves or those
of the U.S.S.R.

In fact, the opposite was true.

In the same

manner that long term Soviet loans to the Egyptians lowered
the outflow of Egypt's hard currency supply, one of the primary benefits of bilateral trade between the Soviets and the
Egyptians was its currency saving effect.

Trade with the

U.S.S.R. was barter trade which ensured that both Egypt and
the Soviet Union would be able to save their hard earned
currency reserves instead of spending them on trade goods,
something that would have been impossible if similar sorts of
12
commerce had been carried on with the West.
Soviet loans to and its trade with Egypt increased over
the years.

As the economies of the two countries became

more intertwined, the Soviet Union became Egypt's main
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customer and supplier of goods.

The Soviets occasionally

helped Nasser's regime to stave off crises in its grain
supply by buying excess rice or by providing low cost or
even no cost wheat and barley in years of drought and famine.
They went so far as to sell Egypt grain at below market
prices even when there were major grain shortages in their
own nation.
Nasser's ability to manipulate the U.S.S.R. was less
apparent in the economic sphere than it was in either
diplomacy or in military matters.

Perhaps this was so be-

cause it was generally less crucial than the military and
diplomatic aspects of their relationship.

Still, the Soviets

did provide Nasser with grain even when there were shortages
of grain at home and they did cancel large amounts of Egypt's
debt to them when those debts and Egypt's other economic
burdens began to approach crisis proportions.

As in diplo-

macy and military interaction, it appears that Nasser could
convince the Soviets that in economic affairs their most important mission in the Middle East was to maintain and/or
step up their support to him even in situations where it
appeared that their short-term interests lay elsewhere.
With the broadening of trade and aid over the years,
there came increases in the Soviet-Egyptian tourist trade
and in other cultural contacts.

Unlike trade, the cultural

interaction between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was subject to the
political vicissitudes of their relationship.

Because it was
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affected by the vagaries of the political situation between
Egypt and the Soviet Union, the cultural aspect of their
friendship was something of an anomaly.

It was also anoma-

lous in that there were few if any negative aspects which
were manifest in it for either side.

The results of their

cultural interaction in fields like ballet, archaeology,
physics, drama, and film only benefitted each in the long
run.
The anomalies of the cultural relationship between the
two countries stenuned mainly from a single factor: it was the
facet of their relationship which the two countries valued
least.

It was the last element of the friendship to develop

and the one in which the least time and money were spent upon
development.

Because i t had relatively little intrinsic

worth to either Nasser or the Soviet leaders, their cultural
interaction became curiously important in the overall relationship.

It became the one aspect of their relationship

in which the two countries both felt comfortable when they
chastised one another in some relatively concrete form.
Through cultural interaction, the two nations were able to
conununicate with each other in a much more tangible manner
13
than private words between diplomats could achieve.
It was
also less awkward than more or less public attacks in the
presses of the two nations.

As a result, it was usually the

chosen venue of conununication because i t was: a) private; and
b) palpable.
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Because they were a means of communicating displeasure,
changes in the cultural aspect of the Soviet-Egyptian
relationship was the one in which Nasser was unable to
induce the Soviets to accede to his whims when they ran
counter to the Soviets' own goals.

It also seems to have

been the one - and this is not surprising given the lack of
intrinsic value of culture in the friendship - in which he
made the fewest attempts to do so.
When looked at over the course of nearly two decades,
Nasser's ability to control the Soviet-Egyptian relationship
is striking.

Given the relative might of the two states and

Egypt's apparent dependence upon Soviet armaments one almost
certainly would have expected the Soviets to be in command
of the stiuation, not the Egyptian leader.

Most American

politicians and many Western analysts believed that the
Soviets were actually the dominant force in the relationship
14
at that time. However, such was not the case.
The guiding
hand in the relationship was clearly Nasser's despite the
heavy dependence of Egypt's economy, its military, and its
foreign policy upon Soviet largesse.

There are relatively
15
few explanations for the situation which developed.
The

most sensible seems to be that the Soviet Union was willing
to pay heavy costs in terms of time, money, and effort in
order to gain a relatively small advantage in its strategic
manuevers for power on the world stage.

It was even willing

to give up a great deal of control over the way in which its
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money and influence was used if that was what was necessary
to maintain its advantage over the West in Egypt.

Of course,

the Soviets did try to attach as many strings to the aid as
was possible.

Those attempts were, however, ineffective in

the relationship as it had developed.
The Soviet Union's behavior in its relationship with
Egypt may well present a lesson in power in interstate
politics to students of international relations.

It would

seem from the Soviet-Egyptian case that in a tightly bipolar
world such as that which developed after World War II, influence in small states around the world is at a premium.

In

such a situation, Great Powers often may be willing to give
a great deal more money, time, effort, and influence than
would otherwise be deemed reasonable in order to gain their
requirements.

Certainly, American behavior toward dictators

like Diem and Thieu in Vietnam, Batista in Cuba, and even the
Shah in Iran would seem to confirm that something of the sort
may well be true, especially in cases where there is
significant competition between the two superpowers for influence.

In such instances, manuevering for power through

aid packages reaches the point of diminishing returns.

This

is because in situations of that sort the small state can
successfully play the more powerful nations off on one
another, particularly if it is led by an extremely capable
politician such as Nasser.
In Egypt's case, its ability to manipulate the Soviet
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Union and follow an independent path in both its foreign and
domestic affairs was certainly enhanced by the political
situation in the Middle East.

The region had been polarized

by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Nasser's hardline stance on

the Palestinian question in its broadest formulation and his
determination to avenge Egypt's defeats at the hands of the
Israelis helped to bring hostilities to pass even in
situations where he did not wish to initiate them.

The re-

sulting hostilities brought about crises in Egypt's political
life and necessitated further bolstering of Nasser's regime
by the Soviet Union because of the perception of its leaders
that he was the key to their presence in the Arab world.
The need to bolster Nasser was heightened further by the need
to offset American and French military sales to Israel.
These factors combined with the specter of the return of
American influence in Egypt to form a vicious escalating
cycle which produced rising levels of arms expenditures and
economic support, and ever lessening prospects of political
control of Nasser and his policies for the U.S.S.R. and its
leaders.
The Soviet willingness to go to great lengths to aid
Nasser seems to have been a consciously, albeit reluctantly,
accepted commitment.

Despite the high costs of their

chosen course of action, Soviet leaders seemed to respect
Nasser's political acumen.

According to Mohammed Heikal,

"The Soviets' relations with President Nasser had been very
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close: they had had their difficult times together, but there
16
had never been any secrets between them." Certainly
Khrushchev, and later both Brezhnev and Kosygin followed
suit, developed a close personal relationship with Egypt's
leader.
The relationship between Nasser and the Soviets was
close, but as we have seen, it was not always the most
cordial of relationships.
gathered and broke.

Storms of political controversy

The conflict over Nasser's suppression

of the ECP which erupted between the two allies in November
1958 and lasted until early 1960 is but one example of the
great variation that existed in the levels of friendship
between the two countries.
The outbreaks of discord, as well as the more common
high level of cooperation and cordiality, are important
elements in the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt.
No understanding of the growth of Soviet-Egyptian friendship,
its role in Middle Eastern and world politics, its effects
on each nation involved, and its internal dynamics can be
considered complete without taking into account - and explaining the existence of - the conflicts which arose
between the two allies.
In one sense explaining the existence of the discord
between the Soviet Union and Egypt is easy.

Conflict be-

tween the two participants is natural in any alliance in
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which neither actor is completely dominant.

Over the course

of decades countless policy decisions are made by both sides.
During such an extended period at least a few issues are
bound to arise on which the interests of the two nations
diverge.

This, however, explains very little about their

relationship.

It is necessary therefore to understand the

genesis of the periods of discord.
In the Soviet-Egyptian instance, conflict nearly always
arose when the Soviets tried to exert some influence over
Egyptian policies of which they disapproved.
were never successful.

Their efforts

The Egyptians, always in control of

their situation with regard to the Soviets, continued on
their chosen path.

The reason that the Egyptians were able

to flout Soviet wishes was simple: the arena in which the
two were involved was Egypt's home territory.

As a result,

the U.S.S.R. had no effective means of coercing Egypt into
17
complying with its wishes.
The reasons behind the consistent pattern of resolution to the outbreaks of disharmony between the Soviet Union
and Egypt confirm the insights into the relationship between
the two states which are presented by Nasser's equally consistent wish to gain what he felt were his needs from the
Soviets.
fitted.

The alliance was one from which both sides beneThe Egyptians received a large influx of military

hardware, as well as training, advice, and limited physical
support.

They also obtained high levels of economic aid,
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a good trading partner, international diplomatic assistance
and cultural broadening.

They gained the aid of one of the

two most powerful nations in the world with only minimal
outlays of money and effort and the acceptance on their part
of only a few political and economic limitations.
The costs to the Egyptians from their ties with the
U.S.S.R. were low in economic terms because what they offered
the Soviet Union was intangible.

Merely allowing the Soviet

Union to establish a presence in the Middle East was Egypt's
payment for all of the concrete aid which it received from
the Soviet Union.

Connections with the Soviet Union presented

Moscow with an alliance with the most populous, politically
and culturally important, and militarily powerful nation in
the Arab world.

Even more, Egypt was an advantageously

located nation which was anxious to develop, and develop upon
progressive, quasi-socialist lines.

Beyond the intrinsic

value of ties with such a nation, cooperation with, and aid
to, Egypt offered the Soviet Union a golden opportunity to
escape the "containment barrier" of the West which surrounded
it and to extend its international involvement and power over
a much broader portion of the world than had theretofore been
possible.

It allowed Moscow to become intimately and

legitimately involved in all sorts of questions - in both the
U.N. and other less public forums, such as diplomatic
tete-a-tetes with the U.S. - throughout the world in ways that
might well have still seemed laughable in other world capitals
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in the years immediately following World War II.

Given the

tremendous advantages which were offered by an alliance with
Egypt, it seems to present little wonder that the Soviets
allowed Nasser to have the guiding hand in their relationship
in order to avoid its loss.
Looked at in this light and in the lights which it shed
by the circumstances from which it arose, the development of
a close-knit alliance between two such sociopolitically disparate nations as Egypt and the Soviet Union becomes understandable.

In fact, given the hostility which the West

exhibited toward Egyptian aspirations - in seemingly legitimate instances like N.E.A.C.C.'s refusal to rearm the
Egyptians with newer, better, and more numerous weaponry
after their war with Israel in 1948-49, in more questionable
situations such as the renege on the Aswan loans, and in
cases of naked aggression such as the Suez Canal Crisis it seems that it was the almost inevitable outcome of the
political circumstances of the world and the Middle East in
the 1950's and 1960's.
Why the relationship developed in the manner in which
it did is also easy to comprehend.

Given the needs and

strengths of both countries, they were ideally mated.

Given

their arena of action, it is little surprise that Egypt, led
by a man as politically astute as Nasser proved himself to
be, was dominant in the overwhelming majority of the
decisions which involved the two countries.
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The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt was
one of inunense value for both participants.

It shaped the

development of Egypt domestically and internally and the
development of the Soviet Union in world affairs.

By alter-

ing the political futures of these two nations (one the most
Arab nation in the world and one of the two most important
nations in the Middle East, the other one of the world's two
dominant superpowers) the Soviet-Egyptian relationship helped
to shape directly the politics and history of the world and
its Middle Eastern region for nearly two decades.
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Notes (Chapter VI)
1)

Mohanuned Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 67. Nasser was
expressing gratitude to the Soviets on the occasion of
the deliveries of the first SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles
to Egypt.

2)

Again the Egyptian entry into the War of Attrition and
its suppression of the Communist party at various times
are perfect examples.

3)

By the end of the Nasser period, Soviet-Egyptian cooperation had broadened from its narrow regional focus and
begun to operate on extraregional issues. Egypt's
recognition of the German Democratic Republic and its
support of North Vietnam in its war with the United
States are cases in point. For other examples of the
sorts of issues that Egypt and the Soviet Union cooperated upon outside of the Middle East, see Alvin
Rubinstein's appendices in Red Star on the Nile.

4)

For a fairly good synopsis of Russia's historical attempts to penetrate into the Middle East, see Aaron
Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins, 1970), pp. 27-37.

5)

For example, in what almost seems to have been a flight
of whimsy, Stalin requested a Soviet trusteeship over
Libya at the Potsdam Conference. U.S. Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference of Berlin, Vol. II (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1960), pp. 253-255 and 264-266. Also
see Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam
Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960),
pp . 3 0 7- 3 0 8 .

6)

Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and
the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1974), p. 7.

7)

Ibid, p. 22. Also see Mary Newcomb Allen, The Policy
of U.S.S.R. towards the State of Israel, 1948-1958
(London: n.p. [dissertation], 1961) for a good chronological account of early relations between the Soviets
and Israel.

8)

The question of who won the race is still a point of
mild contention. Succinctly put, the U.S. was the first
state to extend de facto recognition to the Israelis it did so within fifteen minutes of the Israeli declaration of independence - and the U.S.S.R. was the first to
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extend the new Israeli regime de jure recognition.
See
Krammer, ibid, pp. 28-30 and Philip M. Brown, "The
Recognition of Israel," The American Journal of International Law, XLII (July, 1948), pp. 621-623.

9)

In the Israeli case, the arms deal with Czechoslovakia
had come through still another party (Nicaraguan leader
Anastasio Somoza) before Israel had even become a state.
Krammer, ibid, p. 59.

10)

For a summary of the costs of the military relationship
to both the Soviets and Egypt, see Chapter II.

11)

The Soviet concern for the nations of the Third World,
like that of most states for one another, was motivated
more by self-interest than by altruism.
The Soviets
clearly believed that by supporting anti-colonialist
nationalist movements of the world's developing nations
they were weakening the West.
That had been a clear
theme of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East and
the rest of the world since at least 1956. For a look
at its current role in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, see
Michael Lenker, "The Effect of the Iran-Iraq War on
Soviet Strategy in the Persian Gulf" in Gulf Security
and the Iran-Iraq War edited by Thomas Naff (Washington:
National Defense University Press, 1985). Whether this
goal was being pursued for traditional Great Power
motives or for ideological reasons such as weakening the
foundation of world capitalism, thus hastening its
collapse and the subsequent reorganization of the world
along the lines that Marx envisioned, is unimportant from
the point of view of this work. What is important is its
effect: it helped speed the development of the U.S.S.R.
as a world superpower.

12)

For a discussion of the effects of bilateral trade on
Third World nations, see Carole Sawyer, Communist Trade
with Developing Countries, 1955-1965 (New York: Preger,
19 6 6) ' pp . 5 7- 6 3 .

13)

Egypt's withdrawal of its students from study in the
universities of the Soviet Union is an example of how
cultural interchange was used as an avenue of communication.
In turn, the Soviets used decreases in tourism
levels and in cultural contacts to let the Egyptians
know that they were pursuing a policy of which the
Soviets disapproved.

14)

Dulles is certainly one example of an American politician
who feared that the "red menace" was about to become entrenched in Egypt. His memoirs are filled with foreboding about the prospect. Scholarly work in the West
from the fifties, sixties, and seventies is no less
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inaccurate in its perception of the nature of the
Soviet-Egyptian relationship. See for example, Michel
Salomon, Mediterranee Rouge: un nouvelle empire
Sovietique? (Paris: Laffont, 1972); Lawrence L. Whetten,
The Soviet Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (New
York: National Strategy Information Center, Paper #10,
1971); and Jaan Pennar, "Moscow and Socialism in Egypt,"
Problems of Communism, Volume XV, #5 (May 1966).
15)

For instance, Soviet leaders might have been extremely
selfless individuals who were willing to give Egypt
nearly unlimited amounts of aid out of sheer altruism.
They might have been naive blunderers of whom advantage
was easily taken. Nasser might have been a political
genius who could easily manipulate the leadership of the
U.S.S.R.
It might have been a fluke brought about by a
chance confluence of random events. There is probably a
modicum of truth in each of these explanations.
It seems
likely, however, that the overwhelmingly dominant factor
in causing the situation to develop as it did was that
the Soviet position was based upon a conscious decision
which had been reached from their calculations of the
long-term benefits of solid entrenchment in the Middle
East.

16)

Heikal, op cit, p. 113. Khrushchev confirms both the
respect and the personal closeness in his memoirs. See
Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 435-438.

17)

The key word is effective. Although the Soviets did
have the availability of the threat of an aid cut as a
weapon, the Egyptians had several effective counters to
such a suggestion, i.e., ejection of Soviet forces from
their bases or a turn toward the U.S.
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Figura # 1. The official trade of the Soviet Union with Eqypt, 19171971 (millions of rubles).
Imports
Year
30.2
1913
o.o
1918
o.o
1919
7.12
1923/24
21.6
1924/25
10.2
1925/26
20.5
1926/27
33.l
1927/28
1928(0ct.- Dec.)
6. 2
1929
31.5
1930
31.6
1931
12.8
21.5
1932
1933
14.1
1934
10.8
1935
15.9
1936
11.2
1937
9.36
9.05
1938
1939
1.10
1940
0.675
1946
1.5
1947
3.3
1948
41.6
1949
3.5
1950
19.3
1951
21.8
1952
26.9
11.3
1953
1954
7.6
9.9
1955
1956
34.6
74.0
1957
1958
78.9
1959
79.2
62.8
1960
97.8
1961
93.0
1962
121. 7
1963
140.1
1964
187.8
1965
178.8
1966
253.2
1967
178.2
1968
214.4
1969
326.9
1970
343.2
1971

Exports
20.7

Deficit
-9.5

0.551
80.0
92.6
72.5
113.6
35.l
76.7
64.2
69.0
3.30

-6.649
58.4
82.4
52.0
80.5
28.9
45.2
32.6
56.2
-18.2
-14.l
-10.0
-15.89
-11.2
-9.36
-8.859
-1.009
-0.675
-1.5
-3.3
6.6
32.4
5.4
-15.7
0.7
-0.5
0.4
3.9
10.7
25.8
17.5
4.2
46.4
-11.2
-27.3
-10.5
-28.9
-40.7
-43.8
-122.6
-24.6
-9.1
-47.4
-42.5

o.o
o.o

o.o
o.o
0.01
o.o
o.o

0.211
0.001

o.o
o.o
o.o

47.9
35.9
24.7
6.1
27.6
10.8
8.0
13.8
45.3
99.8
96.4
83.4
109.2
86.6
65.7
111.2
111. 2
147.1
135.0
130.6
153.6
205.3
279.5
300.7

o.o
o.o

Sources: Roger A. Clark, Soviet Economic Facts, 1917-1970; and,
Vneshniaia Torgovliia (various years).
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Figure # 2. Egyptian Armaments as of June 1967.
2410 Tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers, and Assault guns:
Soviet supplied:
Also:
350 T-34 medium tanks
30 Mark 3 Centurion medium tanks
20 AMX 13 light tanks
500 T-54/55 medium tanks
60 IS-III heavy tanks
90 Sherman medium tanks
150 su-100 self-propelled guns
1160 BTR-40, BTR-152, and BTR 50(P) Armored Personnel Carriers
1,600 artillery

piec~s

540 field guns
130 medium guns
200 120mm mortars
695 anti-tank guns
a few Snapper (Shmel) anti-tank missile units
some Katyusha-type tactical rocket launchers
a few other tactical surface-to-surf ace rockets
500 combat aircraft
30 TU-16 medium bombers
40-43 IL-28 light bombers
120-163 MiG-21 C/D interceptors
40-80 MiG-19 all-weather fighters or fighter-bombers
15-55 SU-7 fighter-bombers
100-150 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers
also:
150 SAM-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile installations
Major naval combat vessels
4 "Skoryi" destroyers
8 "S.O. 1 11 Subchaser/corvettes
8 "OSA" Guided-missile patrol boats
7 "Komar" Guided-missile patrol boats
1 "Shershem" Motor torpedo boats
2 11 T301 11 Inshore minesweepers
also:
6 Yugoslav-made motor torpedo boats

5 "Romeo" submarines
6 "W" submarines
1 "MV" submarine
36 "P6" Motor torpedo boats
6 "T43" Fleet minesweepers
4 British-made destroyers

Sources: Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs; Wynfred Joshua and
Stephen Gilbert, Arms for the Third World; the Military Balance,
1967-1968; and, Edgar O'Ballance The Third Arab-Israeli War.
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Figure # 3 soviet-Western Detente and qualitative changes in
Russian military involvement in Eqypt and the Middle East, 1953-1974.
Periods of Detente

Year

Qualitative changes

1953
1954
Spirit of Geneva

1955
1956

Czech Arms Deal. Provides
second-line Soviet equipment and small strategic
bombing capability.

1957
1958
1959
Spirit of Camp David

1960
1961
1962

Post Cuban Missile Crisis/
Test Ban

1963
1964

Provision of first-line
Soviet military equipment
and enlarged strategic
bombing capability

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Commitment of Soviet airdefense personnel

1971
Post-XXIV Party Congress

1972
1973
1974

Provision of assured penetration strategic weapons
and resupply during war

Source: Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, p.180.
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Fiqure # 4. Equipment and materials supplied for works being
built in Egypt through Soviet assistance, 1955-1972 (millions of
U.S. dollars).
Year

1955

1960

1965

1970

1972

Total expendtures going
to Egypt

10.8

68.9

206.4

363.0

287.4

Total machinery

0.04

23.2

136.2

165.3

139.4

Category 16 (project aid)

neg.

17.4

86.0

78.5

*

* Project aid ceased to appear as one of the elements of
Soviet-Egyptian trade in Vneshniaia Torgovliia after 1970.
Sources: Vneshniaia Torgovliia SSSR: and Karen Dawisha, Soviet
Foreign Policy Towards Egypt.

Fiqure # 5. Egyptian Trade, 1955-1970 (Millions of U.S. Dollars).
Exports

Imports
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

World

USSR

CPE

World

USSR

6.63
539
419 20.15
*
409 16.60
535 22.64
*
493 99.77
547 53.38
*
478 82.05
667 79.38
*
639 85.72
461 81.51
*
568 88.63
667 76.90
*
486 60.73
701 80.88
*
398 60.73
740 60.42
*
520 101.80
916 49.08
*
537 96.37
953 74.08
*
604 30.38
934 84.16
*
604 42.55
1070 94.77
*
792.00 165.19 323.91 566.12 41.07
665.96 106.23 260.72 621.68 74.69
637.64 86.48 195.69 745.05 246.17
786.60 95.56 242.54 761.71 281.61

Total Trade
CPE

World

957
944
1040
1145
1099
1235
1187
1138
1436
1490
1538
1674
1358.12
297.81 1286.64
392.88 1382.68
448.76 1548.31

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
276.42

USSR
26.78
39.24
142.16
161. 44
158.41
165.53
153.79
121.15
150.89
170.45
214.52
237.73
306.26
280.92
332.65
377.17

Source: U.N. Statistical Trade Yearbook (applicable years)

CPE

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
700.32
558.53
588.58
691.20
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Figure # 6.

Soviet Trade, 1955-1970 (millions of U.S. dollars).

Imports
1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

430

*

*

610

710

1168

1050

1270

1270

Centrally Planned 2289
Economies

*

*

3200

3780

3817

3850

4310

4720

Developing Market
Economies

*

*

325

425

638

710

710

730

26

90

92

83

121

87

66

111

3264

3639

4140

4930

5623

5610

6290

6840

Developed Market
Economies

Egypt
World

*

185
15
3061

Figures not kept for 1956 & 1957

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1972

1750

1919

1720

1870

2190

2540

3070

4472

Centrally Planned 4890
Economies

5074

4860

5350

5880

6290

6862

9699

Developed Market
Economies

Developing Market
Economies

850

638

1060

1060

1060

1220

1788

1857

Egypt

111

163

135

131

154

229

311

299

World

7590

8057

7640

9280

9110

10050

11719

13753
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Fiqure # 6 (continued).
Exports
1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

553

*

*

760

940

1069

1130

1220

1360

Centrally Planned 2723
Economies

*

*

3090

4080

4000

4470

4600

4900

Developing Market
Economies

91

*

*

450

425

970

1350

1300

1320

Egypt

11

23

53

79

79

70

98

93

122

World

3468

3610

4390

4300

5440

5559

6000

7030

7270

Developed Market
Economies

*

Figures not kept for 1956 & 1957

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1460

1639

2000

2230

2420

2580

2717

3080

Centrally Planned 4900
Economies

5031

5180

5530

6220

6810

7389

8023

Developing Market 1320
Economies

1496

1660

1880

2000

2260

2682

2002

Egypt

140

209

188

179

253

239

363

321

World

7680

8166

8840

9650

10630

11660

Developed Market
Economies

12787 15631

Sources: Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt; U.N.
Statistical Trade Yearbook (various years)

282

Figure# 7.
Year

Egyptian Book and Film imports (Tons).
Films (USSR)

Books (USSR)

Books (US & UK)

Films (US !.

1956

4

640

244

16120

1959

5

2031

151

9076

1962

11

1061

127

8502

1966

n.a.

n.a.

166

18000

UK)

sources: Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreiqn Policy Towards Eqypt; and,
R.D McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Foreiqn Policy.

Fiqure # 8. Eqyptian Students abroad (1959-1972).
Year

USSR

UK

us

1959

138

725

577

1440

92941

1961

240

923

344

1507

107789

1963

240

1217

452

1909

145651

1965

240

1059

426

1733

177123

1966

203

993

328

1524

179100

1969

450

1015

178

1643

197055

1972

1351

1148

362

2801

272259

Total (USSR, UK, !_ US)

At Home
-

Sources: Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreiqn Policy Towards Egypt; R.D.
McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Policy; and, Charles B.
McLane, Soviet-Middle Eastern Relations.
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F iql.".re # 9 • Major cultural missions exchanged between the USSR
and Egypt, 1952-1970 (number per year).
Year
Soviet to

E~

Egyptian to the USSR

Total

1952

0

0

0

1953

0

0

0

1954

0

0

0

1955

2

1

3

1956

1

2

3

1957

3

2

5

1958

1

8

9

1959

1

2

3

1960

1

0

1

1961

2

0

2

1962

1

2

3

1963

5

2

7

1964

2

0

2

1965

0

0

0

1966

3

0

3

1967

2

3

5

1968

3

5

8

1969

4

13

17

1970

12

9

21

Sources: Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Middle Eastern Relations;
Robert Slusser & Jan Triska, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957;
Robert Slusser & George Ginsburgs, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties,
1957-1973; Alvin z. Rubinstein, Red star on the Nile; and Sbornik
deistvuiushchikh dogorov, soglashenii i konventsii,
zakliuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami (various years).
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Fiqure # 10. soviet Tourists in Eqypt, 1955-1970.*
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

# of Soviet tourists

crossin~

Eqyptian borders

*
744
1074
2678
1798
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
9034
12838

*

* Fiqures for Soviet tourists entering Eqypt are only
infrequently available.
Usually Soviets entering Eqypt are
classified as visitors from "other countries" by the Egyptian
government.
Although they are sketchy the fiqures which are
available do seem to show the expected overall rising trend and
they also seem to be reflective of changes in the level of
cordiality in the relationship between the u.s.s.R. and Egypt
(e.g., The decrease in svoiet tourism in 1959 would be the
expected result of the increased hostility which followed
Nasser's suppression of the ECP in late 1958 and 1959.
The
rising rate of tourism in 1968 and 1969 would seem to be
indicative of the high level of cooperation which followed the
June 1967 between Israel and the Arab nations).
Sources: United Arab Republic State Tourist Administration,
Trends of the Travel Movement (Cairo: U.A.R. Tourist
Administration, 1960); and International Travel Statistics
(London: International Union of Official Travel Organizations,
1953-1971).
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